| 1 | /*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2 | * |
| 3 | * crypt.c |
| 4 | * Functions for dealing with encrypted passwords stored in |
| 5 | * pg_authid.rolpassword. |
| 6 | * |
| 7 | * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2019, PostgreSQL Global Development Group |
| 8 | * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California |
| 9 | * |
| 10 | * src/backend/libpq/crypt.c |
| 11 | * |
| 12 | *------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 13 | */ |
| 14 | #include "postgres.h" |
| 15 | |
| 16 | #include <unistd.h> |
| 17 | #ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H |
| 18 | #include <crypt.h> |
| 19 | #endif |
| 20 | |
| 21 | #include "catalog/pg_authid.h" |
| 22 | #include "common/md5.h" |
| 23 | #include "common/scram-common.h" |
| 24 | #include "libpq/crypt.h" |
| 25 | #include "libpq/scram.h" |
| 26 | #include "miscadmin.h" |
| 27 | #include "utils/builtins.h" |
| 28 | #include "utils/syscache.h" |
| 29 | #include "utils/timestamp.h" |
| 30 | |
| 31 | |
| 32 | /* |
| 33 | * Fetch stored password for a user, for authentication. |
| 34 | * |
| 35 | * On error, returns NULL, and stores a palloc'd string describing the reason, |
| 36 | * for the postmaster log, in *logdetail. The error reason should *not* be |
| 37 | * sent to the client, to avoid giving away user information! |
| 38 | */ |
| 39 | char * |
| 40 | get_role_password(const char *role, char **logdetail) |
| 41 | { |
| 42 | TimestampTz vuntil = 0; |
| 43 | HeapTuple roleTup; |
| 44 | Datum datum; |
| 45 | bool isnull; |
| 46 | char *shadow_pass; |
| 47 | |
| 48 | /* Get role info from pg_authid */ |
| 49 | roleTup = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, PointerGetDatum(role)); |
| 50 | if (!HeapTupleIsValid(roleTup)) |
| 51 | { |
| 52 | *logdetail = psprintf(_("Role \"%s\" does not exist." ), |
| 53 | role); |
| 54 | return NULL; /* no such user */ |
| 55 | } |
| 56 | |
| 57 | datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, roleTup, |
| 58 | Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword, &isnull); |
| 59 | if (isnull) |
| 60 | { |
| 61 | ReleaseSysCache(roleTup); |
| 62 | *logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has no password assigned." ), |
| 63 | role); |
| 64 | return NULL; /* user has no password */ |
| 65 | } |
| 66 | shadow_pass = TextDatumGetCString(datum); |
| 67 | |
| 68 | datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, roleTup, |
| 69 | Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil, &isnull); |
| 70 | if (!isnull) |
| 71 | vuntil = DatumGetTimestampTz(datum); |
| 72 | |
| 73 | ReleaseSysCache(roleTup); |
| 74 | |
| 75 | /* |
| 76 | * Password OK, but check to be sure we are not past rolvaliduntil |
| 77 | */ |
| 78 | if (!isnull && vuntil < GetCurrentTimestamp()) |
| 79 | { |
| 80 | *logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has an expired password." ), |
| 81 | role); |
| 82 | return NULL; |
| 83 | } |
| 84 | |
| 85 | return shadow_pass; |
| 86 | } |
| 87 | |
| 88 | /* |
| 89 | * What kind of a password verifier is 'shadow_pass'? |
| 90 | */ |
| 91 | PasswordType |
| 92 | get_password_type(const char *shadow_pass) |
| 93 | { |
| 94 | char *encoded_salt; |
| 95 | int iterations; |
| 96 | uint8 stored_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN]; |
| 97 | uint8 server_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN]; |
| 98 | |
| 99 | if (strncmp(shadow_pass, "md5" , 3) == 0 && |
| 100 | strlen(shadow_pass) == MD5_PASSWD_LEN && |
| 101 | strspn(shadow_pass + 3, MD5_PASSWD_CHARSET) == MD5_PASSWD_LEN - 3) |
| 102 | return PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5; |
| 103 | if (parse_scram_verifier(shadow_pass, &iterations, &encoded_salt, |
| 104 | stored_key, server_key)) |
| 105 | return PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256; |
| 106 | return PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT; |
| 107 | } |
| 108 | |
| 109 | /* |
| 110 | * Given a user-supplied password, convert it into a verifier of |
| 111 | * 'target_type' kind. |
| 112 | * |
| 113 | * If the password is already in encrypted form, we cannot reverse the |
| 114 | * hash, so it is stored as it is regardless of the requested type. |
| 115 | */ |
| 116 | char * |
| 117 | encrypt_password(PasswordType target_type, const char *role, |
| 118 | const char *password) |
| 119 | { |
| 120 | PasswordType guessed_type = get_password_type(password); |
| 121 | char *encrypted_password; |
| 122 | |
| 123 | if (guessed_type != PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT) |
| 124 | { |
| 125 | /* |
| 126 | * Cannot convert an already-encrypted password from one format to |
| 127 | * another, so return it as it is. |
| 128 | */ |
| 129 | return pstrdup(password); |
| 130 | } |
| 131 | |
| 132 | switch (target_type) |
| 133 | { |
| 134 | case PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5: |
| 135 | encrypted_password = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1); |
| 136 | |
| 137 | if (!pg_md5_encrypt(password, role, strlen(role), |
| 138 | encrypted_password)) |
| 139 | elog(ERROR, "password encryption failed" ); |
| 140 | return encrypted_password; |
| 141 | |
| 142 | case PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256: |
| 143 | return pg_be_scram_build_verifier(password); |
| 144 | |
| 145 | case PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT: |
| 146 | elog(ERROR, "cannot encrypt password with 'plaintext'" ); |
| 147 | } |
| 148 | |
| 149 | /* |
| 150 | * This shouldn't happen, because the above switch statements should |
| 151 | * handle every combination of source and target password types. |
| 152 | */ |
| 153 | elog(ERROR, "cannot encrypt password to requested type" ); |
| 154 | return NULL; /* keep compiler quiet */ |
| 155 | } |
| 156 | |
| 157 | /* |
| 158 | * Check MD5 authentication response, and return STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR. |
| 159 | * |
| 160 | * 'shadow_pass' is the user's correct password or password hash, as stored |
| 161 | * in pg_authid.rolpassword. |
| 162 | * 'client_pass' is the response given by the remote user to the MD5 challenge. |
| 163 | * 'md5_salt' is the salt used in the MD5 authentication challenge. |
| 164 | * |
| 165 | * In the error case, optionally store a palloc'd string at *logdetail |
| 166 | * that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not the client). |
| 167 | */ |
| 168 | int |
| 169 | md5_crypt_verify(const char *role, const char *shadow_pass, |
| 170 | const char *client_pass, |
| 171 | const char *md5_salt, int md5_salt_len, |
| 172 | char **logdetail) |
| 173 | { |
| 174 | int retval; |
| 175 | char crypt_pwd[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1]; |
| 176 | |
| 177 | Assert(md5_salt_len > 0); |
| 178 | |
| 179 | if (get_password_type(shadow_pass) != PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5) |
| 180 | { |
| 181 | /* incompatible password hash format. */ |
| 182 | *logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has a password that cannot be used with MD5 authentication." ), |
| 183 | role); |
| 184 | return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 185 | } |
| 186 | |
| 187 | /* |
| 188 | * Compute the correct answer for the MD5 challenge. |
| 189 | * |
| 190 | * We do not bother setting logdetail for any pg_md5_encrypt failure |
| 191 | * below: the only possible error is out-of-memory, which is unlikely, and |
| 192 | * if it did happen adding a psprintf call would only make things worse. |
| 193 | */ |
| 194 | /* stored password already encrypted, only do salt */ |
| 195 | if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass + strlen("md5" ), |
| 196 | md5_salt, md5_salt_len, |
| 197 | crypt_pwd)) |
| 198 | { |
| 199 | return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 200 | } |
| 201 | |
| 202 | if (strcmp(client_pass, crypt_pwd) == 0) |
| 203 | retval = STATUS_OK; |
| 204 | else |
| 205 | { |
| 206 | *logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"." ), |
| 207 | role); |
| 208 | retval = STATUS_ERROR; |
| 209 | } |
| 210 | |
| 211 | return retval; |
| 212 | } |
| 213 | |
| 214 | /* |
| 215 | * Check given password for given user, and return STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR. |
| 216 | * |
| 217 | * 'shadow_pass' is the user's correct password hash, as stored in |
| 218 | * pg_authid.rolpassword. |
| 219 | * 'client_pass' is the password given by the remote user. |
| 220 | * |
| 221 | * In the error case, optionally store a palloc'd string at *logdetail |
| 222 | * that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not the client). |
| 223 | */ |
| 224 | int |
| 225 | plain_crypt_verify(const char *role, const char *shadow_pass, |
| 226 | const char *client_pass, |
| 227 | char **logdetail) |
| 228 | { |
| 229 | char crypt_client_pass[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1]; |
| 230 | |
| 231 | /* |
| 232 | * Client sent password in plaintext. If we have an MD5 hash stored, hash |
| 233 | * the password the client sent, and compare the hashes. Otherwise |
| 234 | * compare the plaintext passwords directly. |
| 235 | */ |
| 236 | switch (get_password_type(shadow_pass)) |
| 237 | { |
| 238 | case PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256: |
| 239 | if (scram_verify_plain_password(role, |
| 240 | client_pass, |
| 241 | shadow_pass)) |
| 242 | { |
| 243 | return STATUS_OK; |
| 244 | } |
| 245 | else |
| 246 | { |
| 247 | *logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"." ), |
| 248 | role); |
| 249 | return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 250 | } |
| 251 | break; |
| 252 | |
| 253 | case PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5: |
| 254 | if (!pg_md5_encrypt(client_pass, |
| 255 | role, |
| 256 | strlen(role), |
| 257 | crypt_client_pass)) |
| 258 | { |
| 259 | /* |
| 260 | * We do not bother setting logdetail for pg_md5_encrypt |
| 261 | * failure: the only possible error is out-of-memory, which is |
| 262 | * unlikely, and if it did happen adding a psprintf call would |
| 263 | * only make things worse. |
| 264 | */ |
| 265 | return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 266 | } |
| 267 | if (strcmp(crypt_client_pass, shadow_pass) == 0) |
| 268 | return STATUS_OK; |
| 269 | else |
| 270 | { |
| 271 | *logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"." ), |
| 272 | role); |
| 273 | return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 274 | } |
| 275 | break; |
| 276 | |
| 277 | case PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT: |
| 278 | |
| 279 | /* |
| 280 | * We never store passwords in plaintext, so this shouldn't |
| 281 | * happen. |
| 282 | */ |
| 283 | break; |
| 284 | } |
| 285 | |
| 286 | /* |
| 287 | * This shouldn't happen. Plain "password" authentication is possible |
| 288 | * with any kind of stored password hash. |
| 289 | */ |
| 290 | *logdetail = psprintf(_("Password of user \"%s\" is in unrecognized format." ), |
| 291 | role); |
| 292 | return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 293 | } |
| 294 | |