1/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
57
58#include <string.h>
59
60#include <openssl/asn1.h>
61#include <openssl/buf.h>
62#include <openssl/digest.h>
63#include <openssl/err.h>
64#include <openssl/mem.h>
65#include <openssl/obj.h>
66#include <openssl/stack.h>
67#include <openssl/x509.h>
68#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
69
70#include "../internal.h"
71
72
73int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
74{
75 int i;
76 X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
77
78 ai = a->cert_info;
79 bi = b->cert_info;
80 i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
81 if (i)
82 return (i);
83 return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
84}
85
86unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
87{
88 unsigned long ret = 0;
89 EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
90 unsigned char md[16];
91 char *f;
92
93 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
94 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
95 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
96 goto err;
97 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
98 goto err;
99 OPENSSL_free(f);
100 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
101 (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
102 (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
103 goto err;
104 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
105 goto err;
106 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
107 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
108 ) & 0xffffffffL;
109 err:
110 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
111 return (ret);
112}
113
114int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
115{
116 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
117}
118
119int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
120{
121 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
122}
123
124int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
125{
126 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
127}
128
129int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
130{
131 return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
132}
133
134X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
135{
136 return (a->cert_info->issuer);
137}
138
139unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
140{
141 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
142}
143
144unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
145{
146 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
147}
148
149X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
150{
151 return (a->cert_info->subject);
152}
153
154ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
155{
156 return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
157}
158
159unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
160{
161 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
162}
163
164unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
165{
166 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
167}
168
169/*
170 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
171 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
172 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
173 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
174 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
175 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
176 */
177int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
178{
179 int rv;
180 /* ensure hash is valid */
181 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
182 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
183
184 rv = OPENSSL_memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
185 if (rv)
186 return rv;
187 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
188 if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
189 rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
190 if (rv)
191 return rv;
192 return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
193 a->cert_info->enc.len);
194 }
195 return rv;
196}
197
198int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
199{
200 int ret;
201
202 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
203
204 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
205 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
206 if (ret < 0)
207 return -2;
208 }
209
210 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
211 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
212 if (ret < 0)
213 return -2;
214 }
215
216 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
217
218 if (ret)
219 return ret;
220
221 return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
222
223}
224
225unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
226{
227 unsigned long ret = 0;
228 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
229
230 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
231 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
232 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
233 NULL))
234 return 0;
235
236 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
237 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
238 ) & 0xffffffffL;
239 return (ret);
240}
241
242/*
243 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
244 * this is reasonably efficient.
245 */
246
247unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
248{
249 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
250 unsigned long ret = 0;
251 unsigned char md[16];
252
253 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
254 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
255 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
256 /* EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); */
257 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
258 && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
259 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
260 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
261 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
262 ) & 0xffffffffL;
263 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
264
265 return (ret);
266}
267
268/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
269X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
270 ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
271{
272 size_t i;
273 X509_CINF cinf;
274 X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
275
276 if (!sk)
277 return NULL;
278
279 x.cert_info = &cinf;
280 cinf.serialNumber = serial;
281 cinf.issuer = name;
282
283 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
284 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
285 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
286 return (x509);
287 }
288 return (NULL);
289}
290
291X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
292{
293 X509 *x509;
294 size_t i;
295
296 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
297 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
298 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
299 return (x509);
300 }
301 return (NULL);
302}
303
304EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
305{
306 if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
307 return (NULL);
308 return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
309}
310
311ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
312{
313 if (!x)
314 return NULL;
315 return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
316}
317
318int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
319{
320 EVP_PKEY *xk;
321 int ret;
322
323 xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
324
325 if (xk)
326 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
327 else
328 ret = -2;
329
330 switch (ret) {
331 case 1:
332 break;
333 case 0:
334 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
335 break;
336 case -1:
337 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
338 break;
339 case -2:
340 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
341 }
342 if (xk)
343 EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
344 if (ret > 0)
345 return 1;
346 return 0;
347}
348
349/*
350 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
351 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
352 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
353 */
354
355static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
356{
357 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
358 int curve_nid;
359 if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
360 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
361 if (!grp)
362 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
363 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
364 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
365 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
366 /*
367 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
368 */
369 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
370 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
371 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
372 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
373 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
374 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
375 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
376 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
377 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
378 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
379 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
380 } else
381 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
382
383 return X509_V_OK;
384}
385
386int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
387 unsigned long flags)
388{
389 int rv, sign_nid;
390 size_t i;
391 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
392 unsigned long tflags;
393 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
394 return X509_V_OK;
395 tflags = flags;
396 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
397 if (x == NULL) {
398 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
399 i = 1;
400 } else
401 i = 0;
402
403 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
404 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
405 /* Correct error depth */
406 i = 0;
407 goto end;
408 }
409
410 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
411 /* Check EE key only */
412 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
413 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
414 /* Correct error depth */
415 i = 0;
416 goto end;
417 }
418 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
419 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
420 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
421 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
422 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
423 goto end;
424 }
425 EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
426 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
427 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
428 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
429 goto end;
430 }
431
432 /* Final check: root CA signature */
433 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
434 end:
435 if (pk)
436 EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
437 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
438 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
439 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
440 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
441 i--;
442 /*
443 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
444 * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
445 */
446 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
447 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
448 if (perror_depth)
449 *perror_depth = i;
450 }
451 return rv;
452}
453
454int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
455{
456 int sign_nid;
457 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
458 return X509_V_OK;
459 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
460 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
461}
462
463/*
464 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
465 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
466 * each X509 structure.
467 */
468STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
469{
470 STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
471 size_t i;
472 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
473 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
474 X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
475 }
476 return ret;
477}
478