1/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
2 * All rights reserved.
3 *
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
7 *
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
14 *
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
21 *
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
24 * are met:
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
39 *
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
50 * SUCH DAMAGE.
51 *
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
56
57#include <ctype.h>
58#include <string.h>
59#include <time.h>
60
61#include <openssl/asn1.h>
62#include <openssl/buf.h>
63#include <openssl/err.h>
64#include <openssl/evp.h>
65#include <openssl/mem.h>
66#include <openssl/obj.h>
67#include <openssl/thread.h>
68#include <openssl/x509.h>
69#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
70
71#include "vpm_int.h"
72#include "../internal.h"
73#include "../x509v3/internal.h"
74
75static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
76 CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
77
78/* CRL score values */
79
80/* No unhandled critical extensions */
81
82#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
83
84/* certificate is within CRL scope */
85
86#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
87
88/* CRL times valid */
89
90#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
91
92/* Issuer name matches certificate */
93
94#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
95
96/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
97
98#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
99
100/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
101
102#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
103
104/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
105
106#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
107
108/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
109
110#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
111
112/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
113
114#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
115
116static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
117static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
118static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
119static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
124static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
125static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
126
127static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
128 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
129static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
130 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
131static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
132 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
133 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
134static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
135 int *pcrl_score);
136static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
137 unsigned int *preasons);
138static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
139static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
140 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
141 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
142
143static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
144
145static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
146{
147 return ok;
148}
149
150/* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
151static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
152{
153 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
154 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
155 return 1;
156 else
157 return 0;
158}
159
160/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
161
162static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
163{
164 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
165 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
166 size_t i;
167 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
168 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
169 if (certs == NULL)
170 return NULL;
171 /* Look for exact match */
172 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
173 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
174 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
175 break;
176 }
177 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
178 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
179 else
180 xtmp = NULL;
181 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
182 return xtmp;
183}
184
185int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
186{
187 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
188 int bad_chain = 0;
189 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
190 int depth, i, ok = 0;
191 int num, j, retry, trust;
192 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
193 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
194 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
195 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
196 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
197 return -1;
198 }
199 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
200 /*
201 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
202 * cannot do another one.
203 */
204 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
205 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
206 return -1;
207 }
208
209 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
210
211 /*
212 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
213 * the first entry is in place
214 */
215 ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
216 if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
217 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
218 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
219 goto end;
220 }
221 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
222 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
223
224 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it.
225 * sktmp = ctx->untrusted ++ ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted */
226 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
227 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
228 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
229 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
230 goto end;
231 }
232
233 if (ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted != NULL) {
234 if (sktmp == NULL) {
235 sktmp = sk_X509_new_null();
236 if (sktmp == NULL) {
237 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
238 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
239 goto end;
240 }
241 }
242
243 for (size_t k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted);
244 k++) {
245 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp,
246 sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted,
247 k))) {
248 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
249 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
250 goto end;
251 }
252 }
253 }
254
255 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
256 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
257 depth = param->depth;
258
259 for (;;) {
260 /* If we have enough, we break */
261 if (depth < num)
262 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
263 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
264 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
265 * later. */
266
267 /* If we are self signed, we break */
268 if (cert_self_signed(x))
269 break;
270 /*
271 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
272 */
273 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
274 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
275 if (ok < 0) {
276 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
277 goto end;
278 }
279 /*
280 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
281 * again later.
282 */
283 if (ok > 0) {
284 X509_free(xtmp);
285 break;
286 }
287 }
288
289 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
290 if (sktmp != NULL) {
291 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
292 if (xtmp != NULL) {
293 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
294 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
295 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
296 ok = 0;
297 goto end;
298 }
299 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
300 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
301 ctx->last_untrusted++;
302 x = xtmp;
303 num++;
304 /*
305 * reparse the full chain for the next one
306 */
307 continue;
308 }
309 }
310 break;
311 }
312
313 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
314 j = num;
315 /*
316 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
317 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
318 * complain.
319 */
320
321 do {
322 /*
323 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
324 */
325 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
326 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
327 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
328 /* we have a self signed certificate */
329 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
330 /*
331 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
332 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
333 * possible impersonation.
334 */
335 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
336 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
337 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
338 ctx->current_cert = x;
339 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
340 if (ok == 1)
341 X509_free(xtmp);
342 bad_chain = 1;
343 ok = cb(0, ctx);
344 if (!ok)
345 goto end;
346 } else {
347 /*
348 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
349 * version so we get any trust settings.
350 */
351 X509_free(x);
352 x = xtmp;
353 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
354 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
355 }
356 } else {
357 /*
358 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
359 */
360 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
361 ctx->last_untrusted--;
362 num--;
363 j--;
364 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
365 }
366 }
367 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
368 for (;;) {
369 /* If we have enough, we break */
370 if (depth < num)
371 break;
372 /* If we are self signed, we break */
373 if (cert_self_signed(x))
374 break;
375 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
376
377 if (ok < 0) {
378 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
379 goto end;
380 }
381 if (ok == 0)
382 break;
383 x = xtmp;
384 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
385 X509_free(xtmp);
386 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
387 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
388 ok = 0;
389 goto end;
390 }
391 num++;
392 }
393
394 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
395 trust = check_trust(ctx);
396
397 /* If explicitly rejected error */
398 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
399 ok = 0;
400 goto end;
401 }
402 /*
403 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
404 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
405 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
406 * chain checking
407 */
408 retry = 0;
409 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
410 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
411 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
412 while (j-- > 1) {
413 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
414 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
415 if (ok < 0)
416 goto end;
417 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
418 if (ok > 0) {
419 /*
420 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
421 */
422 X509_free(xtmp);
423
424 /*
425 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
426 * alternate chain
427 */
428 while (num > j) {
429 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
430 X509_free(xtmp);
431 num--;
432 }
433 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
434 retry = 1;
435 break;
436 }
437 }
438 }
439 } while (retry);
440
441 /*
442 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
443 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
444 * and set bad_chain == 1
445 */
446 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
447 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
448 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
449 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
450 else
451 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
452 ctx->current_cert = x;
453 } else {
454
455 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
456 num++;
457 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
458 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
459 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
460 chain_ss = NULL;
461 }
462
463 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
464 bad_chain = 1;
465 ok = cb(0, ctx);
466 if (!ok)
467 goto end;
468 }
469
470 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
471 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
472
473 if (!ok)
474 goto end;
475
476 ok = check_id(ctx);
477
478 if (!ok)
479 goto end;
480
481 /*
482 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
483 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
484 */
485
486 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
487 if (!ok)
488 goto end;
489
490 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
491 ctx->param->flags);
492 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
493 ctx->error = err;
494 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
495 ok = cb(0, ctx);
496 if (!ok)
497 goto end;
498 }
499
500 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
501 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
502 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
503 else
504 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
505 if (!ok)
506 goto end;
507
508 /* Check name constraints */
509
510 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
511 if (!ok)
512 goto end;
513
514 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
515 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
516 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
517
518 end:
519 if (sktmp != NULL)
520 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
521 if (chain_ss != NULL)
522 X509_free(chain_ss);
523
524 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
525 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
526 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
527 return ok;
528}
529
530/*
531 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
532 */
533
534static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
535{
536 size_t i;
537 X509 *issuer;
538 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
539 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
540 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
541 return issuer;
542 }
543 return NULL;
544}
545
546/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
547
548static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
549{
550 int ret;
551 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
552 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
553 return 1;
554 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
555 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
556 return 0;
557
558 ctx->error = ret;
559 ctx->current_cert = x;
560 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
561 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
562}
563
564/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
565
566static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
567{
568 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
569 if (*issuer) {
570 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
571 return 1;
572 } else
573 return 0;
574}
575
576/*
577 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
578 * purpose
579 */
580
581static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
582{
583 int i, ok = 0, plen = 0;
584 X509 *x;
585 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
586 int proxy_path_length = 0;
587 int purpose;
588 int allow_proxy_certs;
589 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
590
591 enum {
592 // ca_or_leaf allows either type of certificate so that direct use of
593 // self-signed certificates works.
594 ca_or_leaf,
595 must_be_ca,
596 must_not_be_ca,
597 } ca_requirement;
598
599 /* CRL path validation */
600 if (ctx->parent) {
601 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
602 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
603 } else {
604 allow_proxy_certs =
605 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
606 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
607 }
608
609 ca_requirement = ca_or_leaf;
610
611 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
612 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
613 int ret;
614 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
615 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
616 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
617 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
618 ctx->error_depth = i;
619 ctx->current_cert = x;
620 ok = cb(0, ctx);
621 if (!ok)
622 goto end;
623 }
624 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
625 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
626 ctx->error_depth = i;
627 ctx->current_cert = x;
628 ok = cb(0, ctx);
629 if (!ok)
630 goto end;
631 }
632
633 switch (ca_requirement) {
634 case ca_or_leaf:
635 ret = 1;
636 break;
637 case must_not_be_ca:
638 if (X509_check_ca(x)) {
639 ret = 0;
640 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
641 } else
642 ret = 1;
643 break;
644 case must_be_ca:
645 if (!X509_check_ca(x)) {
646 ret = 0;
647 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
648 } else
649 ret = 1;
650 break;
651 default:
652 // impossible.
653 ret = 0;
654 }
655
656 if (ret == 0) {
657 ctx->error_depth = i;
658 ctx->current_cert = x;
659 ok = cb(0, ctx);
660 if (!ok)
661 goto end;
662 }
663 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
664 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, ca_requirement == must_be_ca);
665 if (ret != 1) {
666 ret = 0;
667 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
668 ctx->error_depth = i;
669 ctx->current_cert = x;
670 ok = cb(0, ctx);
671 if (!ok)
672 goto end;
673 }
674 }
675 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
676 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
677 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
678 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
679 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
680 ctx->error_depth = i;
681 ctx->current_cert = x;
682 ok = cb(0, ctx);
683 if (!ok)
684 goto end;
685 }
686 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
687 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
688 plen++;
689 /*
690 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
691 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
692 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
693 */
694 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
695 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
696 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
697 ctx->error_depth = i;
698 ctx->current_cert = x;
699 ok = cb(0, ctx);
700 if (!ok)
701 goto end;
702 }
703 proxy_path_length++;
704 ca_requirement = must_not_be_ca;
705 } else {
706 ca_requirement = must_be_ca;
707 }
708 }
709 ok = 1;
710 end:
711 return ok;
712}
713
714static int reject_dns_name_in_common_name(X509 *x509)
715{
716 X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
717 int i = -1;
718 for (;;) {
719 i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i);
720 if (i == -1) {
721 return X509_V_OK;
722 }
723
724 X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
725 ASN1_STRING *common_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
726 unsigned char *idval;
727 int idlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&idval, common_name);
728 if (idlen < 0) {
729 return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
730 }
731 /* Only process attributes that look like host names. Note it is
732 * important that this check be mirrored in |X509_check_host|. */
733 int looks_like_dns = x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(idval, (size_t)idlen);
734 OPENSSL_free(idval);
735 if (looks_like_dns) {
736 return X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS;
737 }
738 }
739}
740
741static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
742{
743 int i, j, rv;
744 int has_name_constraints = 0;
745 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
746 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
747 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
748 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
749 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
750 continue;
751 /*
752 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
753 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
754 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
755 * to be obeyed.
756 */
757 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
758 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
759 if (nc) {
760 has_name_constraints = 1;
761 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
762 switch (rv) {
763 case X509_V_OK:
764 continue;
765 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
766 ctx->error = rv;
767 return 0;
768 default:
769 ctx->error = rv;
770 ctx->error_depth = i;
771 ctx->current_cert = x;
772 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
773 return 0;
774 break;
775 }
776 }
777 }
778 }
779
780 /* Name constraints do not match against the common name, but
781 * |X509_check_host| still implements the legacy behavior where, on
782 * certificates lacking a SAN list, DNS-like names in the common name are
783 * checked instead.
784 *
785 * While we could apply the name constraints to the common name, name
786 * constraints are rare enough that can hold such certificates to a higher
787 * standard. Note this does not make "DNS-like" heuristic failures any
788 * worse. A decorative common-name misidentified as a DNS name would fail
789 * the name constraint anyway. */
790 X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
791 if (has_name_constraints && leaf->altname == NULL) {
792 rv = reject_dns_name_in_common_name(leaf);
793 switch (rv) {
794 case X509_V_OK:
795 break;
796 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
797 ctx->error = rv;
798 return 0;
799 default:
800 ctx->error = rv;
801 ctx->error_depth = i;
802 ctx->current_cert = leaf;
803 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
804 return 0;
805 break;
806 }
807 }
808
809 return 1;
810}
811
812static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
813{
814 ctx->error = errcode;
815 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
816 ctx->error_depth = 0;
817 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
818}
819
820static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
821{
822 size_t i;
823 size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
824 char *name;
825
826 if (id->peername != NULL) {
827 OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
828 id->peername = NULL;
829 }
830 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
831 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
832 if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags,
833 &id->peername) > 0)
834 return 1;
835 }
836 return n == 0;
837}
838
839static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
840{
841 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
842 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
843 X509 *x = ctx->cert;
844 if (id->poison) {
845 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL))
846 return 0;
847 }
848 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
849 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
850 return 0;
851 }
852 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
853 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
854 return 0;
855 }
856 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
857 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
858 return 0;
859 }
860 return 1;
861}
862
863static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
864{
865 size_t i;
866 int ok;
867 X509 *x = NULL;
868 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
869 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
870 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
871 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
872 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
873 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
874 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
875 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
876 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
877 /*
878 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
879 * overridden.
880 */
881 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
882 ctx->error_depth = i;
883 ctx->current_cert = x;
884 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
885 ok = cb(0, ctx);
886 if (!ok)
887 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
888 }
889 }
890 /*
891 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
892 * return success.
893 */
894 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
895 X509 *mx;
896 if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
897 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
898 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
899 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
900 if (mx) {
901 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
902 X509_free(x);
903 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
904 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
905 }
906 }
907
908 /*
909 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
910 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
911 */
912 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
913}
914
915static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
916{
917 int i, last, ok;
918 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
919 return 1;
920 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
921 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
922 else {
923 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
924 if (ctx->parent)
925 return 1;
926 last = 0;
927 }
928 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
929 ctx->error_depth = i;
930 ok = check_cert(ctx);
931 if (!ok)
932 return ok;
933 }
934 return 1;
935}
936
937static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
938{
939 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
940 X509 *x;
941 int ok = 0, cnum;
942 unsigned int last_reasons;
943 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
944 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
945 ctx->current_cert = x;
946 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
947 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
948 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
949 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
950 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
951 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
952 if (ctx->get_crl)
953 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
954 else
955 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
956 /*
957 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
958 */
959 if (!ok) {
960 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
961 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
962 goto err;
963 }
964 ctx->current_crl = crl;
965 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
966 if (!ok)
967 goto err;
968
969 if (dcrl) {
970 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
971 if (!ok)
972 goto err;
973 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
974 if (!ok)
975 goto err;
976 } else
977 ok = 1;
978
979 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
980 if (ok != 2) {
981 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
982 if (!ok)
983 goto err;
984 }
985
986 X509_CRL_free(crl);
987 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
988 crl = NULL;
989 dcrl = NULL;
990 /*
991 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
992 * so exit loop.
993 */
994 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
995 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
996 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
997 goto err;
998 }
999 }
1000 err:
1001 X509_CRL_free(crl);
1002 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1003
1004 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1005 return ok;
1006
1007}
1008
1009/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1010
1011static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
1012{
1013 time_t *ptime;
1014 int i;
1015 if (notify)
1016 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1017 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1018 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1019 else
1020 ptime = NULL;
1021
1022 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
1023 if (i == 0) {
1024 if (!notify)
1025 return 0;
1026 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
1027 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1028 return 0;
1029 }
1030
1031 if (i > 0) {
1032 if (!notify)
1033 return 0;
1034 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
1035 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1036 return 0;
1037 }
1038
1039 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
1040 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
1041
1042 if (i == 0) {
1043 if (!notify)
1044 return 0;
1045 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
1046 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1047 return 0;
1048 }
1049 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1050 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
1051 if (!notify)
1052 return 0;
1053 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
1054 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1055 return 0;
1056 }
1057 }
1058
1059 if (notify)
1060 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1061
1062 return 1;
1063}
1064
1065static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1066 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1067 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1068{
1069 int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1070 size_t i;
1071 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1072 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1073 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1074 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1075
1076 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1077 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1078 reasons = *preasons;
1079 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1080 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
1081 continue;
1082 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1083 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
1084 int day, sec;
1085 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1086 X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1087 continue;
1088 /*
1089 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1090 * and |sec|.
1091 */
1092 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1093 continue;
1094 }
1095 best_crl = crl;
1096 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1097 best_score = crl_score;
1098 best_reasons = reasons;
1099 }
1100
1101 if (best_crl) {
1102 if (*pcrl)
1103 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1104 *pcrl = best_crl;
1105 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1106 *pscore = best_score;
1107 *preasons = best_reasons;
1108 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1109 if (*pdcrl) {
1110 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1111 *pdcrl = NULL;
1112 }
1113 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1114 }
1115
1116 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1117 return 1;
1118
1119 return 0;
1120}
1121
1122/*
1123 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1124 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1125 */
1126
1127static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1128{
1129 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1130 int i;
1131 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1132 if (i >= 0) {
1133 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1134 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1135 return 0;
1136 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1137 } else
1138 exta = NULL;
1139
1140 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1141
1142 if (i >= 0) {
1143
1144 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1145 return 0;
1146 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1147 } else
1148 extb = NULL;
1149
1150 if (!exta && !extb)
1151 return 1;
1152
1153 if (!exta || !extb)
1154 return 0;
1155
1156 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1157 return 0;
1158
1159 return 1;
1160}
1161
1162/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1163
1164static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1165{
1166 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1167 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1168 return 0;
1169 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1170 if (!base->crl_number)
1171 return 0;
1172 /* Issuer names must match */
1173 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1174 return 0;
1175 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1176 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1177 return 0;
1178 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1179 return 0;
1180 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1181 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1182 return 0;
1183 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1184 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1185 return 1;
1186 return 0;
1187}
1188
1189/*
1190 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1191 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1192 */
1193
1194static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1195 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1196{
1197 X509_CRL *delta;
1198 size_t i;
1199 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1200 return;
1201 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1202 return;
1203 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1204 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1205 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1206 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1207 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1208 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1209 *dcrl = delta;
1210 return;
1211 }
1212 }
1213 *dcrl = NULL;
1214}
1215
1216/*
1217 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1218 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1219 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1220 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1221 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1222 */
1223
1224static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1225 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1226{
1227
1228 int crl_score = 0;
1229 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1230
1231 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1232
1233 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1234 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1235 return 0;
1236 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1237 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1238 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1239 return 0;
1240 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1241 /* If no new reasons reject */
1242 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1243 return 0;
1244 }
1245 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1246 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1247 return 0;
1248 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1249 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1250 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1251 return 0;
1252 } else
1253 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1254
1255 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1256 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1257
1258 /* Check expiry */
1259 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1260 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1261
1262 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1263 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1264
1265 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1266
1267 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1268 return 0;
1269
1270 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1271
1272 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1273 /* If no new reasons reject */
1274 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1275 return 0;
1276 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1277 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1278 }
1279
1280 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1281
1282 return crl_score;
1283
1284}
1285
1286static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1287 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1288{
1289 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1290 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1291 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1292 size_t i;
1293
1294 if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1295 cidx++;
1296
1297 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1298
1299 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1300 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1301 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1302 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1303 return;
1304 }
1305 }
1306
1307 for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1308 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1309 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1310 continue;
1311 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1312 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1313 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1314 return;
1315 }
1316 }
1317
1318 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1319
1320 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1321 return;
1322
1323 /*
1324 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1325 * untrusted certificates.
1326 */
1327 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1328 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1329 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1330 continue;
1331 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1332 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1333 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1334 return;
1335 }
1336 }
1337
1338 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); i++) {
1339 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, i);
1340 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1341 continue;
1342 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1343 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1344 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1345 return;
1346 }
1347 }
1348}
1349
1350/*
1351 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1352 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1353 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1354 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1355 */
1356
1357static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1358{
1359 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1360 int ret;
1361 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1362 if (ctx->parent)
1363 return 0;
1364 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1365 return -1;
1366
1367 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1368 /* Copy verify params across */
1369 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1370
1371 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1372 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1373
1374 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1375 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1376
1377 if (ret <= 0)
1378 goto err;
1379
1380 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1381
1382 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1383 err:
1384 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1385 return ret;
1386}
1387
1388/*
1389 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1390 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1391 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1392 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1393 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1394 * RFC5280 version
1395 */
1396
1397static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1398 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1399 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1400{
1401 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1402 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1403 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1404 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1405 return 1;
1406 return 0;
1407}
1408
1409/*
1410 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
1411 * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
1412 * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
1413 * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1414 */
1415
1416static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1417{
1418 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1419 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1420 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1421 size_t i, j;
1422 if (!a || !b)
1423 return 1;
1424 if (a->type == 1) {
1425 if (!a->dpname)
1426 return 0;
1427 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1428 if (b->type == 1) {
1429 if (!b->dpname)
1430 return 0;
1431 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1432 return 1;
1433 else
1434 return 0;
1435 }
1436 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1437 nm = a->dpname;
1438 gens = b->name.fullname;
1439 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1440 if (!b->dpname)
1441 return 0;
1442 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1443 gens = a->name.fullname;
1444 nm = b->dpname;
1445 }
1446
1447 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1448 if (nm) {
1449 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1450 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1451 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1452 continue;
1453 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1454 return 1;
1455 }
1456 return 0;
1457 }
1458
1459 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1460
1461 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1462 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1463 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1464 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1465 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1466 return 1;
1467 }
1468 }
1469
1470 return 0;
1471
1472}
1473
1474static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1475{
1476 size_t i;
1477 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1478 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1479 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1480 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1481 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1482 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1483 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1484 continue;
1485 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1486 return 1;
1487 }
1488 return 0;
1489}
1490
1491/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1492
1493static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1494 unsigned int *preasons)
1495{
1496 size_t i;
1497 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1498 return 0;
1499 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1500 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1501 return 0;
1502 } else {
1503 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1504 return 0;
1505 }
1506 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1507 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1508 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1509 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1510 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1511 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1512 return 1;
1513 }
1514 }
1515 }
1516 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1517 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1518 return 1;
1519 return 0;
1520}
1521
1522/*
1523 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1524 * to find a delta CRL too
1525 */
1526
1527static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1528 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1529{
1530 int ok;
1531 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1532 int crl_score = 0;
1533 unsigned int reasons;
1534 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1535 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1536 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1537 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1538 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1539 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1540
1541 if (ok)
1542 goto done;
1543
1544 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1545
1546 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1547
1548 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1549 if (!skcrl && crl)
1550 goto done;
1551
1552 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1553
1554 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1555
1556 done:
1557
1558 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1559 if (crl) {
1560 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1561 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1562 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1563 *pcrl = crl;
1564 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1565 return 1;
1566 }
1567
1568 return 0;
1569}
1570
1571/* Check CRL validity */
1572static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1573{
1574 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1575 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1576 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1577 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1578 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1579 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1580 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1581 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1582
1583 /*
1584 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1585 * certificate in chain.
1586 */
1587 else if (cnum < chnum)
1588 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1589 else {
1590 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1591 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1592 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1593 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1594 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1595 if (!ok)
1596 goto err;
1597 }
1598 }
1599
1600 if (issuer) {
1601 /*
1602 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1603 */
1604 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1605 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1606 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1607 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1608 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1609 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1610 if (!ok)
1611 goto err;
1612 }
1613
1614 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1615 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1616 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1617 if (!ok)
1618 goto err;
1619 }
1620
1621 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1622 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1623 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1624 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1625 if (!ok)
1626 goto err;
1627 }
1628 }
1629
1630 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1631 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1632 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1633 if (!ok)
1634 goto err;
1635 }
1636
1637 }
1638
1639 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1640 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1641 if (!ok)
1642 goto err;
1643 }
1644
1645 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1646 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1647
1648 if (!ikey) {
1649 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1650 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1651 if (!ok)
1652 goto err;
1653 } else {
1654 int rv;
1655 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1656 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1657 ctx->error = rv;
1658 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1659 if (!ok)
1660 goto err;
1661 }
1662 /* Verify CRL signature */
1663 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1664 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1665 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1666 if (!ok)
1667 goto err;
1668 }
1669 }
1670 }
1671
1672 ok = 1;
1673
1674 err:
1675 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1676 return ok;
1677}
1678
1679/* Check certificate against CRL */
1680static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1681{
1682 int ok;
1683 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1684 /*
1685 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1686 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1687 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1688 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1689 */
1690 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1691 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1692 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1693 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1694 if (!ok)
1695 return 0;
1696 }
1697 /*
1698 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1699 * is not removeFromCRL.
1700 */
1701 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1702 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1703 return 2;
1704 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1705 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1706 if (!ok)
1707 return 0;
1708 }
1709
1710 return 1;
1711}
1712
1713static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1714{
1715 int ret;
1716 if (ctx->parent)
1717 return 1;
1718 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1719 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1720 if (ret == 0) {
1721 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1722 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1723 return 0;
1724 }
1725 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1726 if (ret == -1) {
1727 /*
1728 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1729 */
1730 X509 *x;
1731 size_t i;
1732 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1733 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1734 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1735 continue;
1736 ctx->current_cert = x;
1737 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1738 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1739 return 0;
1740 }
1741 return 1;
1742 }
1743 if (ret == -2) {
1744 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1745 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1746 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1747 }
1748
1749 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1750 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1751 /*
1752 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1753 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1754 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1755 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1756 */
1757 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1758 return 0;
1759 }
1760
1761 return 1;
1762}
1763
1764static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1765{
1766 time_t *ptime;
1767 int i;
1768
1769 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1770 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1771 else
1772 ptime = NULL;
1773
1774 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1775 if (i == 0) {
1776 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1777 ctx->current_cert = x;
1778 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1779 return 0;
1780 }
1781
1782 if (i > 0) {
1783 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1784 ctx->current_cert = x;
1785 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1786 return 0;
1787 }
1788
1789 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1790 if (i == 0) {
1791 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1792 ctx->current_cert = x;
1793 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1794 return 0;
1795 }
1796
1797 if (i < 0) {
1798 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1799 ctx->current_cert = x;
1800 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1801 return 0;
1802 }
1803
1804 return 1;
1805}
1806
1807static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1808{
1809 int ok = 0, n;
1810 X509 *xs, *xi;
1811 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1812 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1813
1814 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1815
1816 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1817 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1818 n--;
1819 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1820
1821 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1822 xs = xi;
1823 else {
1824 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1825 xs = xi;
1826 goto check_cert;
1827 }
1828 if (n <= 0) {
1829 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1830 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1831 ok = cb(0, ctx);
1832 goto end;
1833 } else {
1834 n--;
1835 ctx->error_depth = n;
1836 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1837 }
1838 }
1839
1840/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1841 while (n >= 0) {
1842 ctx->error_depth = n;
1843
1844 /*
1845 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1846 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1847 * time.
1848 */
1849 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
1850 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1851 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1852 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1853 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1854 if (!ok)
1855 goto end;
1856 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1857 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1858 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1859 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1860 if (!ok) {
1861 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1862 goto end;
1863 }
1864 }
1865 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1866 pkey = NULL;
1867 }
1868
1869 check_cert:
1870 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1871 if (!ok)
1872 goto end;
1873
1874 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1875 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1876 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1877 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1878 if (!ok)
1879 goto end;
1880
1881 n--;
1882 if (n >= 0) {
1883 xi = xs;
1884 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1885 }
1886 }
1887 ok = 1;
1888 end:
1889 return ok;
1890}
1891
1892int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1893{
1894 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1895}
1896
1897int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1898{
1899 static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1900 static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1901 ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
1902 int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
1903
1904 /*
1905 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1906 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1907 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1908 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1909 *
1910 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1911 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1912 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1913 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1914 */
1915 switch (ctm->type) {
1916 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
1917 if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
1918 return 0;
1919 break;
1920 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
1921 if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
1922 return 0;
1923 break;
1924 default:
1925 return 0;
1926 }
1927
1928 /**
1929 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1930 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1931 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1932 */
1933 for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
1934 if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
1935 return 0;
1936 }
1937 if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
1938 return 0;
1939
1940 /*
1941 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1942 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1943 * so we go through ASN.1
1944 */
1945 asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
1946 if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
1947 goto err;
1948 if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
1949 goto err;
1950
1951 /*
1952 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1953 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1954 */
1955 ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1956
1957 err:
1958 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
1959 return ret;
1960}
1961
1962ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1963{
1964 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1965}
1966
1967ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1968{
1969 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1970}
1971
1972ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1973 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1974{
1975 time_t t = 0;
1976
1977 if (in_tm)
1978 t = *in_tm;
1979 else
1980 time(&t);
1981
1982 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1983 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1984 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1985 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1986 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1987 }
1988 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1989}
1990
1991/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1992
1993X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1994 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1995{
1996 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1997 int i;
1998 size_t j;
1999 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2000 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2001 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
2002 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2003 return NULL;
2004 }
2005 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2006 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2007 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2008 return NULL;
2009 }
2010 /* Issuer names must match */
2011 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2012 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2013 return NULL;
2014 }
2015 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2016 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2017 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2018 return NULL;
2019 }
2020 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2021 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2022 return NULL;
2023 }
2024 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2025 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2026 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2027 return NULL;
2028 }
2029 /* CRLs must verify */
2030 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2031 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2032 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2033 return NULL;
2034 }
2035 /* Create new CRL */
2036 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2037 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2038 goto memerr;
2039 /* Set issuer name */
2040 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2041 goto memerr;
2042
2043 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2044 goto memerr;
2045 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2046 goto memerr;
2047
2048 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2049
2050 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2051 goto memerr;
2052
2053 /*
2054 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2055 * number to correct value too.
2056 */
2057
2058 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2059 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2060 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2061 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2062 goto memerr;
2063 }
2064
2065 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2066
2067 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2068
2069 for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) {
2070 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2071 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
2072 /*
2073 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2074 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2075 */
2076 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2077 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2078 if (!rvtmp)
2079 goto memerr;
2080 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2081 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2082 goto memerr;
2083 }
2084 }
2085 }
2086 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2087
2088 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2089 goto memerr;
2090
2091 return crl;
2092
2093 memerr:
2094 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2095 if (crl)
2096 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2097 return NULL;
2098}
2099
2100int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2101 CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,
2102 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
2103 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2104{
2105 /*
2106 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2107 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2108 */
2109 int index;
2110 if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
2111 free_func)) {
2112 return -1;
2113 }
2114 return index;
2115}
2116
2117int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2118{
2119 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2120}
2121
2122void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2123{
2124 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2125}
2126
2127int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2128{
2129 return ctx->error;
2130}
2131
2132void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2133{
2134 ctx->error = err;
2135}
2136
2137int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2138{
2139 return ctx->error_depth;
2140}
2141
2142X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2143{
2144 return ctx->current_cert;
2145}
2146
2147STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2148{
2149 return ctx->chain;
2150}
2151
2152STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2153{
2154 if (!ctx->chain)
2155 return NULL;
2156 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2157}
2158
2159X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2160{
2161 return ctx->current_issuer;
2162}
2163
2164X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2165{
2166 return ctx->current_crl;
2167}
2168
2169X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2170{
2171 return ctx->parent;
2172}
2173
2174void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2175{
2176 ctx->cert = x;
2177}
2178
2179void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2180{
2181 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2182}
2183
2184STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2185{
2186 return ctx->untrusted;
2187}
2188
2189void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2190{
2191 ctx->crls = sk;
2192}
2193
2194int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2195{
2196 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2197}
2198
2199int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2200{
2201 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2202}
2203
2204/*
2205 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2206 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2207 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2208 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2209 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2210 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2211 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2212 * client/server.
2213 */
2214
2215int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2216 int purpose, int trust)
2217{
2218 int idx;
2219 /* If purpose not set use default */
2220 if (!purpose)
2221 purpose = def_purpose;
2222 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2223 if (purpose) {
2224 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2225 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2226 if (idx == -1) {
2227 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2228 return 0;
2229 }
2230 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2231 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2232 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2233 if (idx == -1) {
2234 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2235 return 0;
2236 }
2237 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2238 }
2239 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2240 if (!trust)
2241 trust = ptmp->trust;
2242 }
2243 if (trust) {
2244 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2245 if (idx == -1) {
2246 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2247 return 0;
2248 }
2249 }
2250
2251 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2252 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2253 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2254 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2255 return 1;
2256}
2257
2258X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2259{
2260 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2261 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2262 if (!ctx) {
2263 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2264 return NULL;
2265 }
2266 X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
2267 return ctx;
2268}
2269
2270void X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2271{
2272 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2273}
2274
2275void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2276{
2277 if (ctx == NULL) {
2278 return;
2279 }
2280 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2281 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2282}
2283
2284int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2285 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2286{
2287 int ret = 1;
2288
2289 X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
2290 ctx->ctx = store;
2291 ctx->cert = x509;
2292 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2293
2294 CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
2295
2296 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2297 if (!ctx->param)
2298 goto err;
2299
2300 /*
2301 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2302 */
2303
2304 if (store)
2305 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2306 else
2307 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2308
2309 if (store) {
2310 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2311 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2312 } else
2313 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2314
2315 if (ret)
2316 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2317 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2318
2319 if (ret == 0)
2320 goto err;
2321
2322 if (store && store->check_issued)
2323 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2324 else
2325 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2326
2327 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2328 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2329 else
2330 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2331
2332 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2333 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2334 else
2335 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2336
2337 if (store && store->verify)
2338 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2339 else
2340 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2341
2342 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2343 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2344 else
2345 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2346
2347 if (store && store->get_crl)
2348 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2349 else
2350 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2351
2352 if (store && store->check_crl)
2353 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2354 else
2355 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2356
2357 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2358 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2359 else
2360 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2361
2362 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2363 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2364 else
2365 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2366
2367 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2368 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2369 else
2370 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2371
2372 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2373
2374 return 1;
2375
2376 err:
2377 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
2378 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2379 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2380 }
2381
2382 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2383 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2384 return 0;
2385}
2386
2387/*
2388 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2389 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2390 */
2391
2392void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2393{
2394 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2395 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2396}
2397
2398void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2399{
2400 /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free|
2401 * also calls this function. */
2402 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2403 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2404 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2405 }
2406 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2407 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2408 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2409 ctx->param = NULL;
2410 }
2411 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2412 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2413 ctx->tree = NULL;
2414 }
2415 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2416 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2417 ctx->chain = NULL;
2418 }
2419 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2420 OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2421}
2422
2423void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2424{
2425 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2426}
2427
2428void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2429{
2430 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2431}
2432
2433void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2434 time_t t)
2435{
2436 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2437}
2438
2439X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2440{
2441 return ctx->cert;
2442}
2443
2444void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2445 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2446{
2447 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2448}
2449
2450X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2451{
2452 return ctx->tree;
2453}
2454
2455int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2456{
2457 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2458}
2459
2460int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2461{
2462 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2463 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2464 if (!param)
2465 return 0;
2466 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2467}
2468
2469X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2470{
2471 return ctx->param;
2472}
2473
2474void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2475{
2476 if (ctx->param)
2477 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2478 ctx->param = param;
2479}
2480
2481IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2482
2483IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2484