1/*
2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12#include <stdio.h>
13#include <time.h>
14#include <assert.h>
15#include "../ssl_local.h"
16#include "statem_local.h"
17#include <openssl/buffer.h>
18#include <openssl/rand.h>
19#include <openssl/objects.h>
20#include <openssl/evp.h>
21#include <openssl/md5.h>
22#include <openssl/dh.h>
23#include <openssl/bn.h>
24#include <openssl/engine.h>
25#include <openssl/trace.h>
26#include <internal/cryptlib.h>
27
28static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
29static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
30
31static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
32static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
33static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 WPACKET *pkt);
35
36/*
37 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
38 *
39 * Return values are:
40 * 1: Yes
41 * 0: No
42 */
43static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
44{
45 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
46 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
47 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
48 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
49 return 0;
50
51 return 1;
52}
53
54/*
55 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
56 *
57 * Return values are:
58 * 1: Yes
59 * 0: No
60 */
61static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
62{
63 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
64
65 /*
66 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
67 * ciphersuite or for SRP
68 */
69 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
70 | SSL_kSRP)) {
71 return 1;
72 }
73
74 return 0;
75}
76
77/*
78 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
79 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
80 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
81 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
82 *
83 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
84 * (transition not allowed)
85 */
86static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
87{
88 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
89
90 /*
91 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
92 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
93 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
94 */
95
96 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 default:
98 break;
99
100 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
101 /*
102 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
103 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
104 */
105 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
106 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
107 return 1;
108 }
109 break;
110
111 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
112 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
113 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
114 return 1;
115 }
116 break;
117
118 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
119 if (s->hit) {
120 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
121 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 return 1;
123 }
124 } else {
125 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
126 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
127 return 1;
128 }
129 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
130 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
131 return 1;
132 }
133 }
134 break;
135
136 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
137 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
138 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
139 return 1;
140 }
141 break;
142
143 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
144 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
145 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
146 return 1;
147 }
148 break;
149
150 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
151 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
152 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
153 return 1;
154 }
155 break;
156
157 case TLS_ST_OK:
158 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
159 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
160 return 1;
161 }
162 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
163 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
164 return 1;
165 }
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
167#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
168# error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
169#endif
170 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
171 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
172 /*
173 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
174 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
175 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
176 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
177 */
178 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
179 /* SSLfatal() already called */
180 return 0;
181 }
182 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
183 return 1;
184 }
185 }
186 break;
187 }
188
189 /* No valid transition found */
190 return 0;
191}
192
193/*
194 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
195 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
196 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
197 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
198 *
199 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
200 * (transition not allowed)
201 */
202int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
203{
204 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
205 int ske_expected;
206
207 /*
208 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
209 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
210 */
211 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
212 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
213 goto err;
214 return 1;
215 }
216
217 switch (st->hand_state) {
218 default:
219 break;
220
221 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
222 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
223 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
224 return 1;
225 }
226
227 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
228 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
229 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
230 return 1;
231 }
232 }
233 break;
234
235 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
236 /*
237 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
238 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
239 * HelloRetryRequest.
240 */
241 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
242 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
243 return 1;
244 }
245 break;
246
247 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
248 if (s->hit) {
249 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
250 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
251 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
252 return 1;
253 }
254 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
256 return 1;
257 }
258 } else {
259 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
260 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
261 return 1;
262 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
263 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
264 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
265 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
266 /*
267 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
268 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
269 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
270 * the server is resuming.
271 */
272 s->hit = 1;
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
274 return 1;
275 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
276 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
279 return 1;
280 }
281 } else {
282 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
283 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
284 if (ske_expected
285 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
286 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
287 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
288 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
289 return 1;
290 }
291 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
292 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
293 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
294 return 1;
295 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
296 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
297 return 1;
298 }
299 }
300 }
301 break;
302
303 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
304 /*
305 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
306 * |ext.status_expected| is set
307 */
308 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
309 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
310 return 1;
311 }
312 /* Fall through */
313
314 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
315 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
316 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
317 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
318 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
319 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
320 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
321 return 1;
322 }
323 goto err;
324 }
325 /* Fall through */
326
327 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
328 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
329 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
330 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
331 return 1;
332 }
333 goto err;
334 }
335 /* Fall through */
336
337 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
338 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
339 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
340 return 1;
341 }
342 break;
343
344 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
345 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
346 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
348 return 1;
349 }
350 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
352 return 1;
353 }
354 break;
355
356 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
359 return 1;
360 }
361 break;
362
363 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
364 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
365 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
366 return 1;
367 }
368 break;
369
370 case TLS_ST_OK:
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
373 return 1;
374 }
375 break;
376 }
377
378 err:
379 /* No valid transition found */
380 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
381 BIO *rbio;
382
383 /*
384 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
385 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
386 */
387 s->init_num = 0;
388 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
389 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
390 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
391 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
392 return 0;
393 }
394 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
395 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
396 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
397 return 0;
398}
399
400/*
401 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
402 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
403 * server.
404 */
405static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
406{
407 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
408
409 /*
410 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
411 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
412 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
413 */
414 switch (st->hand_state) {
415 default:
416 /* Shouldn't happen */
417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
418 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
419 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
421
422 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
423 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 }
427 /*
428 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
429 * we already sent close_notify
430 */
431 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
432 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
434 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
436 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
437 }
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
440
441 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
442 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
443 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
445 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
446 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
448 else
449 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
450 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
452
453 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
454 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457 }
458 /* Fall through */
459
460 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
461 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
462 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
463 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
465
466 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
467 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
468 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
469 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
471
472 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
473 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
474 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475
476 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
477 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
478 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
479 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
482
483 case TLS_ST_OK:
484 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487 }
488
489 /* Try to read from the server instead */
490 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
491 }
492}
493
494/*
495 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
496 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
497 */
498WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
499{
500 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
501
502 /*
503 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
504 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
505 * later
506 */
507 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
508 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
509
510 switch (st->hand_state) {
511 default:
512 /* Shouldn't happen */
513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
514 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
516 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
517
518 case TLS_ST_OK:
519 if (!s->renegotiate) {
520 /*
521 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
522 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
523 */
524 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
525 }
526 /* Renegotiation */
527 /* fall thru */
528 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
529 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
530 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
531
532 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
533 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
534 /*
535 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
536 * actually selected a version yet.
537 */
538 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
540 else
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
543 }
544 /*
545 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
546 * we will be sent
547 */
548 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
549
550 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
551 /*
552 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
553 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
554 * because we did early data.
555 */
556 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
557 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
559 else
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
562
563 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
564 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
565
566 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569
570 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
571 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
573 else
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576
577 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
580
581 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
582 /*
583 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
584 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
585 */
586 /*
587 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
588 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
589 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
590 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
591 */
592 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
594 } else {
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
596 }
597 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
599 }
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
601
602 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
604 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605
606 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
607 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
609 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
611 } else {
612#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
614#else
615 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
617 else
618 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
619#endif
620 }
621 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
622
623#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
624 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
625 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
627#endif
628
629 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
630 if (s->hit) {
631 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
633 } else {
634 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
635 }
636
637 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
638 if (s->hit) {
639 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
640 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
641 } else {
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
644 }
645
646 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
647 /*
648 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
649 * convenient time.
650 */
651 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
652 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
653 /* SSLfatal() already called */
654 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
655 }
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
658 }
659 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
660 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
661 }
662}
663
664/*
665 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
666 * the client to the server.
667 */
668WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
669{
670 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
671
672 switch (st->hand_state) {
673 default:
674 /* No pre work to be done */
675 break;
676
677 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
678 s->shutdown = 0;
679 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
680 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
681 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
682 /* SSLfatal() already called */
683 return WORK_ERROR;
684 }
685 }
686 break;
687
688 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
690 if (s->hit) {
691 /*
692 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
693 * messages unless we need to.
694 */
695 st->use_timer = 0;
696 }
697#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
698 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
699 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
700 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
701 }
702#endif
703 }
704 break;
705
706 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
707 /*
708 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
709 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
710 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
711 */
712 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
713 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
714 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
715 /* Fall through */
716
717 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
718 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
719
720 case TLS_ST_OK:
721 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
722 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
723 }
724
725 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
726}
727
728/*
729 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
730 * client to the server.
731 */
732WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
733{
734 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
735
736 s->init_num = 0;
737
738 switch (st->hand_state) {
739 default:
740 /* No post work to be done */
741 break;
742
743 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
744 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
745 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
746 /*
747 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
748 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
749 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
750 */
751 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
752 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
753 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
754 /* SSLfatal() already called */
755 return WORK_ERROR;
756 }
757 }
758 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
759 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
760 return WORK_MORE_A;
761 }
762
763 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
764 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
765 s->first_packet = 1;
766 }
767 break;
768
769 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
770 /*
771 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
772 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
773 */
774 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
775 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
776 break;
777
778 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
779 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
780 /* SSLfatal() already called */
781 return WORK_ERROR;
782 }
783 break;
784
785 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
786 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
787 break;
788 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
789 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
790 /*
791 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
792 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
793 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
794 */
795 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
796 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
797 return WORK_ERROR;
798 break;
799 }
800 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
801#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
802 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
803#else
804 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
805 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
806 else
807 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
808#endif
809 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
810 /* SSLfatal() already called */
811 return WORK_ERROR;
812 }
813
814 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
815 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
817 return WORK_ERROR;
818 }
819
820 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
821#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
822 if (s->hit) {
823 /*
824 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
825 * no SCTP used.
826 */
827 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
828 0, NULL);
829 }
830#endif
831
832 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
833 }
834 break;
835
836 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
837#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
838 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
839 /*
840 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
841 * no SCTP used.
842 */
843 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
844 0, NULL);
845 }
846#endif
847 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
848 return WORK_MORE_B;
849
850 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
851 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
853 return WORK_ERROR;
854 }
855 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
856 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
857 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
858 /* SSLfatal() already called */
859 return WORK_ERROR;
860 }
861 }
862 }
863 break;
864
865 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
866 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
867 return WORK_MORE_A;
868 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
869 /* SSLfatal() already called */
870 return WORK_ERROR;
871 }
872 break;
873 }
874
875 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
876}
877
878/*
879 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
880 * client
881 *
882 * Valid return values are:
883 * 1: Success
884 * 0: Error
885 */
886int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
887 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
888{
889 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
890
891 switch (st->hand_state) {
892 default:
893 /* Shouldn't happen */
894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
895 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
896 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
897 return 0;
898
899 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
900 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
901 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
902 else
903 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
904 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
905 break;
906
907 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
908 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
909 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
910 break;
911
912 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
913 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
914 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
915 break;
916
917 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
918 *confunc = NULL;
919 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
920 break;
921
922 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
923 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
924 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
925 break;
926
927 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
928 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
929 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
930 break;
931
932 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
933 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
934 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
935 break;
936
937#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
938 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
939 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
940 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
941 break;
942#endif
943 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
944 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
945 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
946 break;
947
948 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
949 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
950 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
951 break;
952 }
953
954 return 1;
955}
956
957/*
958 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
959 * reading. Excludes the message header.
960 */
961size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
962{
963 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
964
965 switch (st->hand_state) {
966 default:
967 /* Shouldn't happen */
968 return 0;
969
970 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
971 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
972
973 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
974 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
975
976 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
977 return s->max_cert_list;
978
979 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
980 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
981
982 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
983 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
984
985 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
986 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
987
988 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
989 /*
990 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
991 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
992 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
993 */
994 return s->max_cert_list;
995
996 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
997 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
998
999 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1000 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1001 return 3;
1002 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1003
1004 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1005 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1006
1007 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1008 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1009
1010 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1011 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1012
1013 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1014 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1015 }
1016}
1017
1018/*
1019 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1020 */
1021MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1022{
1023 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1024
1025 switch (st->hand_state) {
1026 default:
1027 /* Shouldn't happen */
1028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1029 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1031 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1032
1033 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1034 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1035
1036 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1037 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1038
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1040 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1041
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1043 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1044
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1046 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1047
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1049 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1050
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1052 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1053
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1055 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1056
1057 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1058 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1059
1060 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1061 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1062
1063 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1064 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1065
1066 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1067 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1068
1069 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1070 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1071
1072 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1073 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1074 }
1075}
1076
1077/*
1078 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1079 * from the server
1080 */
1081WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1082{
1083 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1084
1085 switch (st->hand_state) {
1086 default:
1087 /* Shouldn't happen */
1088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1089 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1090 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1091 return WORK_ERROR;
1092
1093 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1094 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1095 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1096 }
1097}
1098
1099int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1100{
1101 unsigned char *p;
1102 size_t sess_id_len;
1103 int i, protverr;
1104#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1105 SSL_COMP *comp;
1106#endif
1107 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1108 unsigned char *session_id;
1109
1110 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1111 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1112 if (protverr != 0) {
1113 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1114 protverr);
1115 return 0;
1116 }
1117
1118 if (sess == NULL
1119 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1120 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1121 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1122 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1123 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1124 return 0;
1125 }
1126 }
1127 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1128
1129 p = s->s3.client_random;
1130
1131 /*
1132 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1133 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1134 */
1135 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1136 size_t idx;
1137 i = 1;
1138 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1139 if (p[idx]) {
1140 i = 0;
1141 break;
1142 }
1143 }
1144 } else {
1145 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1146 }
1147
1148 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1149 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1151 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1152 return 0;
1153 }
1154
1155 /*-
1156 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1157 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1158 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1159 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1160 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1161 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1162 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1163 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1164 * 1.0.
1165 *
1166 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1167 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1168 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1169 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1170 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1171 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1172 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1173 * know that is maximum server supports.
1174 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1175 * containing version 1.0.
1176 *
1177 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1178 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1179 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1180 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1181 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1182 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1183 * the negotiated version.
1184 *
1185 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1186 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1187 */
1188 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1189 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 return 0;
1193 }
1194
1195 /* Session ID */
1196 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1197 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1198 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1199 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1200 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1201 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1202 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1203 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1204 && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1206 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1207 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1208 return 0;
1209 }
1210 } else {
1211 sess_id_len = 0;
1212 }
1213 } else {
1214 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1215 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1216 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1217 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1218 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1219 }
1220 }
1221 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1222 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1223 sess_id_len))
1224 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1226 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1227 return 0;
1228 }
1229
1230 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1231 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1232 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1233 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1234 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1236 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1237 return 0;
1238 }
1239 }
1240
1241 /* Ciphers supported */
1242 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1245 return 0;
1246 }
1247
1248 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1249 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1250 return 0;
1251 }
1252 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1254 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 return 0;
1256 }
1257
1258 /* COMPRESSION */
1259 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1261 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1262 return 0;
1263 }
1264#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1265 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1266 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1267 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1268 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1269 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1270 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1271 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1272 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1273 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1274 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 return 0;
1276 }
1277 }
1278 }
1279#endif
1280 /* Add the NULL method */
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1283 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1284 return 0;
1285 }
1286
1287 /* TLS extensions */
1288 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1289 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1290 return 0;
1291 }
1292
1293 return 1;
1294}
1295
1296MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1297{
1298 size_t cookie_len;
1299 PACKET cookiepkt;
1300
1301 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1302 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1304 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1305 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1306 }
1307
1308 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1309 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1310 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1311 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1312 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1313 }
1314
1315 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1317 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1318 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1319 }
1320 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1321
1322 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1323}
1324
1325static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1326{
1327 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1328 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1329 int i;
1330
1331 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1332 if (c == NULL) {
1333 /* unknown cipher */
1334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1335 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1336 return 0;
1337 }
1338 /*
1339 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1340 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1341 */
1342 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1344 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1345 return 0;
1346 }
1347
1348 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1349 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1350 if (i < 0) {
1351 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1353 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1354 return 0;
1355 }
1356
1357 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1358 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1359 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1361 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1362 return 0;
1363 }
1364
1365 /*
1366 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1367 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1368 * set and use it for comparison.
1369 */
1370 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1371 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1372 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1373 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1374 /*
1375 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1376 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1377 */
1378 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1379 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1381 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1382 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1383 return 0;
1384 }
1385 } else {
1386 /*
1387 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1388 * ciphersuite.
1389 */
1390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1391 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1392 return 0;
1393 }
1394 }
1395 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1396
1397 return 1;
1398}
1399
1400MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1401{
1402 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1403 size_t session_id_len;
1404 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1405 int hrr = 0;
1406 unsigned int compression;
1407 unsigned int sversion;
1408 unsigned int context;
1409 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1410#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1411 SSL_COMP *comp;
1412#endif
1413
1414 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1416 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1417 goto err;
1418 }
1419
1420 /* load the server random */
1421 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1422 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1423 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1424 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1425 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1426 hrr = 1;
1427 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1429 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1430 goto err;
1431 }
1432 } else {
1433 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1435 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1436 goto err;
1437 }
1438 }
1439
1440 /* Get the session-id. */
1441 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1442 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1443 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1444 goto err;
1445 }
1446 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1447 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1448 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1450 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1451 goto err;
1452 }
1453
1454 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1456 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1457 goto err;
1458 }
1459
1460 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1462 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1463 goto err;
1464 }
1465
1466 /* TLS extensions */
1467 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1468 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1469 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1470 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1472 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1473 goto err;
1474 }
1475
1476 if (!hrr) {
1477 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1478 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1479 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1480 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1481 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1482 goto err;
1483 }
1484
1485 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1487 goto err;
1488 }
1489 }
1490
1491 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1492 if (compression != 0) {
1493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1494 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1495 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1496 goto err;
1497 }
1498
1499 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1500 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1501 session_id_len) != 0) {
1502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1503 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1504 goto err;
1505 }
1506 }
1507
1508 if (hrr) {
1509 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1510 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1511 goto err;
1512 }
1513
1514 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1515 }
1516
1517 /*
1518 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1519 * are appropriate for this version.
1520 */
1521 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1522 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1523 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1525 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1526 goto err;
1527 }
1528
1529 s->hit = 0;
1530
1531 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1532 /*
1533 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1534 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1535 */
1536 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1538 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1539 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1540 goto err;
1541 }
1542
1543 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1544 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1545 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1546 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1547 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1548 goto err;
1549 }
1550 } else {
1551 /*
1552 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1553 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1554 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1555 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1556 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1557 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1558 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1559 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1560 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1561 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1562 */
1563 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1564 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1565 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1566 /*
1567 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1568 * backwards compat reasons
1569 */
1570 int master_key_length;
1571 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1572 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1573 &master_key_length,
1574 NULL, &pref_cipher,
1575 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1576 && master_key_length > 0) {
1577 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1578 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1579 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1580 } else {
1581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1582 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1583 goto err;
1584 }
1585 }
1586
1587 if (session_id_len != 0
1588 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1589 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1590 session_id_len) == 0)
1591 s->hit = 1;
1592 }
1593
1594 if (s->hit) {
1595 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1596 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1597 /* actually a client application bug */
1598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1599 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1600 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1601 goto err;
1602 }
1603 } else {
1604 /*
1605 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1606 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1607 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1608 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1609 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1610 */
1611 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1612 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1613 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1614 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1615 goto err;
1616 }
1617 }
1618
1619 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1620 /*
1621 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1622 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1623 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1624 * used for resumption.
1625 */
1626 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1627 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1628 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1629 if (session_id_len > 0)
1630 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1631 session_id_len);
1632 }
1633 }
1634
1635 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1636 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1638 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1639 goto err;
1640 }
1641 /*
1642 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1643 * version.
1644 */
1645 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1646 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1647
1648 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1650 goto err;
1651 }
1652
1653#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1654 if (compression != 0) {
1655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1656 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1657 goto err;
1658 }
1659 /*
1660 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1661 * using compression.
1662 */
1663 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1664 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1665 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1666 goto err;
1667 }
1668#else
1669 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1671 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1672 goto err;
1673 }
1674 if (compression == 0)
1675 comp = NULL;
1676 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1678 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1679 goto err;
1680 } else {
1681 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1682 }
1683
1684 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1686 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1687 goto err;
1688 } else {
1689 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1690 }
1691#endif
1692
1693 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1694 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1695 goto err;
1696 }
1697
1698#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1700 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1701 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1702 size_t labellen;
1703
1704 /*
1705 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1706 * no SCTP used.
1707 */
1708 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1709 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1710
1711 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1712 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1713 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1714 labellen += 1;
1715
1716 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1717 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1718 labelbuffer,
1719 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1721 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1722 goto err;
1723 }
1724
1725 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1726 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1727 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1728 }
1729#endif
1730
1731 /*
1732 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1733 * we're done with this message
1734 */
1735 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1736 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1737 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1738 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1740 goto err;
1741 }
1742
1743 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1744 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1745 err:
1746 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1747 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1748}
1749
1750static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1751 PACKET *extpkt)
1752{
1753 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1754
1755 /*
1756 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1757 * should not be used.
1758 */
1759 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1760 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1761
1762 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1763 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1764 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1765 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1766 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1767 goto err;
1768 }
1769
1770 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1771 extensions = NULL;
1772
1773 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1774#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1775 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL
1776#endif
1777 ) {
1778 /*
1779 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1780 * ClientHello will not change
1781 */
1782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1783 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1784 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1785 goto err;
1786 }
1787
1788 /*
1789 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1790 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1791 */
1792 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1793 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1794 goto err;
1795 }
1796
1797 /*
1798 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1799 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1800 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1801 * for HRR messages.
1802 */
1803 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1804 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1805 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1806 goto err;
1807 }
1808
1809 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1810 err:
1811 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1812 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1813}
1814
1815MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1816{
1817 int i;
1818 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1819 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1820 X509 *x = NULL;
1821 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1822 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1823 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1824 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1825 unsigned int context = 0;
1826 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1827
1828 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1830 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1831 goto err;
1832 }
1833
1834 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1835 || context != 0
1836 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1837 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1838 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1840 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1841 goto err;
1842 }
1843 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1844 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1845 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1847 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1848 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1849 goto err;
1850 }
1851
1852 certstart = certbytes;
1853 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1854 if (x == NULL) {
1855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1856 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1857 goto err;
1858 }
1859 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1861 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1862 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1863 goto err;
1864 }
1865
1866 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1867 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1868 PACKET extensions;
1869
1870 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1872 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1873 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1874 goto err;
1875 }
1876 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1877 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1878 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1879 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1880 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1881 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1882 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1883 /* SSLfatal already called */
1884 goto err;
1885 }
1886 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1887 }
1888
1889 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1891 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1892 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1893 goto err;
1894 }
1895 x = NULL;
1896 }
1897
1898 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1899 /*
1900 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1901 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1902 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1903 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1904 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1905 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1906 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1907 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1908 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1909 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1910 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1911 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1912 */
1913 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1914 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1915 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1916 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1917 goto err;
1918 }
1919 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1920 if (i > 1) {
1921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1922 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1923 goto err;
1924 }
1925
1926 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1927 /*
1928 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1929 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1930 */
1931 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1932 sk = NULL;
1933
1934 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1935
1936 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1937 x = NULL;
1938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1939 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1940 goto err;
1941 }
1942
1943 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1944 x = NULL;
1945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1946 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1947 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1948 goto err;
1949 }
1950 /*
1951 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1952 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1953 * type.
1954 */
1955 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1956 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1957 x = NULL;
1958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1959 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1960 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1961 goto err;
1962 }
1963 }
1964 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1965
1966 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1967 X509_up_ref(x);
1968 s->session->peer = x;
1969 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1970 x = NULL;
1971
1972 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1973 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1974 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1975 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1976 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1977 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1978 goto err;
1979 }
1980
1981 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1982
1983 err:
1984 X509_free(x);
1985 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1986 return ret;
1987}
1988
1989static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1990{
1991#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1992 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1993
1994 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1995
1996 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1998 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1999 return 0;
2000 }
2001
2002 /*
2003 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2004 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2005 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2006 * identity.
2007 */
2008 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2010 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2011 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2012 return 0;
2013 }
2014
2015 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2016 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2017 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2018 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2019 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2021 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2022 return 0;
2023 }
2024
2025 return 1;
2026#else
2027 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2028 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2029 return 0;
2030#endif
2031}
2032
2033static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2034{
2035#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2036 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2037
2038 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2039 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2040 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2041 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2043 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2044 return 0;
2045 }
2046
2047 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2048 if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
2049 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2050 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2051 || (s->srp_ctx.g =
2052 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2053 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2054 || (s->srp_ctx.s =
2055 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2056 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2057 || (s->srp_ctx.B =
2058 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2059 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2060 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2061 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2062 return 0;
2063 }
2064
2065 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2066 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2067 return 0;
2068 }
2069
2070 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2071 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2072 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2073
2074 return 1;
2075#else
2076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2078 return 0;
2079#endif
2080}
2081
2082static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2083{
2084#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2085 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2086 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2087
2088 DH *dh = NULL;
2089 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2090
2091 int check_bits = 0;
2092
2093 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2094 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2095 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2097 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2098 return 0;
2099 }
2100
2101 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2102 dh = DH_new();
2103
2104 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2105 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2106 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2107 goto err;
2108 }
2109
2110 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2111 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2112 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2113 NULL);
2114 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2115 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2116 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2118 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2119 goto err;
2120 }
2121
2122 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2123 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2125 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2126 goto err;
2127 }
2128
2129 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2131 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2132 goto err;
2133 }
2134 p = g = NULL;
2135
2136 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2138 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2139 goto err;
2140 }
2141
2142 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2144 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2145 goto err;
2146 }
2147 bnpub_key = NULL;
2148
2149 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2151 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2152 goto err;
2153 }
2154
2155 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2157 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2158 goto err;
2159 }
2160
2161 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2162
2163 /*
2164 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2165 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2166 */
2167 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2168 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2169 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2170
2171 return 1;
2172
2173 err:
2174 BN_free(p);
2175 BN_free(g);
2176 BN_free(bnpub_key);
2177 DH_free(dh);
2178 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2179
2180 return 0;
2181#else
2182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2184 return 0;
2185#endif
2186}
2187
2188static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2189{
2190#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2191 PACKET encoded_pt;
2192 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2193
2194 /*
2195 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2196 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2197 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2198 */
2199 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2201 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2202 return 0;
2203 }
2204 /*
2205 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2206 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2207 */
2208 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2209 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2211 SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2212 return 0;
2213 }
2214
2215 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2217 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2218 return 0;
2219 }
2220
2221 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2223 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2224 return 0;
2225 }
2226
2227 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2228 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2229 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2231 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2232 return 0;
2233 }
2234
2235 /*
2236 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2237 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2238 * and ECDSA.
2239 */
2240 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2241 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2242 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2243 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2244 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2245
2246 return 1;
2247#else
2248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2250 return 0;
2251#endif
2252}
2253
2254MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2255{
2256 long alg_k;
2257 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2258 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2259 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2260 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2261
2262 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2263
2264 save_param_start = *pkt;
2265
2266#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2267 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2268 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2269#endif
2270
2271 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2272 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2274 goto err;
2275 }
2276 }
2277
2278 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2279 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2280 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2281 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2282 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2283 goto err;
2284 }
2285 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2286 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2287 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2288 goto err;
2289 }
2290 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2291 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2292 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2293 goto err;
2294 }
2295 } else if (alg_k) {
2296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2297 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2298 goto err;
2299 }
2300
2301 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2302 if (pkey != NULL) {
2303 PACKET params;
2304 int maxsig;
2305 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2306 unsigned char *tbs;
2307 size_t tbslen;
2308 int rv;
2309
2310 /*
2311 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2312 * equals the length of the parameters.
2313 */
2314 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
2315 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2316 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2318 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2319 goto err;
2320 }
2321
2322 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2323 unsigned int sigalg;
2324
2325 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2327 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2328 goto err;
2329 }
2330 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2331 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2332 goto err;
2333 }
2334 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2336 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2337 goto err;
2338 }
2339
2340 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2342 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2343 goto err;
2344 }
2345 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2346 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2347 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
2348
2349 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2350 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2352 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2353 goto err;
2354 }
2355 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2356 if (maxsig < 0) {
2357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2358 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2359 goto err;
2360 }
2361
2362 /*
2363 * Check signature length
2364 */
2365 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2366 /* wrong packet length */
2367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2368 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2369 goto err;
2370 }
2371
2372 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2373 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2375 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2376 goto err;
2377 }
2378
2379 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2381 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2382 goto err;
2383 }
2384 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2385 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2386 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2387 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2389 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2390 goto err;
2391 }
2392 }
2393 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(&params),
2394 PACKET_remaining(&params));
2395 if (tbslen == 0) {
2396 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2397 goto err;
2398 }
2399
2400 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2401 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2402 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2403 if (rv <= 0) {
2404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2405 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2406 goto err;
2407 }
2408 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2409 md_ctx = NULL;
2410 } else {
2411 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2412 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2413 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2414 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2415 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2417 SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2418 }
2419 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2420 goto err;
2421 }
2422 /* still data left over */
2423 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2425 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2426 goto err;
2427 }
2428 }
2429
2430 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2431 err:
2432 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2433 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2434}
2435
2436MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2437{
2438 size_t i;
2439
2440 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2441 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2442 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2443
2444 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2445 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2446 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2447
2448 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2449 /*
2450 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2451 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2452 * we just ignore it
2453 */
2454 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2455 }
2456
2457 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2458 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2459 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2460 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2461 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2462 s->pha_context = NULL;
2463
2464 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2465 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2467 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2468 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2469 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2470 }
2471
2472 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2474 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2475 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2476 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2477 }
2478 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2479 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2480 &rawexts, NULL, 1)
2481 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2482 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2483 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2484 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2485 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2486 }
2487 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2488 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2490 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2491 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2492 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2493 }
2494 } else {
2495 PACKET ctypes;
2496
2497 /* get the certificate types */
2498 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2500 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2501 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2502 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2503 }
2504
2505 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2507 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2508 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2509 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2510 }
2511
2512 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2513 PACKET sigalgs;
2514
2515 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2516 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2517 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2518 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2519 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2520 }
2521
2522 /*
2523 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2524 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2525 */
2526 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2528 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2529 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2530 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2531 }
2532 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2534 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2535 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2536 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2537 }
2538 }
2539
2540 /* get the CA RDNs */
2541 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2542 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2543 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2544 }
2545 }
2546
2547 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2549 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2550 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2551 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2552 }
2553
2554 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2555 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2556
2557 /*
2558 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2559 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2560 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2561 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2562 * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2563 * client_cert_cb.
2564 */
2565 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2566 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2567
2568 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2569}
2570
2571MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2572{
2573 unsigned int ticklen;
2574 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2575 unsigned int sess_len;
2576 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2577 PACKET nonce;
2578
2579 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2580
2581 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2582 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2583 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2584 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2585 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2586 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2587 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2588 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2589 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2590 goto err;
2591 }
2592
2593 /*
2594 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2595 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2596 * be 0 here in that instance
2597 */
2598 if (ticklen == 0)
2599 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2600
2601 /*
2602 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2603 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2604 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2605 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2606 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2607 * cache.
2608 */
2609 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2610 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2611
2612 /*
2613 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2614 * one
2615 */
2616 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2618 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2619 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2620 goto err;
2621 }
2622
2623 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2624 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2625 /*
2626 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2627 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2628 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2629 */
2630 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2631 }
2632
2633 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2634 s->session = new_sess;
2635 }
2636
2637 /*
2638 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2639 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2640 */
2641 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2642
2643 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2644 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2645 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2646
2647 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2648 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2650 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2651 goto err;
2652 }
2653 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2655 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2656 goto err;
2657 }
2658
2659 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2660 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2661 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2662
2663 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2664 PACKET extpkt;
2665
2666 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2667 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2669 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2670 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2671 goto err;
2672 }
2673
2674 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2675 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2676 NULL, 1)
2677 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2678 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2679 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2680 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2681 goto err;
2682 }
2683 }
2684
2685 /*
2686 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2687 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2688 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2689 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2690 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2691 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2692 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2693 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2694 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2695 */
2696 /*
2697 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2698 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2699 */
2700 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2701 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2702 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2704 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2705 goto err;
2706 }
2707 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2708 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2709
2710 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2711 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2712 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2713 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2714 size_t hashlen;
2715 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2716
2717 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2718 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2720 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2721 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2722 goto err;
2723 }
2724 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2725
2726 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2727 nonce_label,
2728 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2729 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2730 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2731 s->session->master_key,
2732 hashlen, 1)) {
2733 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2734 goto err;
2735 }
2736 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2737
2738 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2739 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2740 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2741 }
2742
2743 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2744 err:
2745 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2746 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2747}
2748
2749/*
2750 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2751 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2752 */
2753int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2754{
2755 size_t resplen;
2756 unsigned int type;
2757
2758 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2759 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2761 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2762 return 0;
2763 }
2764 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2765 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2767 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2768 return 0;
2769 }
2770 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2771 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2773 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2774 return 0;
2775 }
2776 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2778 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2779 return 0;
2780 }
2781 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2782
2783 return 1;
2784}
2785
2786
2787MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2788{
2789 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2790 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2791 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2792 }
2793
2794 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2795}
2796
2797/*
2798 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2799 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2800 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2801 * on failure.
2802 */
2803int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2804{
2805 /*
2806 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2807 * the server
2808 */
2809 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2810 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2811 return 0;
2812 }
2813
2814 /*
2815 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2816 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2817 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2818 */
2819 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2820 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2821 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2822
2823 if (ret == 0) {
2824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2825 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2826 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2827 return 0;
2828 }
2829 if (ret < 0) {
2830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2831 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2832 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2833 return 0;
2834 }
2835 }
2836#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2837 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2838 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2839 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2840 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2841 return 0;
2842 }
2843 }
2844#endif
2845
2846 return 1;
2847}
2848
2849MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2850{
2851 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2852 /* should contain no data */
2853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2854 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2855 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2856 }
2857#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2858 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2859 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2861 SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2862 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2863 }
2864 }
2865#endif
2866
2867 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2868 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2869 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2870 }
2871
2872 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2873}
2874
2875static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2876{
2877#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2878 int ret = 0;
2879 /*
2880 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2881 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2882 * strnlen.
2883 */
2884 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2885 size_t identitylen = 0;
2886 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2887 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2888 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2889 size_t psklen = 0;
2890
2891 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2893 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2894 goto err;
2895 }
2896
2897 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2898
2899 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2900 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2901 psk, sizeof(psk));
2902
2903 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2905 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2906 goto err;
2907 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2909 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2910 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2911 goto err;
2912 }
2913
2914 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2915 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2917 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2918 goto err;
2919 }
2920
2921 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2922 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2923 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2925 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2926 goto err;
2927 }
2928
2929 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2930 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2931 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2932 tmppsk = NULL;
2933 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2934 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2935 tmpidentity = NULL;
2936
2937 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2939 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2940 goto err;
2941 }
2942
2943 ret = 1;
2944
2945 err:
2946 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2947 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2948 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2949 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2950
2951 return ret;
2952#else
2953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2954 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2955 return 0;
2956#endif
2957}
2958
2959static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2960{
2961#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2962 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2963 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2964 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2965 size_t enclen;
2966 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2967 size_t pmslen = 0;
2968
2969 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2970 /*
2971 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2972 */
2973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2975 return 0;
2976 }
2977
2978 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2979 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2980 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2981 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2982 return 0;
2983 }
2984
2985 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2986 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2987 if (pms == NULL) {
2988 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2989 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2990 return 0;
2991 }
2992
2993 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2994 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2995 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2996 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2998 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2999 goto err;
3000 }
3001
3002 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3003 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3005 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3006 goto err;
3007 }
3008 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3009 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3010 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3012 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3013 goto err;
3014 }
3015 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3016 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3018 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3019 goto err;
3020 }
3021 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3022 pctx = NULL;
3023
3024 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3025 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3027 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3028 goto err;
3029 }
3030
3031 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3032 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3033 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3034 goto err;
3035 }
3036
3037 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3038 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3039
3040 return 1;
3041 err:
3042 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3043 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3044
3045 return 0;
3046#else
3047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3048 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3049 return 0;
3050#endif
3051}
3052
3053static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3054{
3055#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3056 DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
3057 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
3058 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3059 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3060
3061 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3062 if (skey == NULL) {
3063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3064 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3065 goto err;
3066 }
3067
3068 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3069 if (ckey == NULL) {
3070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3071 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3072 goto err;
3073 }
3074
3075 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3076
3077 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3079 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3080 goto err;
3081 }
3082
3083 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3084 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3085 goto err;
3086 }
3087
3088 /* send off the data */
3089 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3090 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3091 &keybytes)) {
3092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3094 goto err;
3095 }
3096
3097 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3098 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3099
3100 return 1;
3101 err:
3102 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3103 return 0;
3104#else
3105 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3106 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3107 return 0;
3108#endif
3109}
3110
3111static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3112{
3113#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3114 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3115 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3116 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3117 int ret = 0;
3118
3119 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3120 if (skey == NULL) {
3121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3122 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3123 return 0;
3124 }
3125
3126 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3127 if (ckey == NULL) {
3128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3129 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3130 goto err;
3131 }
3132
3133 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3134 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3135 goto err;
3136 }
3137
3138 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3139 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3140
3141 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3143 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3144 goto err;
3145 }
3146
3147 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3150 goto err;
3151 }
3152
3153 ret = 1;
3154 err:
3155 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3156 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3157 return ret;
3158#else
3159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3161 return 0;
3162#endif
3163}
3164
3165static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3166{
3167#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3168 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3169 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3170 X509 *peer_cert;
3171 size_t msglen;
3172 unsigned int md_len;
3173 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3174 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3175 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3176 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3177 size_t pmslen = 0;
3178
3179 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3180 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3181
3182 /*
3183 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3184 */
3185 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3186 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3187 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3188 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3189 return 0;
3190 }
3191
3192 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3193 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3195 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3196 return 0;
3197 }
3198 /*
3199 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3200 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3201 * certificate key for key exchange
3202 */
3203
3204 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3205 pmslen = 32;
3206 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3207 if (pms == NULL) {
3208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3209 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3210 goto err;
3211 }
3212
3213 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3214 /* Generate session key
3215 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3216 */
3217 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3219 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3220 goto err;
3221 };
3222 /*
3223 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3224 * data
3225 */
3226 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3227 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3228 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3229 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3230 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3231 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3232 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3233 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3236 goto err;
3237 }
3238 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3239 ukm_hash = NULL;
3240 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3241 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3243 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3244 goto err;
3245 }
3246 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3247 /*
3248 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3249 */
3250 msglen = 255;
3251 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3253 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3254 goto err;
3255 }
3256
3257 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3258 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3259 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3261 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3262 goto err;
3263 }
3264
3265 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3266 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3267 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3268
3269 return 1;
3270 err:
3271 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3272 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3273 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3274 return 0;
3275#else
3276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3277 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3278 return 0;
3279#endif
3280}
3281
3282static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3283{
3284#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3285 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3286
3287 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3288 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3289 &abytes)) {
3290 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3291 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3292 return 0;
3293 }
3294 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3295
3296 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3297 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3298 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3300 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3301 return 0;
3302 }
3303
3304 return 1;
3305#else
3306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3308 return 0;
3309#endif
3310}
3311
3312int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3313{
3314 unsigned long alg_k;
3315
3316 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3317
3318 /*
3319 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3320 * no need to do so here.
3321 */
3322 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3323 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3324 goto err;
3325
3326 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3327 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3328 goto err;
3329 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3330 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3331 goto err;
3332 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3333 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3334 goto err;
3335 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3336 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3337 goto err;
3338 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3339 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3340 goto err;
3341 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3343 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3344 goto err;
3345 }
3346
3347 return 1;
3348 err:
3349 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3350 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3351#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3352 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3353 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3354#endif
3355 return 0;
3356}
3357
3358int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3359{
3360 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3361 size_t pmslen = 0;
3362
3363 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3364 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3365
3366#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3367 /* Check for SRP */
3368 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3369 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3370 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3371 goto err;
3372 }
3373 return 1;
3374 }
3375#endif
3376
3377 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3379 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3380 goto err;
3381 }
3382 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3384 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3385 pms = NULL;
3386 pmslen = 0;
3387 goto err;
3388 }
3389 pms = NULL;
3390 pmslen = 0;
3391
3392#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3393 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3394 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3395 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3396 size_t labellen;
3397
3398 /*
3399 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3400 * used.
3401 */
3402 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3403 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3404
3405 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3406 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3407 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3408 labellen += 1;
3409
3410 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3411 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3412 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3414 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3415 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3416 goto err;
3417 }
3418
3419 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3420 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3421 }
3422#endif
3423
3424 return 1;
3425 err:
3426 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3427 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3428 return 0;
3429}
3430
3431/*
3432 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3433 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3434 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3435 */
3436static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3437{
3438 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3439 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3440 return 0;
3441 /*
3442 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3443 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3444 */
3445 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3446 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3447 return 0;
3448 return 1;
3449}
3450
3451WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3452{
3453 X509 *x509 = NULL;
3454 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3455 int i;
3456
3457 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3458 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3459 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3460 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3461 if (i < 0) {
3462 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3463 return WORK_MORE_A;
3464 }
3465 if (i == 0) {
3466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3467 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3468 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3469 return WORK_ERROR;
3470 }
3471 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3472 }
3473 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3474 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3475 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3476 }
3477 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3478 }
3479
3480 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3481 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3482 }
3483
3484 /* We need to get a client cert */
3485 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3486 /*
3487 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3488 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3489 */
3490 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3491 if (i < 0) {
3492 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3493 return WORK_MORE_B;
3494 }
3495 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3496 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3497 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3498 i = 0;
3499 } else if (i == 1) {
3500 i = 0;
3501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3502 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3503 }
3504
3505 X509_free(x509);
3506 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3507 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3508 i = 0;
3509 if (i == 0) {
3510 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3511 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3512 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3513 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3514 } else {
3515 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3516 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3517 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3518 return WORK_ERROR;
3519 }
3520 }
3521 }
3522
3523 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3524 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3525 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3526 }
3527
3528 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3530 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3531 return WORK_ERROR;
3532}
3533
3534int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3535{
3536 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3537 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3538 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3539 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3541 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3542 return 0;
3543 }
3544 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3546 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3547 return 0;
3548 }
3549 }
3550 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3551 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3552 : s->cert->key)) {
3553 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3554 return 0;
3555 }
3556
3557 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3558 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3559 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3560 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3561 /*
3562 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3563 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3564 */
3565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3566 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3567 return 0;
3568 }
3569
3570 return 1;
3571}
3572
3573int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3574{
3575 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3576 size_t idx;
3577 long alg_k, alg_a;
3578
3579 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3580 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3581
3582 /* we don't have a certificate */
3583 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3584 return 1;
3585
3586 /* This is the passed certificate */
3587 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3588
3589 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3590 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3592 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3593 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3594 return 0;
3595 }
3596
3597#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3598 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3599 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3600 return 1;
3601 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3602 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3603 return 0;
3604 }
3605#endif
3606#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3607 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3609 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3610 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3611 return 0;
3612 }
3613#endif
3614#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3615 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3617 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3618 return 0;
3619 }
3620#endif
3621
3622 return 1;
3623}
3624
3625#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3626int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3627{
3628 size_t len, padding_len;
3629 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3630
3631 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3632 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3633
3634 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3635 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3637 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3638 return 0;
3639 }
3640
3641 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3642
3643 return 1;
3644}
3645#endif
3646
3647MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3648{
3649 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3650 /* should contain no data */
3651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3652 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3653 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3654 }
3655
3656 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3657 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3658 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3659 }
3660
3661 /*
3662 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3663 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3664 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3665 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3666 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3667 */
3668 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3669 SSL_renegotiate(s);
3670 else
3671 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3672
3673 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3674}
3675
3676static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3677{
3678 PACKET extensions;
3679 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3680
3681 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3682 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3684 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3685 goto err;
3686 }
3687
3688 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3689 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3690 NULL, 1)
3691 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3692 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3693 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3694 goto err;
3695 }
3696
3697 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3698 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3699
3700 err:
3701 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3702 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3703}
3704
3705int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3706{
3707 int i = 0;
3708#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3709 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3710 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3711 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3712 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3713 if (i != 0)
3714 return i;
3715 }
3716#endif
3717 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3718 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3719 return i;
3720}
3721
3722int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3723{
3724 int i;
3725 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3726 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3727
3728 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3729 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3731 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3732 return 0;
3733 }
3734
3735 if (sk == NULL) {
3736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3737 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3738 return 0;
3739 }
3740
3741#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3742# if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3743# error Max cipher length too short
3744# endif
3745 /*
3746 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3747 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3748 * use TLS v1.2
3749 */
3750 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3751 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3752 else
3753#endif
3754 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3755 maxlen = 0xfffe;
3756
3757 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3758 maxlen -= 2;
3759 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3760 maxlen -= 2;
3761
3762 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3763 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3764
3765 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3766 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3767 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3768 continue;
3769
3770 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3772 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3773 return 0;
3774 }
3775
3776 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3777 if (!maxverok) {
3778 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3779 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3780 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
3781 maxverok = 1;
3782 } else {
3783 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
3784 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3785 maxverok = 1;
3786 }
3787 }
3788
3789 totlen += len;
3790 }
3791
3792 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3794 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3795
3796 if (!maxverok)
3797 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3798 "SSL/TLS version");
3799
3800 return 0;
3801 }
3802
3803 if (totlen != 0) {
3804 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3805 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3806 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3807 };
3808 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3810 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3811 return 0;
3812 }
3813 }
3814 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3815 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3816 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3817 };
3818 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3820 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3821 return 0;
3822 }
3823 }
3824 }
3825
3826 return 1;
3827}
3828
3829int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3830{
3831 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3832 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3834 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3835 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3836 return 0;
3837 }
3838
3839 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3840 return 1;
3841}
3842