| 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| 5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| 8 | */ |
| 9 | |
| 10 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| 11 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
| 12 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| 13 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| 14 | |
| 15 | #include "pcy_local.h" |
| 16 | |
| 17 | static void expected_print(BIO *channel, |
| 18 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, |
| 19 | int indent) |
| 20 | { |
| 21 | if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
| 22 | || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) |
| 23 | BIO_puts(channel, " Not Mapped\n" ); |
| 24 | else { |
| 25 | int i; |
| 26 | |
| 27 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set; |
| 28 | ASN1_OBJECT *oid; |
| 29 | BIO_puts(channel, " Expected: " ); |
| 30 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) { |
| 31 | oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i); |
| 32 | if (i) |
| 33 | BIO_puts(channel, ", " ); |
| 34 | i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(channel, oid); |
| 35 | } |
| 36 | BIO_puts(channel, "\n" ); |
| 37 | } |
| 38 | } |
| 39 | |
| 40 | static void tree_print(BIO *channel, |
| 41 | char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| 42 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) |
| 43 | { |
| 44 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev; |
| 45 | |
| 46 | if (!curr) |
| 47 | curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel; |
| 48 | else |
| 49 | curr++; |
| 50 | |
| 51 | BIO_printf(channel, "Level print after %s\n" , str); |
| 52 | BIO_printf(channel, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n" , |
| 53 | (long)(curr - tree->levels)); |
| 54 | for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) { |
| 55 | int i; |
| 56 | |
| 57 | BIO_printf(channel, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n" , |
| 58 | (long)(plev - tree->levels), plev->flags); |
| 59 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) { |
| 60 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node = |
| 61 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i); |
| 62 | |
| 63 | X509_POLICY_NODE_print(channel, node, 2); |
| 64 | expected_print(channel, plev, node, 2); |
| 65 | BIO_printf(channel, " Flags: %x\n" , node->data->flags); |
| 66 | } |
| 67 | if (plev->anyPolicy) |
| 68 | X509_POLICY_NODE_print(channel, plev->anyPolicy, 2); |
| 69 | } |
| 70 | } |
| 71 | |
| 72 | #define TREE_PRINT(str, tree, curr) \ |
| 73 | OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(X509V3_POLICY) { \ |
| 74 | tree_print(trc_out, "before tree_prune()", tree, curr); \ |
| 75 | } OSSL_TRACE_END(X509V3_POLICY) |
| 76 | |
| 77 | /*- |
| 78 | * Return value: <= 0 on error, or positive bit mask: |
| 79 | * |
| 80 | * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree |
| 81 | * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree (including bare TA case) |
| 82 | * X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT: explicit policy required |
| 83 | */ |
| 84 | static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| 85 | unsigned int flags) |
| 86 | { |
| 87 | X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; |
| 88 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level; |
| 89 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; |
| 90 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL; |
| 91 | int ret = X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| 92 | int n = sk_X509_num(certs) - 1; /* RFC5280 paths omit the TA */ |
| 93 | int explicit_policy = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : n+1; |
| 94 | int any_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : n+1; |
| 95 | int map_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : n+1; |
| 96 | int i; |
| 97 | |
| 98 | *ptree = NULL; |
| 99 | |
| 100 | /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */ |
| 101 | if (n == 0) |
| 102 | return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY; |
| 103 | |
| 104 | /* |
| 105 | * First setup the policy cache in all n non-TA certificates, this will be |
| 106 | * used in X509_verify_cert() which will invoke the verify callback for all |
| 107 | * certificates with invalid policy extensions. |
| 108 | */ |
| 109 | for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 110 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| 111 | |
| 112 | /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| 113 | X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
| 114 | |
| 115 | /* If cache is NULL, likely ENOMEM: return immediately */ |
| 116 | if (policy_cache_set(x) == NULL) |
| 117 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 118 | } |
| 119 | |
| 120 | /* |
| 121 | * At this point check for invalid policies and required explicit policy. |
| 122 | * Note that the explicit_policy counter is a count-down to zero, with the |
| 123 | * requirement kicking in if and once it does that. The counter is |
| 124 | * decremented for every non-self-issued certificate in the path, but may |
| 125 | * be further reduced by policy constraints in a non-leaf certificate. |
| 126 | * |
| 127 | * The ultimate policy set is the intersection of all the policies along |
| 128 | * the path, if we hit a certificate with an empty policy set, and explicit |
| 129 | * policy is required we're done. |
| 130 | */ |
| 131 | for (i = n - 1; |
| 132 | i >= 0 && (explicit_policy > 0 || (ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) == 0); |
| 133 | i--) { |
| 134 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| 135 | uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x); |
| 136 | |
| 137 | /* All the policies are already cached, we can return early */ |
| 138 | if (ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) |
| 139 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID; |
| 140 | |
| 141 | /* Access the cache which we now know exists */ |
| 142 | cache = policy_cache_set(x); |
| 143 | |
| 144 | if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) && cache->data == NULL) |
| 145 | ret = X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY; |
| 146 | if (explicit_policy > 0) { |
| 147 | if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| 148 | explicit_policy--; |
| 149 | if ((cache->explicit_skip >= 0) |
| 150 | && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy)) |
| 151 | explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip; |
| 152 | } |
| 153 | } |
| 154 | |
| 155 | if (explicit_policy == 0) |
| 156 | ret |= X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT; |
| 157 | if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) == 0) |
| 158 | return ret; |
| 159 | |
| 160 | /* If we get this far initialize the tree */ |
| 161 | if ((tree = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree))) == NULL) { |
| 162 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_TREE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 163 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 164 | } |
| 165 | |
| 166 | /* |
| 167 | * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3. |
| 168 | * |
| 169 | * The top level is implicitly for the trust anchor with valid expected |
| 170 | * policies of anyPolicy. (RFC 5280 has the TA at depth 0 and the leaf at |
| 171 | * depth n, we have the leaf at depth 0 and the TA at depth n). |
| 172 | */ |
| 173 | if ((tree->levels = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree->levels)*(n+1))) == NULL) { |
| 174 | OPENSSL_free(tree); |
| 175 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_TREE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 176 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 177 | } |
| 178 | tree->nlevel = n+1; |
| 179 | level = tree->levels; |
| 180 | if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL) |
| 181 | goto bad_tree; |
| 182 | if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) { |
| 183 | policy_data_free(data); |
| 184 | goto bad_tree; |
| 185 | } |
| 186 | |
| 187 | /* |
| 188 | * In this pass initialize all the tree levels and whether anyPolicy and |
| 189 | * policy mapping are inhibited at each level. |
| 190 | */ |
| 191 | for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 192 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| 193 | uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x); |
| 194 | |
| 195 | /* Access the cache which we now know exists */ |
| 196 | cache = policy_cache_set(x); |
| 197 | |
| 198 | X509_up_ref(x); |
| 199 | (++level)->cert = x; |
| 200 | |
| 201 | if (!cache->anyPolicy) |
| 202 | level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; |
| 203 | |
| 204 | /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */ |
| 205 | if (any_skip == 0) { |
| 206 | /* |
| 207 | * Any matching allowed only if certificate is self issued and not |
| 208 | * the last in the chain. |
| 209 | */ |
| 210 | if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0)) |
| 211 | level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; |
| 212 | } else { |
| 213 | if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| 214 | any_skip--; |
| 215 | if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) && (cache->any_skip < any_skip)) |
| 216 | any_skip = cache->any_skip; |
| 217 | } |
| 218 | |
| 219 | if (map_skip == 0) |
| 220 | level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; |
| 221 | else { |
| 222 | if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| 223 | map_skip--; |
| 224 | if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) && (cache->map_skip < map_skip)) |
| 225 | map_skip = cache->map_skip; |
| 226 | } |
| 227 | } |
| 228 | |
| 229 | *ptree = tree; |
| 230 | return ret; |
| 231 | |
| 232 | bad_tree: |
| 233 | X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| 234 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 235 | } |
| 236 | |
| 237 | /* |
| 238 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise |
| 239 | */ |
| 240 | static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 241 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data) |
| 242 | { |
| 243 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| 244 | int i, matched = 0; |
| 245 | |
| 246 | /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */ |
| 247 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { |
| 248 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); |
| 249 | |
| 250 | if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { |
| 251 | if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL) |
| 252 | return 0; |
| 253 | matched = 1; |
| 254 | } |
| 255 | } |
| 256 | if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { |
| 257 | if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) |
| 258 | return 0; |
| 259 | } |
| 260 | return 1; |
| 261 | } |
| 262 | |
| 263 | /* |
| 264 | * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from |
| 265 | * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match. |
| 266 | * |
| 267 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| 268 | */ |
| 269 | static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 270 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) |
| 271 | { |
| 272 | int i; |
| 273 | |
| 274 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) { |
| 275 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); |
| 276 | |
| 277 | /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ |
| 278 | if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) |
| 279 | return 0; |
| 280 | } |
| 281 | return 1; |
| 282 | } |
| 283 | |
| 284 | /* |
| 285 | * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched |
| 286 | * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy. |
| 287 | * |
| 288 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| 289 | */ |
| 290 | static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 291 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| 292 | const ASN1_OBJECT *id, |
| 293 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 294 | { |
| 295 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data; |
| 296 | |
| 297 | if (id == NULL) |
| 298 | id = node->data->valid_policy; |
| 299 | /* |
| 300 | * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched |
| 301 | * node. |
| 302 | */ |
| 303 | if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node))) == NULL) |
| 304 | return 0; |
| 305 | |
| 306 | /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ |
| 307 | data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; |
| 308 | data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; |
| 309 | if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) { |
| 310 | policy_data_free(data); |
| 311 | return 0; |
| 312 | } |
| 313 | return 1; |
| 314 | } |
| 315 | |
| 316 | /* |
| 317 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| 318 | */ |
| 319 | static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 320 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| 321 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 322 | { |
| 323 | const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| 324 | int i; |
| 325 | |
| 326 | if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
| 327 | || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) { |
| 328 | /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */ |
| 329 | if (node->nchild) |
| 330 | return 1; |
| 331 | if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree)) |
| 332 | return 0; |
| 333 | /* Add it */ |
| 334 | } else { |
| 335 | /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */ |
| 336 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set; |
| 337 | if (node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset)) |
| 338 | return 1; |
| 339 | /* Locate unmatched nodes */ |
| 340 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) { |
| 341 | ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i); |
| 342 | if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid)) |
| 343 | continue; |
| 344 | if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree)) |
| 345 | return 0; |
| 346 | } |
| 347 | |
| 348 | } |
| 349 | return 1; |
| 350 | } |
| 351 | |
| 352 | /* |
| 353 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise |
| 354 | */ |
| 355 | static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 356 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| 357 | X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 358 | { |
| 359 | int i; |
| 360 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| 361 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| 362 | |
| 363 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { |
| 364 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); |
| 365 | |
| 366 | if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree)) |
| 367 | return 0; |
| 368 | } |
| 369 | /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ |
| 370 | if (last->anyPolicy && |
| 371 | level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) |
| 372 | return 0; |
| 373 | return 1; |
| 374 | } |
| 375 | |
| 376 | /*- |
| 377 | * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level then |
| 378 | * proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever have no |
| 379 | * data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty. |
| 380 | * |
| 381 | * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of: |
| 382 | * |
| 383 | * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree |
| 384 | * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree |
| 385 | */ |
| 386 | static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) |
| 387 | { |
| 388 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes; |
| 389 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| 390 | int i; |
| 391 | nodes = curr->nodes; |
| 392 | if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) { |
| 393 | for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 394 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); |
| 395 | /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */ |
| 396 | if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) { |
| 397 | node->parent->nchild--; |
| 398 | OPENSSL_free(node); |
| 399 | (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); |
| 400 | } |
| 401 | } |
| 402 | } |
| 403 | |
| 404 | for (;;) { |
| 405 | --curr; |
| 406 | nodes = curr->nodes; |
| 407 | for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 408 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); |
| 409 | if (node->nchild == 0) { |
| 410 | node->parent->nchild--; |
| 411 | OPENSSL_free(node); |
| 412 | (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); |
| 413 | } |
| 414 | } |
| 415 | if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) { |
| 416 | if (curr->anyPolicy->parent) |
| 417 | curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--; |
| 418 | OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy); |
| 419 | curr->anyPolicy = NULL; |
| 420 | } |
| 421 | if (curr == tree->levels) { |
| 422 | /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */ |
| 423 | if (!curr->anyPolicy) |
| 424 | return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY; |
| 425 | break; |
| 426 | } |
| 427 | } |
| 428 | return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| 429 | } |
| 430 | |
| 431 | /* |
| 432 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| 433 | */ |
| 434 | static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes, |
| 435 | X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy) |
| 436 | { |
| 437 | if (*pnodes == NULL && |
| 438 | (*pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new()) == NULL) |
| 439 | return 0; |
| 440 | if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) >= 0) |
| 441 | return 1; |
| 442 | return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy) != 0; |
| 443 | } |
| 444 | |
| 445 | #define TREE_CALC_FAILURE 0 |
| 446 | #define TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE 1 |
| 447 | #define TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE 2 |
| 448 | |
| 449 | /*- |
| 450 | * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter is |
| 451 | * used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user set. |
| 452 | * If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to the |
| 453 | * authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set of |
| 454 | * valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. |
| 455 | * |
| 456 | * Return value: |
| 457 | * TREE_CALC_FAILURE on failure, |
| 458 | * TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE on success and pnodes need not be freed, |
| 459 | * TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE on success and pnodes needs to be freed |
| 460 | */ |
| 461 | static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| 462 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes) |
| 463 | { |
| 464 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; |
| 465 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr; |
| 466 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes; |
| 467 | int i, j; |
| 468 | curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1; |
| 469 | |
| 470 | /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */ |
| 471 | if (curr->anyPolicy) { |
| 472 | if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy)) |
| 473 | return TREE_CALC_FAILURE; |
| 474 | addnodes = pnodes; |
| 475 | } else |
| 476 | /* Add policies to authority set */ |
| 477 | addnodes = &tree->auth_policies; |
| 478 | |
| 479 | curr = tree->levels; |
| 480 | for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) { |
| 481 | /* |
| 482 | * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower |
| 483 | * levels so end search. |
| 484 | */ |
| 485 | if ((anyptr = curr->anyPolicy) == NULL) |
| 486 | break; |
| 487 | curr++; |
| 488 | for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) { |
| 489 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j); |
| 490 | if ((node->parent == anyptr) |
| 491 | && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) { |
| 492 | if (addnodes == pnodes) { |
| 493 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(*pnodes); |
| 494 | *pnodes = NULL; |
| 495 | } |
| 496 | return TREE_CALC_FAILURE; |
| 497 | } |
| 498 | } |
| 499 | } |
| 500 | if (addnodes == pnodes) |
| 501 | return TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE; |
| 502 | |
| 503 | *pnodes = tree->auth_policies; |
| 504 | return TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE; |
| 505 | } |
| 506 | |
| 507 | /* |
| 508 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| 509 | */ |
| 510 | static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| 511 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, |
| 512 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes) |
| 513 | { |
| 514 | int i; |
| 515 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| 516 | ASN1_OBJECT *oid; |
| 517 | X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy; |
| 518 | X509_POLICY_DATA *; |
| 519 | |
| 520 | /* |
| 521 | * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this |
| 522 | * will happen if it is a leaf node. |
| 523 | */ |
| 524 | if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0) |
| 525 | return 1; |
| 526 | |
| 527 | anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy; |
| 528 | |
| 529 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { |
| 530 | oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); |
| 531 | if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) { |
| 532 | tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY; |
| 533 | return 1; |
| 534 | } |
| 535 | } |
| 536 | |
| 537 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { |
| 538 | oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); |
| 539 | node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid); |
| 540 | if (!node) { |
| 541 | if (!anyPolicy) |
| 542 | continue; |
| 543 | /* |
| 544 | * Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers |
| 545 | * from anyPolicy. |
| 546 | */ |
| 547 | extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy)); |
| 548 | if (extra == NULL) |
| 549 | return 0; |
| 550 | extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set; |
| 551 | extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS |
| 552 | | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; |
| 553 | node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree); |
| 554 | } |
| 555 | if (!tree->user_policies) { |
| 556 | tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); |
| 557 | if (!tree->user_policies) |
| 558 | return 1; |
| 559 | } |
| 560 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node)) |
| 561 | return 0; |
| 562 | } |
| 563 | return 1; |
| 564 | } |
| 565 | |
| 566 | /*- |
| 567 | * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of: |
| 568 | * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree |
| 569 | * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree |
| 570 | * (see tree_prune()). |
| 571 | */ |
| 572 | static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 573 | { |
| 574 | int ret, i; |
| 575 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1; |
| 576 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; |
| 577 | |
| 578 | for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { |
| 579 | cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert); |
| 580 | if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) |
| 581 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 582 | |
| 583 | if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) |
| 584 | && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree)) |
| 585 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 586 | TREE_PRINT("before tree_prune()" , tree, curr); |
| 587 | ret = tree_prune(tree, curr); |
| 588 | if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) |
| 589 | return ret; |
| 590 | } |
| 591 | return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| 592 | } |
| 593 | |
| 594 | static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) |
| 595 | { |
| 596 | if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE)) |
| 597 | OPENSSL_free(node); |
| 598 | } |
| 599 | |
| 600 | void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 601 | { |
| 602 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; |
| 603 | int i; |
| 604 | |
| 605 | if (!tree) |
| 606 | return; |
| 607 | |
| 608 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies); |
| 609 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free); |
| 610 | |
| 611 | for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { |
| 612 | X509_free(curr->cert); |
| 613 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free); |
| 614 | policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy); |
| 615 | } |
| 616 | |
| 617 | sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free); |
| 618 | OPENSSL_free(tree->levels); |
| 619 | OPENSSL_free(tree); |
| 620 | |
| 621 | } |
| 622 | |
| 623 | /*- |
| 624 | * Application policy checking function. |
| 625 | * Return codes: |
| 626 | * X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE: Failure to satisfy explicit policy |
| 627 | * X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID: Inconsistent or invalid extensions |
| 628 | * X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL: Internal error, most likely malloc |
| 629 | * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: Success (null tree if empty or bare TA) |
| 630 | */ |
| 631 | int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy, |
| 632 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| 633 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags) |
| 634 | { |
| 635 | int init_ret; |
| 636 | int ret; |
| 637 | int calc_ret; |
| 638 | X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL; |
| 639 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL; |
| 640 | |
| 641 | *ptree = NULL; |
| 642 | *pexplicit_policy = 0; |
| 643 | init_ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags); |
| 644 | |
| 645 | if (init_ret <= 0) |
| 646 | return init_ret; |
| 647 | |
| 648 | if ((init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) == 0) { |
| 649 | if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) { |
| 650 | X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| 651 | return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| 652 | } |
| 653 | } else { |
| 654 | *pexplicit_policy = 1; |
| 655 | /* Tree empty and requireExplicit True: Error */ |
| 656 | if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) |
| 657 | return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE; |
| 658 | } |
| 659 | |
| 660 | ret = tree_evaluate(tree); |
| 661 | TREE_PRINT("tree_evaluate()" , tree, NULL); |
| 662 | if (ret <= 0) |
| 663 | goto error; |
| 664 | |
| 665 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) { |
| 666 | X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| 667 | if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) |
| 668 | return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE; |
| 669 | return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| 670 | } |
| 671 | |
| 672 | /* Tree is not empty: continue */ |
| 673 | |
| 674 | if ((calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes)) == 0) |
| 675 | goto error; |
| 676 | ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes); |
| 677 | if (calc_ret == TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE) |
| 678 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes); |
| 679 | if (!ret) |
| 680 | goto error; |
| 681 | |
| 682 | *ptree = tree; |
| 683 | |
| 684 | if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) { |
| 685 | nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree); |
| 686 | if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0) |
| 687 | return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE; |
| 688 | } |
| 689 | return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| 690 | |
| 691 | error: |
| 692 | X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| 693 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 694 | } |
| 695 | |