| 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project |
| 3 | * 2004. |
| 4 | */ |
| 5 | /* ==================================================================== |
| 6 | * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| 7 | * |
| 8 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 9 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 10 | * are met: |
| 11 | * |
| 12 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 13 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 14 | * |
| 15 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 16 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 17 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| 18 | * distribution. |
| 19 | * |
| 20 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| 21 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| 22 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 23 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
| 24 | * |
| 25 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| 26 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| 27 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| 28 | * licensing@OpenSSL.org. |
| 29 | * |
| 30 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| 31 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| 32 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| 33 | * |
| 34 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| 35 | * acknowledgment: |
| 36 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 37 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
| 38 | * |
| 39 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| 40 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 41 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| 42 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| 43 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| 44 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| 45 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| 46 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 47 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| 48 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| 49 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| 50 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 51 | * ==================================================================== |
| 52 | * |
| 53 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| 54 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| 55 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| 56 | * |
| 57 | */ |
| 58 | |
| 59 | #include <string.h> |
| 60 | |
| 61 | #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| 62 | #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| 63 | #include <openssl/stack.h> |
| 64 | #include <openssl/thread.h> |
| 65 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| 66 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| 67 | |
| 68 | #include "pcy_int.h" |
| 69 | #include "../internal.h" |
| 70 | |
| 71 | /* |
| 72 | * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during |
| 73 | * evaluation. |
| 74 | */ |
| 75 | |
| 76 | /* |
| 77 | * #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
| 78 | */ |
| 79 | |
| 80 | #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
| 81 | |
| 82 | static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, |
| 83 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent) |
| 84 | { |
| 85 | if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
| 86 | || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) |
| 87 | BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n" ); |
| 88 | else { |
| 89 | int i; |
| 90 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set; |
| 91 | ASN1_OBJECT *oid; |
| 92 | BIO_puts(err, " Expected: " ); |
| 93 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) { |
| 94 | oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i); |
| 95 | if (i) |
| 96 | BIO_puts(err, ", " ); |
| 97 | i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid); |
| 98 | } |
| 99 | BIO_puts(err, "\n" ); |
| 100 | } |
| 101 | } |
| 102 | |
| 103 | static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| 104 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) |
| 105 | { |
| 106 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev; |
| 107 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| 108 | int i; |
| 109 | BIO *err; |
| 110 | err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| 111 | if (!curr) |
| 112 | curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel; |
| 113 | else |
| 114 | curr++; |
| 115 | BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n" , str); |
| 116 | BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n" , curr - tree->levels); |
| 117 | for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) { |
| 118 | BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n" , |
| 119 | plev - tree->levels, plev->flags); |
| 120 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) { |
| 121 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i); |
| 122 | X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2); |
| 123 | expected_print(err, plev, node, 2); |
| 124 | BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n" , node->data->flags); |
| 125 | } |
| 126 | if (plev->anyPolicy) |
| 127 | X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2); |
| 128 | } |
| 129 | |
| 130 | BIO_free(err); |
| 131 | |
| 132 | } |
| 133 | #else |
| 134 | |
| 135 | # define tree_print(a,b,c) /* */ |
| 136 | |
| 137 | #endif |
| 138 | |
| 139 | /*- |
| 140 | * Initialize policy tree. Return values: |
| 141 | * 0 Some internal error occurred. |
| 142 | * -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates. |
| 143 | * 1 Tree initialized OK. |
| 144 | * 2 Policy tree is empty. |
| 145 | * 5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true. |
| 146 | * 6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true. |
| 147 | */ |
| 148 | |
| 149 | static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| 150 | unsigned int flags) |
| 151 | { |
| 152 | X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; |
| 153 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level; |
| 154 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; |
| 155 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL; |
| 156 | X509 *x; |
| 157 | int ret = 1; |
| 158 | int i, n; |
| 159 | int explicit_policy; |
| 160 | int any_skip; |
| 161 | int map_skip; |
| 162 | *ptree = NULL; |
| 163 | n = sk_X509_num(certs); |
| 164 | |
| 165 | #if 0 |
| 166 | /* Disable policy mapping for now... */ |
| 167 | flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; |
| 168 | #endif |
| 169 | |
| 170 | if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) |
| 171 | explicit_policy = 0; |
| 172 | else |
| 173 | explicit_policy = n + 1; |
| 174 | |
| 175 | if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) |
| 176 | any_skip = 0; |
| 177 | else |
| 178 | any_skip = n + 1; |
| 179 | |
| 180 | if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
| 181 | map_skip = 0; |
| 182 | else |
| 183 | map_skip = n + 1; |
| 184 | |
| 185 | /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */ |
| 186 | if (n == 1) |
| 187 | return 1; |
| 188 | /* |
| 189 | * First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the trust |
| 190 | * anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can calculate |
| 191 | * explicit_policy value at this point. |
| 192 | */ |
| 193 | for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 194 | x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| 195 | X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); |
| 196 | cache = policy_cache_set(x); |
| 197 | /* If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately */ |
| 198 | if (cache == NULL) |
| 199 | return 0; |
| 200 | /* |
| 201 | * If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue |
| 202 | */ |
| 203 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) |
| 204 | ret = -1; |
| 205 | /* |
| 206 | * Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies) and |
| 207 | * haven't already set an inconsistent code note it. |
| 208 | */ |
| 209 | else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data) |
| 210 | ret = 2; |
| 211 | if (explicit_policy > 0) { |
| 212 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| 213 | explicit_policy--; |
| 214 | if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1) |
| 215 | && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy)) |
| 216 | explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip; |
| 217 | } |
| 218 | } |
| 219 | |
| 220 | if (ret != 1) { |
| 221 | if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy) |
| 222 | return 6; |
| 223 | return ret; |
| 224 | } |
| 225 | |
| 226 | /* If we get this far initialize the tree */ |
| 227 | |
| 228 | tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE)); |
| 229 | |
| 230 | if (!tree) |
| 231 | return 0; |
| 232 | |
| 233 | tree->flags = 0; |
| 234 | tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n); |
| 235 | tree->nlevel = 0; |
| 236 | tree->extra_data = NULL; |
| 237 | tree->auth_policies = NULL; |
| 238 | tree->user_policies = NULL; |
| 239 | |
| 240 | if (!tree->levels) { |
| 241 | OPENSSL_free(tree); |
| 242 | return 0; |
| 243 | } |
| 244 | |
| 245 | OPENSSL_memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL)); |
| 246 | |
| 247 | tree->nlevel = n; |
| 248 | |
| 249 | level = tree->levels; |
| 250 | |
| 251 | /* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */ |
| 252 | |
| 253 | data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0); |
| 254 | |
| 255 | if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree)) |
| 256 | goto bad_tree; |
| 257 | |
| 258 | for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 259 | level++; |
| 260 | x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| 261 | cache = policy_cache_set(x); |
| 262 | X509_up_ref(x); |
| 263 | level->cert = x; |
| 264 | |
| 265 | if (!cache->anyPolicy) |
| 266 | level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; |
| 267 | |
| 268 | /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */ |
| 269 | if (any_skip == 0) { |
| 270 | /* |
| 271 | * Any matching allowed if certificate is self issued and not the |
| 272 | * last in the chain. |
| 273 | */ |
| 274 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0)) |
| 275 | level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; |
| 276 | } else { |
| 277 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| 278 | any_skip--; |
| 279 | if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) |
| 280 | && (cache->any_skip < any_skip)) |
| 281 | any_skip = cache->any_skip; |
| 282 | } |
| 283 | |
| 284 | if (map_skip == 0) |
| 285 | level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; |
| 286 | else { |
| 287 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| 288 | map_skip--; |
| 289 | if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) |
| 290 | && (cache->map_skip < map_skip)) |
| 291 | map_skip = cache->map_skip; |
| 292 | } |
| 293 | |
| 294 | } |
| 295 | |
| 296 | *ptree = tree; |
| 297 | |
| 298 | if (explicit_policy) |
| 299 | return 1; |
| 300 | else |
| 301 | return 5; |
| 302 | |
| 303 | bad_tree: |
| 304 | |
| 305 | X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| 306 | |
| 307 | return 0; |
| 308 | |
| 309 | } |
| 310 | |
| 311 | static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 312 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data) |
| 313 | { |
| 314 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| 315 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| 316 | int matched = 0; |
| 317 | size_t i; |
| 318 | /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */ |
| 319 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { |
| 320 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); |
| 321 | if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { |
| 322 | if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL)) |
| 323 | return 0; |
| 324 | matched = 1; |
| 325 | } |
| 326 | } |
| 327 | if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { |
| 328 | if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) |
| 329 | return 0; |
| 330 | } |
| 331 | return 1; |
| 332 | } |
| 333 | |
| 334 | /* |
| 335 | * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from |
| 336 | * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match. |
| 337 | */ |
| 338 | |
| 339 | static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 340 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) |
| 341 | { |
| 342 | size_t i; |
| 343 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data; |
| 344 | |
| 345 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) { |
| 346 | data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); |
| 347 | /* |
| 348 | * If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding |
| 349 | * CertificatePolicies entry. However such an identical node would |
| 350 | * be created if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be |
| 351 | * no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create link |
| 352 | * because then it will have the mapping flags right and we can prune |
| 353 | * it later. |
| 354 | */ |
| 355 | #if 0 |
| 356 | if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY) |
| 357 | && !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)) |
| 358 | continue; |
| 359 | #endif |
| 360 | /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ |
| 361 | if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) |
| 362 | return 0; |
| 363 | } |
| 364 | return 1; |
| 365 | } |
| 366 | |
| 367 | /* |
| 368 | * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched |
| 369 | * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy. |
| 370 | */ |
| 371 | |
| 372 | static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 373 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| 374 | const ASN1_OBJECT *id, |
| 375 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 376 | { |
| 377 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data; |
| 378 | if (id == NULL) |
| 379 | id = node->data->valid_policy; |
| 380 | /* |
| 381 | * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched |
| 382 | * node. |
| 383 | */ |
| 384 | data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node)); |
| 385 | |
| 386 | if (data == NULL) |
| 387 | return 0; |
| 388 | /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ |
| 389 | data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; |
| 390 | data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; |
| 391 | if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) { |
| 392 | policy_data_free(data); |
| 393 | return 0; |
| 394 | } |
| 395 | |
| 396 | return 1; |
| 397 | } |
| 398 | |
| 399 | static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 400 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| 401 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 402 | { |
| 403 | const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| 404 | size_t i; |
| 405 | |
| 406 | if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
| 407 | || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) { |
| 408 | /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */ |
| 409 | if (node->nchild) |
| 410 | return 1; |
| 411 | if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree)) |
| 412 | return 0; |
| 413 | /* Add it */ |
| 414 | } else { |
| 415 | /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */ |
| 416 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set; |
| 417 | if ((size_t)node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset)) |
| 418 | return 1; |
| 419 | /* Locate unmatched nodes */ |
| 420 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) { |
| 421 | ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i); |
| 422 | if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid)) |
| 423 | continue; |
| 424 | if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree)) |
| 425 | return 0; |
| 426 | } |
| 427 | |
| 428 | } |
| 429 | |
| 430 | return 1; |
| 431 | |
| 432 | } |
| 433 | |
| 434 | static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 435 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| 436 | X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 437 | { |
| 438 | size_t i; |
| 439 | /* |
| 440 | * X509_POLICY_DATA *data; |
| 441 | */ |
| 442 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| 443 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| 444 | |
| 445 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { |
| 446 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); |
| 447 | |
| 448 | if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree)) |
| 449 | return 0; |
| 450 | |
| 451 | #if 0 |
| 452 | |
| 453 | /* |
| 454 | * Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced nodes. |
| 455 | * Note: need something better for policy mapping because each node |
| 456 | * may have multiple children |
| 457 | */ |
| 458 | if (node->nchild) |
| 459 | continue; |
| 460 | |
| 461 | /* |
| 462 | * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from |
| 463 | * unmatched node. |
| 464 | */ |
| 465 | data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy, |
| 466 | node_critical(node)); |
| 467 | |
| 468 | if (data == NULL) |
| 469 | return 0; |
| 470 | /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ |
| 471 | data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; |
| 472 | data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; |
| 473 | if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) { |
| 474 | policy_data_free(data); |
| 475 | return 0; |
| 476 | } |
| 477 | #endif |
| 478 | |
| 479 | } |
| 480 | /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ |
| 481 | if (last->anyPolicy) { |
| 482 | if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) |
| 483 | return 0; |
| 484 | } |
| 485 | return 1; |
| 486 | } |
| 487 | |
| 488 | /* |
| 489 | * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level |
| 490 | * then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever |
| 491 | * have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty. |
| 492 | */ |
| 493 | |
| 494 | static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) |
| 495 | { |
| 496 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes; |
| 497 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| 498 | int i; |
| 499 | nodes = curr->nodes; |
| 500 | if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) { |
| 501 | for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 502 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); |
| 503 | /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */ |
| 504 | if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) { |
| 505 | node->parent->nchild--; |
| 506 | OPENSSL_free(node); |
| 507 | (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); |
| 508 | } |
| 509 | } |
| 510 | } |
| 511 | |
| 512 | for (;;) { |
| 513 | --curr; |
| 514 | nodes = curr->nodes; |
| 515 | for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 516 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); |
| 517 | if (node->nchild == 0) { |
| 518 | node->parent->nchild--; |
| 519 | OPENSSL_free(node); |
| 520 | (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); |
| 521 | } |
| 522 | } |
| 523 | if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) { |
| 524 | if (curr->anyPolicy->parent) |
| 525 | curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--; |
| 526 | OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy); |
| 527 | curr->anyPolicy = NULL; |
| 528 | } |
| 529 | if (curr == tree->levels) { |
| 530 | /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */ |
| 531 | if (!curr->anyPolicy) |
| 532 | return 2; |
| 533 | return 1; |
| 534 | } |
| 535 | } |
| 536 | |
| 537 | } |
| 538 | |
| 539 | static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes, |
| 540 | X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy) |
| 541 | { |
| 542 | if (!*pnodes) { |
| 543 | *pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new(); |
| 544 | if (!*pnodes) |
| 545 | return 0; |
| 546 | } else { |
| 547 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(*pnodes); |
| 548 | if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, NULL, pcy)) |
| 549 | return 1; |
| 550 | } |
| 551 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy)) |
| 552 | return 0; |
| 553 | |
| 554 | return 1; |
| 555 | |
| 556 | } |
| 557 | |
| 558 | /* |
| 559 | * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter |
| 560 | * is used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user |
| 561 | * set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to |
| 562 | * the authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set |
| 563 | * of valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. The return |
| 564 | * value of '2' is used in this case to indicate that pnodes should be freed. |
| 565 | */ |
| 566 | |
| 567 | static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| 568 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes) |
| 569 | { |
| 570 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; |
| 571 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr; |
| 572 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes; |
| 573 | int i; |
| 574 | size_t j; |
| 575 | curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1; |
| 576 | |
| 577 | /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */ |
| 578 | if (curr->anyPolicy) { |
| 579 | if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy)) |
| 580 | return 0; |
| 581 | addnodes = pnodes; |
| 582 | } else |
| 583 | /* Add policies to authority set */ |
| 584 | addnodes = &tree->auth_policies; |
| 585 | |
| 586 | curr = tree->levels; |
| 587 | for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) { |
| 588 | /* |
| 589 | * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower |
| 590 | * levels so end search. |
| 591 | */ |
| 592 | if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy)) |
| 593 | break; |
| 594 | curr++; |
| 595 | for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) { |
| 596 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j); |
| 597 | if ((node->parent == anyptr) |
| 598 | && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) |
| 599 | return 0; |
| 600 | } |
| 601 | } |
| 602 | |
| 603 | if (addnodes == pnodes) |
| 604 | return 2; |
| 605 | |
| 606 | *pnodes = tree->auth_policies; |
| 607 | |
| 608 | return 1; |
| 609 | } |
| 610 | |
| 611 | static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| 612 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, |
| 613 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes) |
| 614 | { |
| 615 | size_t i; |
| 616 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| 617 | ASN1_OBJECT *oid; |
| 618 | |
| 619 | X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy; |
| 620 | X509_POLICY_DATA *; |
| 621 | |
| 622 | /* |
| 623 | * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this |
| 624 | * will happen if it is a leaf node. |
| 625 | */ |
| 626 | |
| 627 | if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0) |
| 628 | return 1; |
| 629 | |
| 630 | anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy; |
| 631 | |
| 632 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { |
| 633 | oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); |
| 634 | if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) { |
| 635 | tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY; |
| 636 | return 1; |
| 637 | } |
| 638 | } |
| 639 | |
| 640 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { |
| 641 | oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); |
| 642 | node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid); |
| 643 | if (!node) { |
| 644 | if (!anyPolicy) |
| 645 | continue; |
| 646 | /* |
| 647 | * Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers |
| 648 | * from anyPolicy. |
| 649 | */ |
| 650 | extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy)); |
| 651 | if (!extra) |
| 652 | return 0; |
| 653 | extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set; |
| 654 | extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS |
| 655 | | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; |
| 656 | node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree); |
| 657 | } |
| 658 | if (!tree->user_policies) { |
| 659 | tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); |
| 660 | if (!tree->user_policies) |
| 661 | return 1; |
| 662 | } |
| 663 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node)) |
| 664 | return 0; |
| 665 | } |
| 666 | return 1; |
| 667 | |
| 668 | } |
| 669 | |
| 670 | static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 671 | { |
| 672 | int ret, i; |
| 673 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1; |
| 674 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; |
| 675 | |
| 676 | for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { |
| 677 | cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert); |
| 678 | if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) |
| 679 | return 0; |
| 680 | |
| 681 | if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) |
| 682 | && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree)) |
| 683 | return 0; |
| 684 | tree_print("before tree_prune()" , tree, curr); |
| 685 | ret = tree_prune(tree, curr); |
| 686 | if (ret != 1) |
| 687 | return ret; |
| 688 | } |
| 689 | |
| 690 | return 1; |
| 691 | |
| 692 | } |
| 693 | |
| 694 | static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) |
| 695 | { |
| 696 | if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE)) |
| 697 | OPENSSL_free(node); |
| 698 | } |
| 699 | |
| 700 | void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 701 | { |
| 702 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; |
| 703 | int i; |
| 704 | |
| 705 | if (!tree) |
| 706 | return; |
| 707 | |
| 708 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies); |
| 709 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free); |
| 710 | |
| 711 | for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { |
| 712 | if (curr->cert) |
| 713 | X509_free(curr->cert); |
| 714 | if (curr->nodes) |
| 715 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free); |
| 716 | if (curr->anyPolicy) |
| 717 | policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy); |
| 718 | } |
| 719 | |
| 720 | if (tree->extra_data) |
| 721 | sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free); |
| 722 | |
| 723 | OPENSSL_free(tree->levels); |
| 724 | OPENSSL_free(tree); |
| 725 | |
| 726 | } |
| 727 | |
| 728 | /*- |
| 729 | * Application policy checking function. |
| 730 | * Return codes: |
| 731 | * 0 Internal Error. |
| 732 | * 1 Successful. |
| 733 | * -1 One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions |
| 734 | * -2 User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true. |
| 735 | */ |
| 736 | |
| 737 | int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy, |
| 738 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| 739 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags) |
| 740 | { |
| 741 | int ret; |
| 742 | int calc_ret; |
| 743 | X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL; |
| 744 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL; |
| 745 | *ptree = NULL; |
| 746 | |
| 747 | *pexplicit_policy = 0; |
| 748 | ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags); |
| 749 | |
| 750 | switch (ret) { |
| 751 | |
| 752 | /* Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK */ |
| 753 | case 2: |
| 754 | return 1; |
| 755 | |
| 756 | /* Some internal error */ |
| 757 | case -1: |
| 758 | return -1; |
| 759 | |
| 760 | /* Some internal error */ |
| 761 | case 0: |
| 762 | return 0; |
| 763 | |
| 764 | /* Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error */ |
| 765 | |
| 766 | case 6: |
| 767 | *pexplicit_policy = 1; |
| 768 | return -2; |
| 769 | |
| 770 | /* Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue */ |
| 771 | case 5: |
| 772 | *pexplicit_policy = 1; |
| 773 | break; |
| 774 | |
| 775 | /* Tree OK: continue */ |
| 776 | |
| 777 | case 1: |
| 778 | if (!tree) |
| 779 | /* |
| 780 | * tree_init() returns success and a null tree |
| 781 | * if it's just looking at a trust anchor. |
| 782 | * I'm not sure that returning success here is |
| 783 | * correct, but I'm sure that reporting this |
| 784 | * as an internal error which our caller |
| 785 | * interprets as a malloc failure is wrong. |
| 786 | */ |
| 787 | return 1; |
| 788 | break; |
| 789 | } |
| 790 | |
| 791 | if (!tree) |
| 792 | goto error; |
| 793 | ret = tree_evaluate(tree); |
| 794 | |
| 795 | tree_print("tree_evaluate()" , tree, NULL); |
| 796 | |
| 797 | if (ret <= 0) |
| 798 | goto error; |
| 799 | |
| 800 | /* Return value 2 means tree empty */ |
| 801 | if (ret == 2) { |
| 802 | X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| 803 | if (*pexplicit_policy) |
| 804 | return -2; |
| 805 | else |
| 806 | return 1; |
| 807 | } |
| 808 | |
| 809 | /* Tree is not empty: continue */ |
| 810 | |
| 811 | calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes); |
| 812 | |
| 813 | if (!calc_ret) |
| 814 | goto error; |
| 815 | |
| 816 | ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes); |
| 817 | |
| 818 | if (calc_ret == 2) |
| 819 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes); |
| 820 | |
| 821 | if (!ret) |
| 822 | goto error; |
| 823 | |
| 824 | |
| 825 | if (tree) |
| 826 | *ptree = tree; |
| 827 | |
| 828 | if (*pexplicit_policy) { |
| 829 | nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree); |
| 830 | if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0) |
| 831 | return -2; |
| 832 | } |
| 833 | |
| 834 | return 1; |
| 835 | |
| 836 | error: |
| 837 | |
| 838 | X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| 839 | |
| 840 | return 0; |
| 841 | |
| 842 | } |
| 843 | |