1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | * |
4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
8 | */ |
9 | |
10 | #include <stdio.h> |
11 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
12 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
13 | #include <openssl/engine.h> |
14 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
15 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
16 | #include "internal/refcount.h" |
17 | #include "crypto/bn.h" |
18 | #include "crypto/evp.h" |
19 | #include "crypto/rsa.h" |
20 | #include "rsa_local.h" |
21 | |
22 | RSA *RSA_new(void) |
23 | { |
24 | return RSA_new_method(NULL); |
25 | } |
26 | |
27 | const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa) |
28 | { |
29 | return rsa->meth; |
30 | } |
31 | |
32 | int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth) |
33 | { |
34 | /* |
35 | * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us |
36 | * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from. |
37 | */ |
38 | const RSA_METHOD *mtmp; |
39 | mtmp = rsa->meth; |
40 | if (mtmp->finish) |
41 | mtmp->finish(rsa); |
42 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
43 | ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine); |
44 | rsa->engine = NULL; |
45 | #endif |
46 | rsa->meth = meth; |
47 | if (meth->init) |
48 | meth->init(rsa); |
49 | return 1; |
50 | } |
51 | |
52 | RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine) |
53 | { |
54 | RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); |
55 | |
56 | if (ret == NULL) { |
57 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
58 | return NULL; |
59 | } |
60 | |
61 | ret->references = 1; |
62 | ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); |
63 | if (ret->lock == NULL) { |
64 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
65 | OPENSSL_free(ret); |
66 | return NULL; |
67 | } |
68 | |
69 | ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method(); |
70 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
71 | ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; |
72 | if (engine) { |
73 | if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) { |
74 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); |
75 | goto err; |
76 | } |
77 | ret->engine = engine; |
78 | } else { |
79 | ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA(); |
80 | } |
81 | if (ret->engine) { |
82 | ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine); |
83 | if (ret->meth == NULL) { |
84 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); |
85 | goto err; |
86 | } |
87 | } |
88 | #endif |
89 | |
90 | ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; |
91 | if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { |
92 | goto err; |
93 | } |
94 | |
95 | if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { |
96 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); |
97 | goto err; |
98 | } |
99 | |
100 | return ret; |
101 | |
102 | err: |
103 | RSA_free(ret); |
104 | return NULL; |
105 | } |
106 | |
107 | void RSA_free(RSA *r) |
108 | { |
109 | int i; |
110 | |
111 | if (r == NULL) |
112 | return; |
113 | |
114 | CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock); |
115 | REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA" , r); |
116 | if (i > 0) |
117 | return; |
118 | REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); |
119 | |
120 | if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL) |
121 | r->meth->finish(r); |
122 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
123 | ENGINE_finish(r->engine); |
124 | #endif |
125 | |
126 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data); |
127 | |
128 | CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); |
129 | |
130 | BN_free(r->n); |
131 | BN_free(r->e); |
132 | BN_clear_free(r->d); |
133 | BN_clear_free(r->p); |
134 | BN_clear_free(r->q); |
135 | BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); |
136 | BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); |
137 | BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); |
138 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss); |
139 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); |
140 | BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding); |
141 | BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding); |
142 | OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data); |
143 | OPENSSL_free(r); |
144 | } |
145 | |
146 | int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r) |
147 | { |
148 | int i; |
149 | |
150 | if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0) |
151 | return 0; |
152 | |
153 | REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA" , r); |
154 | REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); |
155 | return i > 1 ? 1 : 0; |
156 | } |
157 | |
158 | int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg) |
159 | { |
160 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg); |
161 | } |
162 | |
163 | void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx) |
164 | { |
165 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx); |
166 | } |
167 | |
168 | /* |
169 | * Define a scaling constant for our fixed point arithmetic. |
170 | * This value must be a power of two because the base two logarithm code |
171 | * makes this assumption. The exponent must also be a multiple of three so |
172 | * that the scale factor has an exact cube root. Finally, the scale factor |
173 | * should not be so large that a multiplication of two scaled numbers |
174 | * overflows a 64 bit unsigned integer. |
175 | */ |
176 | static const unsigned int scale = 1 << 18; |
177 | static const unsigned int cbrt_scale = 1 << (2 * 18 / 3); |
178 | |
179 | /* Define some constants, none exceed 32 bits */ |
180 | static const unsigned int log_2 = 0x02c5c8; /* scale * log(2) */ |
181 | static const unsigned int log_e = 0x05c551; /* scale * log2(M_E) */ |
182 | static const unsigned int c1_923 = 0x07b126; /* scale * 1.923 */ |
183 | static const unsigned int c4_690 = 0x12c28f; /* scale * 4.690 */ |
184 | |
185 | /* |
186 | * Multiply two scaled integers together and rescale the result. |
187 | */ |
188 | static ossl_inline uint64_t mul2(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) |
189 | { |
190 | return a * b / scale; |
191 | } |
192 | |
193 | /* |
194 | * Calculate the cube root of a 64 bit scaled integer. |
195 | * Although the cube root of a 64 bit number does fit into a 32 bit unsigned |
196 | * integer, this is not guaranteed after scaling, so this function has a |
197 | * 64 bit return. This uses the shifting nth root algorithm with some |
198 | * algebraic simplifications. |
199 | */ |
200 | static uint64_t icbrt64(uint64_t x) |
201 | { |
202 | uint64_t r = 0; |
203 | uint64_t b; |
204 | int s; |
205 | |
206 | for (s = 63; s >= 0; s -= 3) { |
207 | r <<= 1; |
208 | b = 3 * r * (r + 1) + 1; |
209 | if ((x >> s) >= b) { |
210 | x -= b << s; |
211 | r++; |
212 | } |
213 | } |
214 | return r * cbrt_scale; |
215 | } |
216 | |
217 | /* |
218 | * Calculate the natural logarithm of a 64 bit scaled integer. |
219 | * This is done by calculating a base two logarithm and scaling. |
220 | * The maximum logarithm (base 2) is 64 and this reduces base e, so |
221 | * a 32 bit result should not overflow. The argument passed must be |
222 | * greater than unity so we don't need to handle negative results. |
223 | */ |
224 | static uint32_t ilog_e(uint64_t v) |
225 | { |
226 | uint32_t i, r = 0; |
227 | |
228 | /* |
229 | * Scale down the value into the range 1 .. 2. |
230 | * |
231 | * If fractional numbers need to be processed, another loop needs |
232 | * to go here that checks v < scale and if so multiplies it by 2 and |
233 | * reduces r by scale. This also means making r signed. |
234 | */ |
235 | while (v >= 2 * scale) { |
236 | v >>= 1; |
237 | r += scale; |
238 | } |
239 | for (i = scale / 2; i != 0; i /= 2) { |
240 | v = mul2(v, v); |
241 | if (v >= 2 * scale) { |
242 | v >>= 1; |
243 | r += i; |
244 | } |
245 | } |
246 | r = (r * (uint64_t)scale) / log_e; |
247 | return r; |
248 | } |
249 | |
250 | /* |
251 | * NIST SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D: Maximum Security Strength Estimates for IFC |
252 | * Modulus Lengths. |
253 | * |
254 | * E = \frac{1.923 \sqrt[3]{nBits \cdot log_e(2)} |
255 | * \cdot(log_e(nBits \cdot log_e(2))^{2/3} - 4.69}{log_e(2)} |
256 | * The two cube roots are merged together here. |
257 | */ |
258 | uint16_t rsa_compute_security_bits(int n) |
259 | { |
260 | uint64_t x; |
261 | uint32_t lx; |
262 | uint16_t y; |
263 | |
264 | /* Look for common values as listed in SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */ |
265 | switch (n) { |
266 | case 2048: |
267 | return 112; |
268 | case 3072: |
269 | return 128; |
270 | case 4096: |
271 | return 152; |
272 | case 6144: |
273 | return 176; |
274 | case 8192: |
275 | return 200; |
276 | } |
277 | /* |
278 | * The first incorrect result (i.e. not accurate or off by one low) occurs |
279 | * for n = 699668. The true value here is 1200. Instead of using this n |
280 | * as the check threshold, the smallest n such that the correct result is |
281 | * 1200 is used instead. |
282 | */ |
283 | if (n >= 687737) |
284 | return 1200; |
285 | if (n < 8) |
286 | return 0; |
287 | |
288 | x = n * (uint64_t)log_2; |
289 | lx = ilog_e(x); |
290 | y = (uint16_t)((mul2(c1_923, icbrt64(mul2(mul2(x, lx), lx))) - c4_690) |
291 | / log_2); |
292 | return (y + 4) & ~7; |
293 | } |
294 | |
295 | int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa) |
296 | { |
297 | int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n); |
298 | |
299 | if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) { |
300 | /* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */ |
301 | int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos); |
302 | |
303 | if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) |
304 | return 0; |
305 | } |
306 | return rsa_compute_security_bits(bits); |
307 | } |
308 | |
309 | int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) |
310 | { |
311 | /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
312 | * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be |
313 | * left NULL (in case only the public key is used). |
314 | */ |
315 | if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) |
316 | || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) |
317 | return 0; |
318 | |
319 | if (n != NULL) { |
320 | BN_free(r->n); |
321 | r->n = n; |
322 | } |
323 | if (e != NULL) { |
324 | BN_free(r->e); |
325 | r->e = e; |
326 | } |
327 | if (d != NULL) { |
328 | BN_clear_free(r->d); |
329 | r->d = d; |
330 | BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
331 | } |
332 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
333 | |
334 | return 1; |
335 | } |
336 | |
337 | int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) |
338 | { |
339 | /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
340 | * parameters MUST be non-NULL. |
341 | */ |
342 | if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) |
343 | || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL)) |
344 | return 0; |
345 | |
346 | if (p != NULL) { |
347 | BN_clear_free(r->p); |
348 | r->p = p; |
349 | BN_set_flags(r->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
350 | } |
351 | if (q != NULL) { |
352 | BN_clear_free(r->q); |
353 | r->q = q; |
354 | BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
355 | } |
356 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
357 | |
358 | return 1; |
359 | } |
360 | |
361 | int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) |
362 | { |
363 | /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
364 | * parameters MUST be non-NULL. |
365 | */ |
366 | if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) |
367 | || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) |
368 | || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) |
369 | return 0; |
370 | |
371 | if (dmp1 != NULL) { |
372 | BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); |
373 | r->dmp1 = dmp1; |
374 | BN_set_flags(r->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
375 | } |
376 | if (dmq1 != NULL) { |
377 | BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); |
378 | r->dmq1 = dmq1; |
379 | BN_set_flags(r->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
380 | } |
381 | if (iqmp != NULL) { |
382 | BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); |
383 | r->iqmp = iqmp; |
384 | BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
385 | } |
386 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
387 | |
388 | return 1; |
389 | } |
390 | |
391 | /* |
392 | * Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure |
393 | * and related functions to let user pass a triplet? |
394 | */ |
395 | int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[], |
396 | BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum) |
397 | { |
398 | STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL; |
399 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; |
400 | int i; |
401 | |
402 | if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0) |
403 | return 0; |
404 | |
405 | prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); |
406 | if (prime_infos == NULL) |
407 | return 0; |
408 | |
409 | if (r->prime_infos != NULL) |
410 | old = r->prime_infos; |
411 | |
412 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { |
413 | pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new(); |
414 | if (pinfo == NULL) |
415 | goto err; |
416 | if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) { |
417 | BN_clear_free(pinfo->r); |
418 | BN_clear_free(pinfo->d); |
419 | BN_clear_free(pinfo->t); |
420 | pinfo->r = primes[i]; |
421 | pinfo->d = exps[i]; |
422 | pinfo->t = coeffs[i]; |
423 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
424 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
425 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
426 | } else { |
427 | rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo); |
428 | goto err; |
429 | } |
430 | (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); |
431 | } |
432 | |
433 | r->prime_infos = prime_infos; |
434 | |
435 | if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { |
436 | r->prime_infos = old; |
437 | goto err; |
438 | } |
439 | |
440 | if (old != NULL) { |
441 | /* |
442 | * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could |
443 | * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not |
444 | * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent |
445 | * with other *set0* functions: just free it... |
446 | */ |
447 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free); |
448 | } |
449 | |
450 | r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI; |
451 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
452 | |
453 | return 1; |
454 | err: |
455 | /* r, d, t should not be freed */ |
456 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex); |
457 | return 0; |
458 | } |
459 | |
460 | void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, |
461 | const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) |
462 | { |
463 | if (n != NULL) |
464 | *n = r->n; |
465 | if (e != NULL) |
466 | *e = r->e; |
467 | if (d != NULL) |
468 | *d = r->d; |
469 | } |
470 | |
471 | void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) |
472 | { |
473 | if (p != NULL) |
474 | *p = r->p; |
475 | if (q != NULL) |
476 | *q = r->q; |
477 | } |
478 | |
479 | int (const RSA *r) |
480 | { |
481 | int pnum; |
482 | |
483 | pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos); |
484 | if (pnum <= 0) |
485 | pnum = 0; |
486 | return pnum; |
487 | } |
488 | |
489 | int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[]) |
490 | { |
491 | int pnum, i; |
492 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; |
493 | |
494 | if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0) |
495 | return 0; |
496 | |
497 | /* |
498 | * return other primes |
499 | * it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum] |
500 | */ |
501 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { |
502 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); |
503 | primes[i] = pinfo->r; |
504 | } |
505 | |
506 | return 1; |
507 | } |
508 | |
509 | void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, |
510 | const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, |
511 | const BIGNUM **iqmp) |
512 | { |
513 | if (dmp1 != NULL) |
514 | *dmp1 = r->dmp1; |
515 | if (dmq1 != NULL) |
516 | *dmq1 = r->dmq1; |
517 | if (iqmp != NULL) |
518 | *iqmp = r->iqmp; |
519 | } |
520 | |
521 | int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[], |
522 | const BIGNUM *coeffs[]) |
523 | { |
524 | int pnum; |
525 | |
526 | if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0) |
527 | return 0; |
528 | |
529 | /* return other primes */ |
530 | if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) { |
531 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; |
532 | int i; |
533 | |
534 | /* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */ |
535 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { |
536 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); |
537 | if (exps != NULL) |
538 | exps[i] = pinfo->d; |
539 | if (coeffs != NULL) |
540 | coeffs[i] = pinfo->t; |
541 | } |
542 | } |
543 | |
544 | return 1; |
545 | } |
546 | |
547 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r) |
548 | { |
549 | return r->n; |
550 | } |
551 | |
552 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *r) |
553 | { |
554 | return r->e; |
555 | } |
556 | |
557 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *r) |
558 | { |
559 | return r->d; |
560 | } |
561 | |
562 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *r) |
563 | { |
564 | return r->p; |
565 | } |
566 | |
567 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *r) |
568 | { |
569 | return r->q; |
570 | } |
571 | |
572 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *r) |
573 | { |
574 | return r->dmp1; |
575 | } |
576 | |
577 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *r) |
578 | { |
579 | return r->dmq1; |
580 | } |
581 | |
582 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r) |
583 | { |
584 | return r->iqmp; |
585 | } |
586 | |
587 | const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *r) |
588 | { |
589 | return r->pss; |
590 | } |
591 | |
592 | void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags) |
593 | { |
594 | r->flags &= ~flags; |
595 | } |
596 | |
597 | int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags) |
598 | { |
599 | return r->flags & flags; |
600 | } |
601 | |
602 | void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags) |
603 | { |
604 | r->flags |= flags; |
605 | } |
606 | |
607 | int RSA_get_version(RSA *r) |
608 | { |
609 | /* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */ |
610 | return r->version; |
611 | } |
612 | |
613 | ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r) |
614 | { |
615 | return r->engine; |
616 | } |
617 | |
618 | int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2) |
619 | { |
620 | /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ |
621 | if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL |
622 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA |
623 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) |
624 | return -1; |
625 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2); |
626 | } |
627 | |
628 | DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM) |
629 | |
630 | int rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes, |
631 | const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps, |
632 | const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs) |
633 | { |
634 | STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL; |
635 | int pnum; |
636 | |
637 | if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL) |
638 | return 0; |
639 | |
640 | pnum = sk_BIGNUM_num(primes); |
641 | if (pnum < 2 |
642 | || pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) |
643 | || pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) + 1) |
644 | return 0; |
645 | |
646 | if (!RSA_set0_factors(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 0), |
647 | sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 1)) |
648 | || !RSA_set0_crt_params(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 0), |
649 | sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 1), |
650 | sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0))) |
651 | return 0; |
652 | |
653 | old_infos = r->prime_infos; |
654 | |
655 | if (pnum > 2) { |
656 | int i; |
657 | |
658 | prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); |
659 | if (prime_infos == NULL) |
660 | return 0; |
661 | |
662 | for (i = 2; i < pnum; i++) { |
663 | BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, i); |
664 | BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, i); |
665 | BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, i - 1); |
666 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; |
667 | |
668 | if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL)) |
669 | goto err; |
670 | |
671 | /* Using rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */ |
672 | if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pinfo))) == NULL) { |
673 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
674 | goto err; |
675 | } |
676 | |
677 | pinfo->r = prime; |
678 | pinfo->d = exp; |
679 | pinfo->t = coeff; |
680 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
681 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
682 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
683 | (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); |
684 | } |
685 | |
686 | r->prime_infos = prime_infos; |
687 | |
688 | if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { |
689 | r->prime_infos = old_infos; |
690 | goto err; |
691 | } |
692 | } |
693 | |
694 | if (old_infos != NULL) { |
695 | /* |
696 | * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could |
697 | * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not |
698 | * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent |
699 | * with other *set0* functions: just free it... |
700 | */ |
701 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); |
702 | } |
703 | |
704 | r->version = pnum > 2 ? RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI : RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT; |
705 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
706 | |
707 | return 1; |
708 | err: |
709 | /* r, d, t should not be freed */ |
710 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex); |
711 | return 0; |
712 | } |
713 | |
714 | DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM) |
715 | |
716 | int rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes, |
717 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps, |
718 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs) |
719 | { |
720 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; |
721 | int i, pnum; |
722 | |
723 | if (r == NULL) |
724 | return 0; |
725 | |
726 | pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r); |
727 | |
728 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_p(r)); |
729 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_q(r)); |
730 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmp1(r)); |
731 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmq1(r)); |
732 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, RSA_get0_iqmp(r)); |
733 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { |
734 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); |
735 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, pinfo->r); |
736 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, pinfo->d); |
737 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, pinfo->t); |
738 | } |
739 | |
740 | return 1; |
741 | } |
742 | |
743 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad_mode) |
744 | { |
745 | OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params; |
746 | |
747 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
748 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
749 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
750 | return -2; |
751 | } |
752 | |
753 | /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ |
754 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL |
755 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA |
756 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) |
757 | return -1; |
758 | |
759 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ |
760 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) |
761 | || ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) |
762 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, |
763 | pad_mode, NULL); |
764 | |
765 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, &pad_mode); |
766 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
767 | |
768 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, pad_params); |
769 | } |
770 | |
771 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad_mode) |
772 | { |
773 | OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params; |
774 | |
775 | if (ctx == NULL || pad_mode == NULL) { |
776 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
777 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
778 | return -2; |
779 | } |
780 | |
781 | /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ |
782 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL |
783 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA |
784 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) |
785 | return -1; |
786 | |
787 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ |
788 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) |
789 | || ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) |
790 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, 0, |
791 | pad_mode); |
792 | |
793 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode); |
794 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
795 | |
796 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, pad_params)) |
797 | return 0; |
798 | |
799 | return 1; |
800 | |
801 | } |
802 | |
803 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) |
804 | { |
805 | const char *name; |
806 | |
807 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { |
808 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
809 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
810 | return -2; |
811 | } |
812 | |
813 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
814 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
815 | return -1; |
816 | |
817 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ |
818 | if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) |
819 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
820 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md); |
821 | |
822 | name = (md == NULL) ? "" : EVP_MD_name(md); |
823 | |
824 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(ctx, name, NULL); |
825 | } |
826 | |
827 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, |
828 | const char *mdprops) |
829 | { |
830 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[3], *p = rsa_params; |
831 | |
832 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { |
833 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
834 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
835 | return -2; |
836 | } |
837 | |
838 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
839 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
840 | return -1; |
841 | |
842 | |
843 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, |
844 | /* |
845 | * Cast away the const. This is read |
846 | * only so should be safe |
847 | */ |
848 | (char *)mdname, |
849 | strlen(mdname) + 1); |
850 | if (mdprops != NULL) { |
851 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string( |
852 | OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST_PROPS, |
853 | /* |
854 | * Cast away the const. This is read |
855 | * only so should be safe |
856 | */ |
857 | (char *)mdprops, |
858 | strlen(mdprops) + 1); |
859 | } |
860 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
861 | |
862 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params); |
863 | } |
864 | |
865 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, |
866 | size_t namelen) |
867 | { |
868 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; |
869 | |
870 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { |
871 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
872 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
873 | return -2; |
874 | } |
875 | |
876 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
877 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
878 | return -1; |
879 | |
880 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, |
881 | name, namelen); |
882 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
883 | |
884 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params)) |
885 | return -1; |
886 | |
887 | return 1; |
888 | } |
889 | |
890 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md) |
891 | { |
892 | /* 80 should be big enough */ |
893 | char name[80] = "" ; |
894 | |
895 | if (ctx == NULL || md == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { |
896 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
897 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
898 | return -2; |
899 | } |
900 | |
901 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
902 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
903 | return -1; |
904 | |
905 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ |
906 | if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) |
907 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
908 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md); |
909 | |
910 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(ctx, name, sizeof(name)) <= 0) |
911 | return -1; |
912 | |
913 | /* May be NULL meaning "unknown" */ |
914 | *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(name); |
915 | |
916 | return 1; |
917 | } |
918 | |
919 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) |
920 | { |
921 | const char *name; |
922 | |
923 | if (ctx == NULL |
924 | || (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) |
925 | && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx))) { |
926 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
927 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
928 | return -2; |
929 | } |
930 | |
931 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
932 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL |
933 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA |
934 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) |
935 | return -1; |
936 | |
937 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ |
938 | if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) |
939 | && ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) |
940 | || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx) |
941 | && ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL)) |
942 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, |
943 | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
944 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md); |
945 | |
946 | name = (md == NULL) ? "" : EVP_MD_name(md); |
947 | |
948 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(ctx, name, NULL); |
949 | } |
950 | |
951 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, |
952 | const char *mdprops) |
953 | { |
954 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[3], *p = rsa_params; |
955 | |
956 | if (ctx == NULL |
957 | || mdname == NULL |
958 | || (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) |
959 | && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx))) { |
960 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
961 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
962 | return -2; |
963 | } |
964 | |
965 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
966 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL |
967 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA |
968 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) |
969 | return -1; |
970 | |
971 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, |
972 | /* |
973 | * Cast away the const. This is read |
974 | * only so should be safe |
975 | */ |
976 | (char *)mdname, |
977 | strlen(mdname) + 1); |
978 | if (mdprops != NULL) { |
979 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string( |
980 | OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST_PROPS, |
981 | /* |
982 | * Cast away the const. This is read |
983 | * only so should be safe |
984 | */ |
985 | (char *)mdprops, |
986 | strlen(mdprops) + 1); |
987 | } |
988 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
989 | |
990 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params); |
991 | } |
992 | |
993 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, |
994 | size_t namelen) |
995 | { |
996 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; |
997 | |
998 | if (ctx == NULL |
999 | || (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) |
1000 | && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx))) { |
1001 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
1002 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
1003 | return -2; |
1004 | } |
1005 | |
1006 | /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ |
1007 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL |
1008 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA |
1009 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) |
1010 | return -1; |
1011 | |
1012 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, |
1013 | name, namelen); |
1014 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
1015 | |
1016 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params)) |
1017 | return -1; |
1018 | |
1019 | return 1; |
1020 | } |
1021 | |
1022 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md) |
1023 | { |
1024 | /* 80 should be big enough */ |
1025 | char name[80] = "" ; |
1026 | |
1027 | if (ctx == NULL |
1028 | || (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) |
1029 | && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx))) { |
1030 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
1031 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
1032 | return -2; |
1033 | } |
1034 | |
1035 | /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ |
1036 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL |
1037 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA |
1038 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) |
1039 | return -1; |
1040 | |
1041 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ |
1042 | if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) |
1043 | && ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) |
1044 | || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx) |
1045 | && ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL)) |
1046 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, |
1047 | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
1048 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md); |
1049 | |
1050 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(ctx, name, sizeof(name)) <= 0) |
1051 | return -1; |
1052 | |
1053 | /* May be NULL meaning "unknown" */ |
1054 | *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(name); |
1055 | |
1056 | return 1; |
1057 | } |
1058 | |
1059 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *label, int llen) |
1060 | { |
1061 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; |
1062 | |
1063 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { |
1064 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
1065 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
1066 | return -2; |
1067 | } |
1068 | |
1069 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
1070 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
1071 | return -1; |
1072 | |
1073 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ |
1074 | if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) |
1075 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
1076 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, llen, |
1077 | (void *)label); |
1078 | |
1079 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, |
1080 | /* |
1081 | * Cast away the const. This is read |
1082 | * only so should be safe |
1083 | */ |
1084 | (void *)label, |
1085 | (size_t)llen); |
1086 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
1087 | |
1088 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params)) |
1089 | return 0; |
1090 | |
1091 | OPENSSL_free(label); |
1092 | return 1; |
1093 | } |
1094 | |
1095 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label) |
1096 | { |
1097 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[3], *p = rsa_params; |
1098 | size_t labellen; |
1099 | |
1100 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { |
1101 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
1102 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
1103 | return -2; |
1104 | } |
1105 | |
1106 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
1107 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
1108 | return -1; |
1109 | |
1110 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ |
1111 | if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) |
1112 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
1113 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, |
1114 | (void *)label); |
1115 | |
1116 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, |
1117 | (void **)label, 0); |
1118 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL_LEN, |
1119 | &labellen); |
1120 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
1121 | |
1122 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params)) |
1123 | return -1; |
1124 | |
1125 | if (labellen > INT_MAX) |
1126 | return -1; |
1127 | |
1128 | return (int)labellen; |
1129 | } |
1130 | |