| 1 | /* |
| 2 | * librdkafka - The Apache Kafka C/C++ library |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Copyright (c) 2017 Magnus Edenhill |
| 5 | * All rights reserved. |
| 6 | * |
| 7 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 8 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: |
| 9 | * |
| 10 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, |
| 11 | * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 12 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, |
| 13 | * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation |
| 14 | * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 15 | * |
| 16 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" |
| 17 | * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 18 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 19 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE |
| 20 | * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR |
| 21 | * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF |
| 22 | * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS |
| 23 | * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN |
| 24 | * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| 25 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE |
| 26 | * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 27 | */ |
| 28 | |
| 29 | |
| 30 | /** |
| 31 | * Builtin SASL SCRAM support when Cyrus SASL is not available |
| 32 | */ |
| 33 | #include "rdkafka_int.h" |
| 34 | #include "rdkafka_transport.h" |
| 35 | #include "rdkafka_transport_int.h" |
| 36 | #include "rdkafka_sasl.h" |
| 37 | #include "rdkafka_sasl_int.h" |
| 38 | #include "rdrand.h" |
| 39 | |
| 40 | #if WITH_SSL |
| 41 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| 42 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 43 | #include <openssl/sha.h> |
| 44 | #else |
| 45 | #error "WITH_SSL (OpenSSL) is required for SASL SCRAM" |
| 46 | #endif |
| 47 | |
| 48 | |
| 49 | /** |
| 50 | * @brief Per-connection state |
| 51 | */ |
| 52 | struct rd_kafka_sasl_scram_state { |
| 53 | enum { |
| 54 | RD_KAFKA_SASL_SCRAM_STATE_CLIENT_FIRST_MESSAGE, |
| 55 | RD_KAFKA_SASL_SCRAM_STATE_SERVER_FIRST_MESSAGE, |
| 56 | RD_KAFKA_SASL_SCRAM_STATE_CLIENT_FINAL_MESSAGE, |
| 57 | } state; |
| 58 | rd_chariov_t cnonce; /* client c-nonce */ |
| 59 | rd_chariov_t first_msg_bare; /* client-first-message-bare */ |
| 60 | char *ServerSignatureB64; /* ServerSignature in Base64 */ |
| 61 | const EVP_MD *evp; /* Hash function pointer */ |
| 62 | }; |
| 63 | |
| 64 | |
| 65 | /** |
| 66 | * @brief Close and free authentication state |
| 67 | */ |
| 68 | static void rd_kafka_sasl_scram_close (rd_kafka_transport_t *rktrans) { |
| 69 | struct rd_kafka_sasl_scram_state *state = rktrans->rktrans_sasl.state; |
| 70 | |
| 71 | if (!state) |
| 72 | return; |
| 73 | |
| 74 | RD_IF_FREE(state->cnonce.ptr, rd_free); |
| 75 | RD_IF_FREE(state->first_msg_bare.ptr, rd_free); |
| 76 | RD_IF_FREE(state->ServerSignatureB64, rd_free); |
| 77 | rd_free(state); |
| 78 | } |
| 79 | |
| 80 | |
| 81 | |
| 82 | /** |
| 83 | * @brief Generates a nonce string (a random printable string) |
| 84 | * @remark dst->ptr will be allocated and must be freed. |
| 85 | */ |
| 86 | static void rd_kafka_sasl_scram_generate_nonce (rd_chariov_t *dst) { |
| 87 | int i; |
| 88 | dst->size = 32; |
| 89 | dst->ptr = rd_malloc(dst->size+1); |
| 90 | for (i = 0 ; i < (int)dst->size ; i++) |
| 91 | dst->ptr[i] = 'a'; // (char)rd_jitter(0x2d/*-*/, 0x7e/*~*/); |
| 92 | dst->ptr[i] = 0; |
| 93 | } |
| 94 | |
| 95 | |
| 96 | /** |
| 97 | * @brief Parses inbuf for SCRAM attribute \p attr (e.g., 's') |
| 98 | * @returns a newly allocated copy of the value, or NULL |
| 99 | * on failure in which case an error is written to \p errstr |
| 100 | * prefixed by \p description. |
| 101 | */ |
| 102 | static char *rd_kafka_sasl_scram_get_attr (const rd_chariov_t *inbuf, char attr, |
| 103 | const char *description, |
| 104 | char *errstr, size_t errstr_size) { |
| 105 | size_t of = 0; |
| 106 | |
| 107 | for (of = 0 ; of < inbuf->size ; ) { |
| 108 | const char *td; |
| 109 | size_t len; |
| 110 | |
| 111 | /* Find next delimiter , (if any) */ |
| 112 | td = memchr(&inbuf->ptr[of], ',', inbuf->size - of); |
| 113 | if (td) |
| 114 | len = (size_t)(td - &inbuf->ptr[of]); |
| 115 | else |
| 116 | len = inbuf->size - of; |
| 117 | |
| 118 | /* Check if attr "x=" matches */ |
| 119 | if (inbuf->ptr[of] == attr && inbuf->size > of+1 && |
| 120 | inbuf->ptr[of+1] == '=') { |
| 121 | char *ret; |
| 122 | of += 2; /* past = */ |
| 123 | ret = rd_malloc(len - 2 + 1); |
| 124 | memcpy(ret, &inbuf->ptr[of], len - 2); |
| 125 | ret[len-2] = '\0'; |
| 126 | return ret; |
| 127 | } |
| 128 | |
| 129 | /* Not the attr we are looking for, skip |
| 130 | * past the next delimiter and continue looking. */ |
| 131 | of += len+1; |
| 132 | } |
| 133 | |
| 134 | rd_snprintf(errstr, errstr_size, |
| 135 | "%s: could not find attribute (%c)" , |
| 136 | description, attr); |
| 137 | return NULL; |
| 138 | } |
| 139 | |
| 140 | |
| 141 | /** |
| 142 | * @brief Base64 encode binary input \p in |
| 143 | * @returns a newly allocated, base64-encoded string or NULL on error. |
| 144 | */ |
| 145 | static char *rd_base64_encode (const rd_chariov_t *in) { |
| 146 | char *ret; |
| 147 | size_t ret_len, max_len; |
| 148 | |
| 149 | /* OpenSSL takes an |int| argument so the input cannot exceed that. */ |
| 150 | if (in->size > INT_MAX) { |
| 151 | return NULL; |
| 152 | } |
| 153 | |
| 154 | /* This does not overflow given the |INT_MAX| bound, above. */ |
| 155 | max_len = (((in->size + 2) / 3) * 4) + 1; |
| 156 | ret = rd_malloc(max_len); |
| 157 | if (ret == NULL) { |
| 158 | return NULL; |
| 159 | } |
| 160 | |
| 161 | ret_len = EVP_EncodeBlock((uint8_t*)ret, (uint8_t*)in->ptr, (int)in->size); |
| 162 | assert(ret_len < max_len); |
| 163 | ret[ret_len] = 0; |
| 164 | |
| 165 | return ret; |
| 166 | } |
| 167 | |
| 168 | |
| 169 | /** |
| 170 | * @brief Base64 decode input string \p in. Ignores leading and trailing |
| 171 | * whitespace. |
| 172 | * @returns -1 on invalid Base64, or 0 on successes in which case a |
| 173 | * newly allocated binary string is set in out (and size). |
| 174 | */ |
| 175 | static int rd_base64_decode (const rd_chariov_t *in, rd_chariov_t *out) { |
| 176 | size_t ret_len; |
| 177 | |
| 178 | /* OpenSSL takes an |int| argument, so |in->size| must not exceed |
| 179 | * that. */ |
| 180 | if (in->size % 4 != 0 || in->size > INT_MAX) { |
| 181 | return -1; |
| 182 | } |
| 183 | |
| 184 | ret_len = ((in->size / 4) * 3); |
| 185 | out->ptr = rd_malloc(ret_len+1); |
| 186 | |
| 187 | if (EVP_DecodeBlock((uint8_t*)out->ptr, (uint8_t*)in->ptr, |
| 188 | (int)in->size) == -1) { |
| 189 | free(out->ptr); |
| 190 | out->ptr = NULL; |
| 191 | return -1; |
| 192 | } |
| 193 | |
| 194 | /* EVP_DecodeBlock will pad the output with trailing NULs and count |
| 195 | * them in the return value. */ |
| 196 | if (in->size > 1 && in->ptr[in->size-1] == '=') { |
| 197 | if (in->size > 2 && in->ptr[in->size-2] == '=') { |
| 198 | ret_len -= 2; |
| 199 | } else { |
| 200 | ret_len -= 1; |
| 201 | } |
| 202 | } |
| 203 | |
| 204 | out->ptr[ret_len] = 0; |
| 205 | out->size = ret_len; |
| 206 | |
| 207 | return 0; |
| 208 | } |
| 209 | |
| 210 | |
| 211 | /** |
| 212 | * @brief Perform H(str) hash function and stores the result in \p out |
| 213 | * which must be at least EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. |
| 214 | * @returns 0 on success, else -1 |
| 215 | */ |
| 216 | static int |
| 217 | rd_kafka_sasl_scram_H (rd_kafka_transport_t *rktrans, |
| 218 | const rd_chariov_t *str, |
| 219 | rd_chariov_t *out) { |
| 220 | |
| 221 | rktrans->rktrans_rkb->rkb_rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_H( |
| 222 | (const unsigned char *)str->ptr, str->size, |
| 223 | (unsigned char *)out->ptr); |
| 224 | |
| 225 | out->size = rktrans->rktrans_rkb->rkb_rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_H_size; |
| 226 | return 0; |
| 227 | } |
| 228 | |
| 229 | /** |
| 230 | * @brief Perform HMAC(key,str) and stores the result in \p out |
| 231 | * which must be at least EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. |
| 232 | * @returns 0 on success, else -1 |
| 233 | */ |
| 234 | static int |
| 235 | rd_kafka_sasl_scram_HMAC (rd_kafka_transport_t *rktrans, |
| 236 | const rd_chariov_t *key, |
| 237 | const rd_chariov_t *str, |
| 238 | rd_chariov_t *out) { |
| 239 | const EVP_MD *evp = |
| 240 | rktrans->rktrans_rkb->rkb_rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_evp; |
| 241 | unsigned int outsize; |
| 242 | |
| 243 | //printf("HMAC KEY: %s\n", rd_base64_encode(key)); |
| 244 | //printf("HMAC STR: %s\n", rd_base64_encode(str)); |
| 245 | |
| 246 | if (!HMAC(evp, |
| 247 | (const unsigned char *)key->ptr, (int)key->size, |
| 248 | (const unsigned char *)str->ptr, (int)str->size, |
| 249 | (unsigned char *)out->ptr, &outsize)) { |
| 250 | rd_rkb_dbg(rktrans->rktrans_rkb, SECURITY, "SCRAM" , |
| 251 | "HMAC failed" ); |
| 252 | return -1; |
| 253 | } |
| 254 | |
| 255 | out->size = outsize; |
| 256 | //printf("HMAC OUT: %s\n", rd_base64_encode(out)); |
| 257 | |
| 258 | return 0; |
| 259 | } |
| 260 | |
| 261 | |
| 262 | |
| 263 | /** |
| 264 | * @brief Perform \p itcnt iterations of HMAC() on the given buffer \p in |
| 265 | * using \p salt, writing the output into \p out which must be |
| 266 | * at least EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. Actual size is updated in \p *outsize. |
| 267 | * @returns 0 on success, else -1 |
| 268 | */ |
| 269 | static int |
| 270 | rd_kafka_sasl_scram_Hi (rd_kafka_transport_t *rktrans, |
| 271 | const rd_chariov_t *in, |
| 272 | const rd_chariov_t *salt, |
| 273 | int itcnt, rd_chariov_t *out) { |
| 274 | const EVP_MD *evp = |
| 275 | rktrans->rktrans_rkb->rkb_rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_evp; |
| 276 | unsigned int ressize = 0; |
| 277 | unsigned char tempres[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 278 | unsigned char *saltplus; |
| 279 | int i; |
| 280 | |
| 281 | /* U1 := HMAC(str, salt + INT(1)) */ |
| 282 | saltplus = rd_alloca(salt->size + 4); |
| 283 | memcpy(saltplus, salt->ptr, salt->size); |
| 284 | saltplus[salt->size] = 0; |
| 285 | saltplus[salt->size+1] = 0; |
| 286 | saltplus[salt->size+2] = 0; |
| 287 | saltplus[salt->size+3] = 1; |
| 288 | |
| 289 | /* U1 := HMAC(str, salt + INT(1)) */ |
| 290 | if (!HMAC(evp, |
| 291 | (const unsigned char *)in->ptr, (int)in->size, |
| 292 | saltplus, salt->size+4, |
| 293 | tempres, &ressize)) { |
| 294 | rd_rkb_dbg(rktrans->rktrans_rkb, SECURITY, "SCRAM" , |
| 295 | "HMAC priming failed" ); |
| 296 | return -1; |
| 297 | } |
| 298 | |
| 299 | memcpy(out->ptr, tempres, ressize); |
| 300 | |
| 301 | /* Ui-1 := HMAC(str, Ui-2) .. */ |
| 302 | for (i = 1 ; i < itcnt ; i++) { |
| 303 | unsigned char tempdest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 304 | int j; |
| 305 | |
| 306 | if (unlikely(!HMAC(evp, |
| 307 | (const unsigned char *)in->ptr, (int)in->size, |
| 308 | tempres, ressize, |
| 309 | tempdest, NULL))) { |
| 310 | rd_rkb_dbg(rktrans->rktrans_rkb, SECURITY, "SCRAM" , |
| 311 | "Hi() HMAC #%d/%d failed" , i, itcnt); |
| 312 | return -1; |
| 313 | } |
| 314 | |
| 315 | /* U1 XOR U2 .. */ |
| 316 | for (j = 0 ; j < (int)ressize ; j++) { |
| 317 | out->ptr[j] ^= tempdest[j]; |
| 318 | tempres[j] = tempdest[j]; |
| 319 | } |
| 320 | } |
| 321 | |
| 322 | out->size = ressize; |
| 323 | |
| 324 | return 0; |
| 325 | } |
| 326 | |
| 327 | |
| 328 | /** |
| 329 | * @returns a SASL value-safe-char encoded string, replacing "," and "=" |
| 330 | * with their escaped counterparts in a newly allocated string. |
| 331 | */ |
| 332 | static char *rd_kafka_sasl_safe_string (const char *str) { |
| 333 | char *safe = NULL, *d = NULL/*avoid warning*/; |
| 334 | int pass; |
| 335 | size_t len = 0; |
| 336 | |
| 337 | /* Pass #1: scan for needed length and allocate. |
| 338 | * Pass #2: encode string */ |
| 339 | for (pass = 0 ; pass < 2 ; pass++) { |
| 340 | const char *s; |
| 341 | for (s = str ; *s ; s++) { |
| 342 | if (pass == 0) { |
| 343 | len += 1 + (*s == ',' || *s == '='); |
| 344 | continue; |
| 345 | } |
| 346 | |
| 347 | if (*s == ',') { |
| 348 | *(d++) = '='; |
| 349 | *(d++) = '2'; |
| 350 | *(d++) = 'C'; |
| 351 | } else if (*s == '=') { |
| 352 | *(d++) = '='; |
| 353 | *(d++) = '3'; |
| 354 | *(d++) = 'D'; |
| 355 | } else |
| 356 | *(d++) = *s; |
| 357 | } |
| 358 | |
| 359 | if (pass == 0) |
| 360 | d = safe = rd_malloc(len+1); |
| 361 | } |
| 362 | |
| 363 | rd_assert(d == safe + (int)len); |
| 364 | *d = '\0'; |
| 365 | |
| 366 | return safe; |
| 367 | } |
| 368 | |
| 369 | |
| 370 | /** |
| 371 | * @brief Build client-final-message-without-proof |
| 372 | * @remark out->ptr will be allocated and must be freed. |
| 373 | */ |
| 374 | static void |
| 375 | rd_kafka_sasl_scram_build_client_final_message_wo_proof ( |
| 376 | struct rd_kafka_sasl_scram_state *state, |
| 377 | const char *snonce, |
| 378 | rd_chariov_t *out) { |
| 379 | const char *attr_c = "biws" ; /* base64 encode of "n,," */ |
| 380 | |
| 381 | /* |
| 382 | * client-final-message-without-proof = |
| 383 | * channel-binding "," nonce ["," |
| 384 | * extensions] |
| 385 | */ |
| 386 | out->size = strlen("c=,r=" ) + strlen(attr_c) + |
| 387 | state->cnonce.size + strlen(snonce); |
| 388 | out->ptr = rd_malloc(out->size+1); |
| 389 | rd_snprintf(out->ptr, out->size+1, "c=%s,r=%.*s%s" , |
| 390 | attr_c, (int)state->cnonce.size, state->cnonce.ptr, snonce); |
| 391 | } |
| 392 | |
| 393 | |
| 394 | /** |
| 395 | * @brief Build client-final-message |
| 396 | * @returns -1 on error. |
| 397 | */ |
| 398 | static int |
| 399 | rd_kafka_sasl_scram_build_client_final_message ( |
| 400 | rd_kafka_transport_t *rktrans, |
| 401 | const rd_chariov_t *salt, |
| 402 | const char *server_nonce, |
| 403 | const rd_chariov_t *server_first_msg, |
| 404 | int itcnt, rd_chariov_t *out) { |
| 405 | struct rd_kafka_sasl_scram_state *state = rktrans->rktrans_sasl.state; |
| 406 | const rd_kafka_conf_t *conf = &rktrans->rktrans_rkb->rkb_rk->rk_conf; |
| 407 | rd_chariov_t SaslPassword = |
| 408 | { .ptr = conf->sasl.password, |
| 409 | .size = strlen(conf->sasl.password) }; |
| 410 | rd_chariov_t SaltedPassword = |
| 411 | { .ptr = rd_alloca(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) }; |
| 412 | rd_chariov_t ClientKey = |
| 413 | { .ptr = rd_alloca(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) }; |
| 414 | rd_chariov_t ServerKey = |
| 415 | { .ptr = rd_alloca(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) }; |
| 416 | rd_chariov_t StoredKey = |
| 417 | { .ptr = rd_alloca(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) }; |
| 418 | rd_chariov_t AuthMessage = RD_ZERO_INIT; |
| 419 | rd_chariov_t ClientSignature = |
| 420 | { .ptr = rd_alloca(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) }; |
| 421 | rd_chariov_t ServerSignature = |
| 422 | { .ptr = rd_alloca(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) }; |
| 423 | const rd_chariov_t ClientKeyVerbatim = |
| 424 | { .ptr = "Client Key" , .size = 10 }; |
| 425 | const rd_chariov_t ServerKeyVerbatim = |
| 426 | { .ptr = "Server Key" , .size = 10 }; |
| 427 | rd_chariov_t ClientProof = |
| 428 | { .ptr = rd_alloca(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) }; |
| 429 | rd_chariov_t client_final_msg_wo_proof; |
| 430 | char *ClientProofB64; |
| 431 | int i; |
| 432 | |
| 433 | /* Constructing the ClientProof attribute (p): |
| 434 | * |
| 435 | * p = Base64-encoded ClientProof |
| 436 | * SaltedPassword := Hi(Normalize(password), salt, i) |
| 437 | * ClientKey := HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Client Key") |
| 438 | * StoredKey := H(ClientKey) |
| 439 | * AuthMessage := client-first-message-bare + "," + |
| 440 | * server-first-message + "," + |
| 441 | * client-final-message-without-proof |
| 442 | * ClientSignature := HMAC(StoredKey, AuthMessage) |
| 443 | * ClientProof := ClientKey XOR ClientSignature |
| 444 | * ServerKey := HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Server Key") |
| 445 | * ServerSignature := HMAC(ServerKey, AuthMessage) |
| 446 | */ |
| 447 | |
| 448 | /* SaltedPassword := Hi(Normalize(password), salt, i) */ |
| 449 | if (rd_kafka_sasl_scram_Hi( |
| 450 | rktrans, &SaslPassword, salt, |
| 451 | itcnt, &SaltedPassword) == -1) |
| 452 | return -1; |
| 453 | |
| 454 | /* ClientKey := HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Client Key") */ |
| 455 | if (rd_kafka_sasl_scram_HMAC( |
| 456 | rktrans, &SaltedPassword, &ClientKeyVerbatim, |
| 457 | &ClientKey) == -1) |
| 458 | return -1; |
| 459 | |
| 460 | /* StoredKey := H(ClientKey) */ |
| 461 | if (rd_kafka_sasl_scram_H(rktrans, &ClientKey, &StoredKey) == -1) |
| 462 | return -1; |
| 463 | |
| 464 | /* client-final-message-without-proof */ |
| 465 | rd_kafka_sasl_scram_build_client_final_message_wo_proof( |
| 466 | state, server_nonce, &client_final_msg_wo_proof); |
| 467 | |
| 468 | /* AuthMessage := client-first-message-bare + "," + |
| 469 | * server-first-message + "," + |
| 470 | * client-final-message-without-proof */ |
| 471 | AuthMessage.size = |
| 472 | state->first_msg_bare.size + 1 + |
| 473 | server_first_msg->size + 1 + |
| 474 | client_final_msg_wo_proof.size; |
| 475 | AuthMessage.ptr = rd_alloca(AuthMessage.size+1); |
| 476 | rd_snprintf(AuthMessage.ptr, AuthMessage.size+1, |
| 477 | "%.*s,%.*s,%.*s" , |
| 478 | (int)state->first_msg_bare.size, state->first_msg_bare.ptr, |
| 479 | (int)server_first_msg->size, server_first_msg->ptr, |
| 480 | (int)client_final_msg_wo_proof.size, |
| 481 | client_final_msg_wo_proof.ptr); |
| 482 | |
| 483 | /* |
| 484 | * Calculate ServerSignature for later verification when |
| 485 | * server-final-message is received. |
| 486 | */ |
| 487 | |
| 488 | /* ServerKey := HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Server Key") */ |
| 489 | if (rd_kafka_sasl_scram_HMAC( |
| 490 | rktrans, &SaltedPassword, &ServerKeyVerbatim, |
| 491 | &ServerKey) == -1) { |
| 492 | rd_free(client_final_msg_wo_proof.ptr); |
| 493 | return -1; |
| 494 | } |
| 495 | |
| 496 | /* ServerSignature := HMAC(ServerKey, AuthMessage) */ |
| 497 | if (rd_kafka_sasl_scram_HMAC(rktrans, &ServerKey, |
| 498 | &AuthMessage, &ServerSignature) == -1) { |
| 499 | rd_free(client_final_msg_wo_proof.ptr); |
| 500 | return -1; |
| 501 | } |
| 502 | |
| 503 | /* Store the Base64 encoded ServerSignature for quick comparison */ |
| 504 | state->ServerSignatureB64 = rd_base64_encode(&ServerSignature); |
| 505 | if (state->ServerSignatureB64 == NULL) { |
| 506 | rd_free(client_final_msg_wo_proof.ptr); |
| 507 | return -1; |
| 508 | } |
| 509 | |
| 510 | /* |
| 511 | * Continue with client-final-message |
| 512 | */ |
| 513 | |
| 514 | /* ClientSignature := HMAC(StoredKey, AuthMessage) */ |
| 515 | if (rd_kafka_sasl_scram_HMAC(rktrans, &StoredKey, |
| 516 | &AuthMessage, &ClientSignature) == -1) { |
| 517 | rd_free(client_final_msg_wo_proof.ptr); |
| 518 | return -1; |
| 519 | } |
| 520 | |
| 521 | /* ClientProof := ClientKey XOR ClientSignature */ |
| 522 | assert(ClientKey.size == ClientSignature.size); |
| 523 | for (i = 0 ; i < (int)ClientKey.size ; i++) |
| 524 | ClientProof.ptr[i] = ClientKey.ptr[i] ^ ClientSignature.ptr[i]; |
| 525 | ClientProof.size = ClientKey.size; |
| 526 | |
| 527 | |
| 528 | /* Base64 encoded ClientProof */ |
| 529 | ClientProofB64 = rd_base64_encode(&ClientProof); |
| 530 | if (ClientProofB64 == NULL) { |
| 531 | rd_free(client_final_msg_wo_proof.ptr); |
| 532 | return -1; |
| 533 | } |
| 534 | |
| 535 | /* Construct client-final-message */ |
| 536 | out->size = client_final_msg_wo_proof.size + |
| 537 | strlen(",p=" ) + strlen(ClientProofB64); |
| 538 | out->ptr = rd_malloc(out->size + 1); |
| 539 | |
| 540 | rd_snprintf(out->ptr, out->size+1, |
| 541 | "%.*s,p=%s" , |
| 542 | (int)client_final_msg_wo_proof.size, |
| 543 | client_final_msg_wo_proof.ptr, |
| 544 | ClientProofB64); |
| 545 | rd_free(ClientProofB64); |
| 546 | rd_free(client_final_msg_wo_proof.ptr); |
| 547 | |
| 548 | return 0; |
| 549 | } |
| 550 | |
| 551 | |
| 552 | /** |
| 553 | * @brief Handle first message from server |
| 554 | * |
| 555 | * Parse server response which looks something like: |
| 556 | * "r=fyko+d2lbbFgONR....,s=QSXCR+Q6sek8bf92,i=4096" |
| 557 | * |
| 558 | * @returns -1 on error. |
| 559 | */ |
| 560 | static int |
| 561 | rd_kafka_sasl_scram_handle_server_first_message (rd_kafka_transport_t *rktrans, |
| 562 | const rd_chariov_t *in, |
| 563 | rd_chariov_t *out, |
| 564 | char *errstr, |
| 565 | size_t errstr_size) { |
| 566 | struct rd_kafka_sasl_scram_state *state = rktrans->rktrans_sasl.state; |
| 567 | char *server_nonce; |
| 568 | rd_chariov_t salt_b64, salt; |
| 569 | char *itcntstr; |
| 570 | const char *endptr; |
| 571 | int itcnt; |
| 572 | char *attr_m; |
| 573 | |
| 574 | /* Mandatory future extension check */ |
| 575 | if ((attr_m = rd_kafka_sasl_scram_get_attr( |
| 576 | in, 'm', NULL, NULL, 0))) { |
| 577 | rd_snprintf(errstr, errstr_size, |
| 578 | "Unsupported mandatory SCRAM extension" ); |
| 579 | rd_free(attr_m); |
| 580 | return -1; |
| 581 | } |
| 582 | |
| 583 | /* Server nonce */ |
| 584 | if (!(server_nonce = rd_kafka_sasl_scram_get_attr( |
| 585 | in, 'r', |
| 586 | "Server nonce in server-first-message" , |
| 587 | errstr, errstr_size))) |
| 588 | return -1; |
| 589 | |
| 590 | if (strlen(server_nonce) <= state->cnonce.size || |
| 591 | strncmp(state->cnonce.ptr, server_nonce, state->cnonce.size)) { |
| 592 | rd_snprintf(errstr, errstr_size, |
| 593 | "Server/client nonce mismatch in " |
| 594 | "server-first-message" ); |
| 595 | rd_free(server_nonce); |
| 596 | return -1; |
| 597 | } |
| 598 | |
| 599 | /* Salt (Base64) */ |
| 600 | if (!(salt_b64.ptr = rd_kafka_sasl_scram_get_attr( |
| 601 | in, 's', |
| 602 | "Salt in server-first-message" , |
| 603 | errstr, errstr_size))) { |
| 604 | rd_free(server_nonce); |
| 605 | return -1; |
| 606 | } |
| 607 | salt_b64.size = strlen(salt_b64.ptr); |
| 608 | |
| 609 | /* Convert Salt to binary */ |
| 610 | if (rd_base64_decode(&salt_b64, &salt) == -1) { |
| 611 | rd_snprintf(errstr, errstr_size, |
| 612 | "Invalid Base64 Salt in server-first-message" ); |
| 613 | rd_free(server_nonce); |
| 614 | rd_free(salt_b64.ptr); |
| 615 | return -1; |
| 616 | } |
| 617 | rd_free(salt_b64.ptr); |
| 618 | |
| 619 | /* Iteration count (as string) */ |
| 620 | if (!(itcntstr = rd_kafka_sasl_scram_get_attr( |
| 621 | in, 'i', |
| 622 | "Iteration count in server-first-message" , |
| 623 | errstr, errstr_size))) { |
| 624 | rd_free(server_nonce); |
| 625 | rd_free(salt.ptr); |
| 626 | return -1; |
| 627 | } |
| 628 | |
| 629 | /* Iteration count (as int) */ |
| 630 | errno = 0; |
| 631 | itcnt = (int)strtoul(itcntstr, (char **)&endptr, 10); |
| 632 | if (itcntstr == endptr || *endptr != '\0' || errno != 0 || |
| 633 | itcnt > 1000000) { |
| 634 | rd_snprintf(errstr, errstr_size, |
| 635 | "Invalid value (not integer or too large) " |
| 636 | "for Iteration count in server-first-message" ); |
| 637 | rd_free(server_nonce); |
| 638 | rd_free(salt.ptr); |
| 639 | rd_free(itcntstr); |
| 640 | return -1; |
| 641 | } |
| 642 | rd_free(itcntstr); |
| 643 | |
| 644 | /* Build client-final-message */ |
| 645 | if (rd_kafka_sasl_scram_build_client_final_message( |
| 646 | rktrans, &salt, server_nonce, in, itcnt, out) == -1) { |
| 647 | rd_snprintf(errstr, errstr_size, |
| 648 | "Failed to build SCRAM client-final-message" ); |
| 649 | rd_free(salt.ptr); |
| 650 | rd_free(server_nonce); |
| 651 | return -1; |
| 652 | } |
| 653 | |
| 654 | rd_free(server_nonce); |
| 655 | rd_free(salt.ptr); |
| 656 | |
| 657 | return 0; |
| 658 | } |
| 659 | |
| 660 | /** |
| 661 | * @brief Handle server-final-message |
| 662 | * |
| 663 | * This is the end of authentication and the SCRAM state |
| 664 | * will be freed at the end of this function regardless of |
| 665 | * authentication outcome. |
| 666 | * |
| 667 | * @returns -1 on failure |
| 668 | */ |
| 669 | static int |
| 670 | rd_kafka_sasl_scram_handle_server_final_message ( |
| 671 | rd_kafka_transport_t *rktrans, |
| 672 | const rd_chariov_t *in, |
| 673 | char *errstr, size_t errstr_size) { |
| 674 | struct rd_kafka_sasl_scram_state *state = rktrans->rktrans_sasl.state; |
| 675 | char *attr_v, *attr_e; |
| 676 | |
| 677 | if ((attr_e = rd_kafka_sasl_scram_get_attr( |
| 678 | in, 'e', "server-error in server-final-message" , |
| 679 | errstr, errstr_size))) { |
| 680 | /* Authentication failed */ |
| 681 | |
| 682 | rd_snprintf(errstr, errstr_size, |
| 683 | "SASL SCRAM authentication failed: " |
| 684 | "broker responded with %s" , |
| 685 | attr_e); |
| 686 | rd_free(attr_e); |
| 687 | return -1; |
| 688 | |
| 689 | } else if ((attr_v = rd_kafka_sasl_scram_get_attr( |
| 690 | in, 'v', "verifier in server-final-message" , |
| 691 | errstr, errstr_size))) { |
| 692 | const rd_kafka_conf_t *conf; |
| 693 | |
| 694 | /* Authentication succesful on server, |
| 695 | * but we need to verify the ServerSignature too. */ |
| 696 | rd_rkb_dbg(rktrans->rktrans_rkb, SECURITY | RD_KAFKA_DBG_BROKER, |
| 697 | "SCRAMAUTH" , |
| 698 | "SASL SCRAM authentication succesful on server: " |
| 699 | "verifying ServerSignature" ); |
| 700 | |
| 701 | if (strcmp(attr_v, state->ServerSignatureB64)) { |
| 702 | rd_snprintf(errstr, errstr_size, |
| 703 | "SASL SCRAM authentication failed: " |
| 704 | "ServerSignature mismatch " |
| 705 | "(server's %s != ours %s)" , |
| 706 | attr_v, state->ServerSignatureB64); |
| 707 | rd_free(attr_v); |
| 708 | return -1; |
| 709 | } |
| 710 | rd_free(attr_v); |
| 711 | |
| 712 | conf = &rktrans->rktrans_rkb->rkb_rk->rk_conf; |
| 713 | |
| 714 | rd_rkb_dbg(rktrans->rktrans_rkb, SECURITY | RD_KAFKA_DBG_BROKER, |
| 715 | "SCRAMAUTH" , |
| 716 | "Authenticated as %s using %s" , |
| 717 | conf->sasl.username, |
| 718 | conf->sasl.mechanisms); |
| 719 | |
| 720 | rd_kafka_sasl_auth_done(rktrans); |
| 721 | return 0; |
| 722 | |
| 723 | } else { |
| 724 | rd_snprintf(errstr, errstr_size, |
| 725 | "SASL SCRAM authentication failed: " |
| 726 | "no verifier or server-error returned from broker" ); |
| 727 | return -1; |
| 728 | } |
| 729 | } |
| 730 | |
| 731 | |
| 732 | |
| 733 | /** |
| 734 | * @brief Build client-first-message |
| 735 | */ |
| 736 | static void |
| 737 | rd_kafka_sasl_scram_build_client_first_message ( |
| 738 | rd_kafka_transport_t *rktrans, |
| 739 | rd_chariov_t *out) { |
| 740 | char *sasl_username; |
| 741 | struct rd_kafka_sasl_scram_state *state = rktrans->rktrans_sasl.state; |
| 742 | const rd_kafka_conf_t *conf = &rktrans->rktrans_rkb->rkb_rk->rk_conf; |
| 743 | |
| 744 | rd_kafka_sasl_scram_generate_nonce(&state->cnonce); |
| 745 | |
| 746 | sasl_username = rd_kafka_sasl_safe_string(conf->sasl.username); |
| 747 | |
| 748 | out->size = strlen("n,,n=,r=" ) + strlen(sasl_username) + |
| 749 | state->cnonce.size; |
| 750 | out->ptr = rd_malloc(out->size+1); |
| 751 | |
| 752 | rd_snprintf(out->ptr, out->size+1, |
| 753 | "n,,n=%s,r=%.*s" , |
| 754 | sasl_username, |
| 755 | (int)state->cnonce.size, state->cnonce.ptr); |
| 756 | rd_free(sasl_username); |
| 757 | |
| 758 | /* Save client-first-message-bare (skip gs2-header) */ |
| 759 | state->first_msg_bare.size = out->size-3; |
| 760 | state->first_msg_bare.ptr = rd_memdup(out->ptr+3, |
| 761 | state->first_msg_bare.size); |
| 762 | } |
| 763 | |
| 764 | |
| 765 | |
| 766 | /** |
| 767 | * @brief SASL SCRAM client state machine |
| 768 | * @returns -1 on failure (errstr set), else 0. |
| 769 | */ |
| 770 | static int rd_kafka_sasl_scram_fsm (rd_kafka_transport_t *rktrans, |
| 771 | const rd_chariov_t *in, |
| 772 | char *errstr, size_t errstr_size) { |
| 773 | static const char *state_names[] = { |
| 774 | "client-first-message" , |
| 775 | "server-first-message" , |
| 776 | "client-final-message" , |
| 777 | }; |
| 778 | struct rd_kafka_sasl_scram_state *state = rktrans->rktrans_sasl.state; |
| 779 | rd_chariov_t out = RD_ZERO_INIT; |
| 780 | int r = -1; |
| 781 | rd_ts_t ts_start = rd_clock(); |
| 782 | int prev_state = state->state; |
| 783 | |
| 784 | rd_rkb_dbg(rktrans->rktrans_rkb, SECURITY, "SASLSCRAM" , |
| 785 | "SASL SCRAM client in state %s" , |
| 786 | state_names[state->state]); |
| 787 | |
| 788 | switch (state->state) |
| 789 | { |
| 790 | case RD_KAFKA_SASL_SCRAM_STATE_CLIENT_FIRST_MESSAGE: |
| 791 | rd_dassert(!in); /* Not expecting any server-input */ |
| 792 | |
| 793 | rd_kafka_sasl_scram_build_client_first_message(rktrans, &out); |
| 794 | state->state = RD_KAFKA_SASL_SCRAM_STATE_SERVER_FIRST_MESSAGE; |
| 795 | break; |
| 796 | |
| 797 | |
| 798 | case RD_KAFKA_SASL_SCRAM_STATE_SERVER_FIRST_MESSAGE: |
| 799 | rd_dassert(in); /* Requires server-input */ |
| 800 | |
| 801 | if (rd_kafka_sasl_scram_handle_server_first_message( |
| 802 | rktrans, in, &out, errstr, errstr_size) == -1) |
| 803 | return -1; |
| 804 | |
| 805 | state->state = RD_KAFKA_SASL_SCRAM_STATE_CLIENT_FINAL_MESSAGE; |
| 806 | break; |
| 807 | |
| 808 | case RD_KAFKA_SASL_SCRAM_STATE_CLIENT_FINAL_MESSAGE: |
| 809 | rd_dassert(in); /* Requires server-input */ |
| 810 | |
| 811 | r = rd_kafka_sasl_scram_handle_server_final_message( |
| 812 | rktrans, in, errstr, errstr_size); |
| 813 | break; |
| 814 | } |
| 815 | |
| 816 | if (out.ptr) { |
| 817 | r = rd_kafka_sasl_send(rktrans, out.ptr, (int)out.size, |
| 818 | errstr, errstr_size); |
| 819 | rd_free(out.ptr); |
| 820 | } |
| 821 | |
| 822 | ts_start = (rd_clock() - ts_start) / 1000; |
| 823 | if (ts_start >= 100) |
| 824 | rd_rkb_dbg(rktrans->rktrans_rkb, SECURITY, "SCRAM" , |
| 825 | "SASL SCRAM state %s handled in %" PRId64"ms" , |
| 826 | state_names[prev_state], ts_start); |
| 827 | |
| 828 | |
| 829 | return r; |
| 830 | } |
| 831 | |
| 832 | |
| 833 | /** |
| 834 | * @brief Handle received frame from broker. |
| 835 | */ |
| 836 | static int rd_kafka_sasl_scram_recv (rd_kafka_transport_t *rktrans, |
| 837 | const void *buf, size_t size, |
| 838 | char *errstr, size_t errstr_size) { |
| 839 | const rd_chariov_t in = { .ptr = (char *)buf, .size = size }; |
| 840 | return rd_kafka_sasl_scram_fsm(rktrans, &in, errstr, errstr_size); |
| 841 | } |
| 842 | |
| 843 | |
| 844 | /** |
| 845 | * @brief Initialize and start SASL SCRAM (builtin) authentication. |
| 846 | * |
| 847 | * Returns 0 on successful init and -1 on error. |
| 848 | * |
| 849 | * @locality broker thread |
| 850 | */ |
| 851 | static int rd_kafka_sasl_scram_client_new (rd_kafka_transport_t *rktrans, |
| 852 | const char *hostname, |
| 853 | char *errstr, size_t errstr_size) { |
| 854 | struct rd_kafka_sasl_scram_state *state; |
| 855 | |
| 856 | state = rd_calloc(1, sizeof(*state)); |
| 857 | state->state = RD_KAFKA_SASL_SCRAM_STATE_CLIENT_FIRST_MESSAGE; |
| 858 | rktrans->rktrans_sasl.state = state; |
| 859 | |
| 860 | /* Kick off the FSM */ |
| 861 | return rd_kafka_sasl_scram_fsm(rktrans, NULL, errstr, errstr_size); |
| 862 | } |
| 863 | |
| 864 | |
| 865 | |
| 866 | /** |
| 867 | * @brief Validate SCRAM config and look up the hash function |
| 868 | */ |
| 869 | static int rd_kafka_sasl_scram_conf_validate (rd_kafka_t *rk, |
| 870 | char *errstr, |
| 871 | size_t errstr_size) { |
| 872 | const char *mech = rk->rk_conf.sasl.mechanisms; |
| 873 | |
| 874 | if (!rk->rk_conf.sasl.username || !rk->rk_conf.sasl.password) { |
| 875 | rd_snprintf(errstr, errstr_size, |
| 876 | "sasl.username and sasl.password must be set" ); |
| 877 | return -1; |
| 878 | } |
| 879 | |
| 880 | if (!strcmp(mech, "SCRAM-SHA-1" )) { |
| 881 | rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_evp = EVP_sha1(); |
| 882 | rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_H = SHA1; |
| 883 | rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_H_size = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| 884 | } else if (!strcmp(mech, "SCRAM-SHA-256" )) { |
| 885 | rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_evp = EVP_sha256(); |
| 886 | rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_H = SHA256; |
| 887 | rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_H_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| 888 | } else if (!strcmp(mech, "SCRAM-SHA-512" )) { |
| 889 | rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_evp = EVP_sha512(); |
| 890 | rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_H = SHA512; |
| 891 | rk->rk_conf.sasl.scram_H_size = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| 892 | } else { |
| 893 | rd_snprintf(errstr, errstr_size, |
| 894 | "Unsupported hash function: %s " |
| 895 | "(try SCRAM-SHA-512)" , |
| 896 | mech); |
| 897 | return -1; |
| 898 | } |
| 899 | |
| 900 | return 0; |
| 901 | } |
| 902 | |
| 903 | |
| 904 | |
| 905 | |
| 906 | const struct rd_kafka_sasl_provider rd_kafka_sasl_scram_provider = { |
| 907 | .name = "SCRAM (builtin)" , |
| 908 | .client_new = rd_kafka_sasl_scram_client_new, |
| 909 | .recv = rd_kafka_sasl_scram_recv, |
| 910 | .close = rd_kafka_sasl_scram_close, |
| 911 | .conf_validate = rd_kafka_sasl_scram_conf_validate, |
| 912 | }; |
| 913 | |