| 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| 5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| 8 | */ |
| 9 | |
| 10 | #include "../ssl_local.h" |
| 11 | #include "record_local.h" |
| 12 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| 13 | |
| 14 | /*- |
| 15 | * tls13_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Will call SSLfatal() for |
| 16 | * internal errors, but not otherwise. |
| 17 | * |
| 18 | * Returns: |
| 19 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too |
| 20 | * short etc). |
| 21 | * 1: if the record encryption was successful. |
| 22 | * -1: if the record's AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, |
| 23 | * an internal error occurred. |
| 24 | */ |
| 25 | int tls13_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending) |
| 26 | { |
| 27 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; |
| 28 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], [SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
| 29 | size_t ivlen, taglen, offset, loop, hdrlen; |
| 30 | unsigned char *staticiv; |
| 31 | unsigned char *seq; |
| 32 | int lenu, lenf; |
| 33 | SSL3_RECORD *rec = &recs[0]; |
| 34 | uint32_t alg_enc; |
| 35 | WPACKET wpkt; |
| 36 | |
| 37 | if (n_recs != 1) { |
| 38 | /* Should not happen */ |
| 39 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Support pipelining */ |
| 40 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC, |
| 41 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 42 | return -1; |
| 43 | } |
| 44 | |
| 45 | if (sending) { |
| 46 | ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; |
| 47 | staticiv = s->write_iv; |
| 48 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
| 49 | } else { |
| 50 | ctx = s->enc_read_ctx; |
| 51 | staticiv = s->read_iv; |
| 52 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
| 53 | } |
| 54 | |
| 55 | /* |
| 56 | * If we're sending an alert and ctx != NULL then we must be forcing |
| 57 | * plaintext alerts. If we're reading and ctx != NULL then we allow |
| 58 | * plaintext alerts at certain points in the handshake. If we've got this |
| 59 | * far then we have already validated that a plaintext alert is ok here. |
| 60 | */ |
| 61 | if (ctx == NULL || rec->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { |
| 62 | memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); |
| 63 | rec->input = rec->data; |
| 64 | return 1; |
| 65 | } |
| 66 | |
| 67 | ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); |
| 68 | |
| 69 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING |
| 70 | || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) { |
| 71 | if (s->session != NULL && s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0) { |
| 72 | alg_enc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc; |
| 73 | } else { |
| 74 | if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL |
| 75 | && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) { |
| 76 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC, |
| 77 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 78 | return -1; |
| 79 | } |
| 80 | alg_enc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc; |
| 81 | } |
| 82 | } else { |
| 83 | /* |
| 84 | * To get here we must have selected a ciphersuite - otherwise ctx would |
| 85 | * be NULL |
| 86 | */ |
| 87 | if (!ossl_assert(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL)) { |
| 88 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC, |
| 89 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 90 | return -1; |
| 91 | } |
| 92 | alg_enc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc; |
| 93 | } |
| 94 | |
| 95 | if (alg_enc & SSL_AESCCM) { |
| 96 | if (alg_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) |
| 97 | taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
| 98 | else |
| 99 | taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
| 100 | if (sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, |
| 101 | NULL) <= 0) { |
| 102 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC, |
| 103 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 104 | return -1; |
| 105 | } |
| 106 | } else if (alg_enc & SSL_AESGCM) { |
| 107 | taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
| 108 | } else if (alg_enc & SSL_CHACHA20) { |
| 109 | taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
| 110 | } else { |
| 111 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC, |
| 112 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 113 | return -1; |
| 114 | } |
| 115 | |
| 116 | if (!sending) { |
| 117 | /* |
| 118 | * Take off tag. There must be at least one byte of content type as |
| 119 | * well as the tag |
| 120 | */ |
| 121 | if (rec->length < taglen + 1) |
| 122 | return 0; |
| 123 | rec->length -= taglen; |
| 124 | } |
| 125 | |
| 126 | /* Set up IV */ |
| 127 | if (ivlen < SEQ_NUM_SIZE) { |
| 128 | /* Should not happen */ |
| 129 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC, |
| 130 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 131 | return -1; |
| 132 | } |
| 133 | offset = ivlen - SEQ_NUM_SIZE; |
| 134 | memcpy(iv, staticiv, offset); |
| 135 | for (loop = 0; loop < SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop++) |
| 136 | iv[offset + loop] = staticiv[offset + loop] ^ seq[loop]; |
| 137 | |
| 138 | /* Increment the sequence counter */ |
| 139 | for (loop = SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop > 0; loop--) { |
| 140 | ++seq[loop - 1]; |
| 141 | if (seq[loop - 1] != 0) |
| 142 | break; |
| 143 | } |
| 144 | if (loop == 0) { |
| 145 | /* Sequence has wrapped */ |
| 146 | return -1; |
| 147 | } |
| 148 | |
| 149 | /* TODO(size_t): lenu/lenf should be a size_t but EVP doesn't support it */ |
| 150 | if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, sending) <= 0 |
| 151 | || (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, |
| 152 | taglen, |
| 153 | rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)) { |
| 154 | return -1; |
| 155 | } |
| 156 | |
| 157 | /* Set up the AAD */ |
| 158 | if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, recheader, sizeof(recheader), 0) |
| 159 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, rec->type) |
| 160 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->rec_version) |
| 161 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->length + taglen) |
| 162 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &hdrlen) |
| 163 | || hdrlen != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH |
| 164 | || !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) { |
| 165 | WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt); |
| 166 | return -1; |
| 167 | } |
| 168 | |
| 169 | /* |
| 170 | * For CCM we must explicitly set the total plaintext length before we add |
| 171 | * any AAD. |
| 172 | */ |
| 173 | if (((alg_enc & SSL_AESCCM) != 0 |
| 174 | && EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, NULL, |
| 175 | (unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0) |
| 176 | || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, recheader, |
| 177 | sizeof(recheader)) <= 0 |
| 178 | || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, rec->data, &lenu, rec->input, |
| 179 | (unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0 |
| 180 | || EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, rec->data + lenu, &lenf) <= 0 |
| 181 | || (size_t)(lenu + lenf) != rec->length) { |
| 182 | return -1; |
| 183 | } |
| 184 | if (sending) { |
| 185 | /* Add the tag */ |
| 186 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen, |
| 187 | rec->data + rec->length) <= 0) { |
| 188 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC, |
| 189 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 190 | return -1; |
| 191 | } |
| 192 | rec->length += taglen; |
| 193 | } |
| 194 | |
| 195 | return 1; |
| 196 | } |
| 197 | |