| 1 | /* v3_purp.c */ |
| 2 | /* |
| 3 | * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project |
| 4 | * 2001. |
| 5 | */ |
| 6 | /* ==================================================================== |
| 7 | * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| 8 | * |
| 9 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 10 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 11 | * are met: |
| 12 | * |
| 13 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 14 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 15 | * |
| 16 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 17 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 18 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| 19 | * distribution. |
| 20 | * |
| 21 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| 22 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| 23 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 24 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
| 25 | * |
| 26 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| 27 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| 28 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| 29 | * licensing@OpenSSL.org. |
| 30 | * |
| 31 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| 32 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| 33 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| 34 | * |
| 35 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| 36 | * acknowledgment: |
| 37 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 38 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
| 39 | * |
| 40 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| 41 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 42 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| 43 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| 44 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| 45 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| 46 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| 47 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| 49 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| 50 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| 51 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 52 | * ==================================================================== |
| 53 | * |
| 54 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| 55 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| 56 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ |
| 57 | |
| 58 | #include <stdio.h> |
| 59 | |
| 60 | #include <string.h> |
| 61 | |
| 62 | #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| 63 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
| 64 | #include <openssl/digest.h> |
| 65 | #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| 66 | #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| 67 | #include <openssl/thread.h> |
| 68 | #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> |
| 69 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| 70 | |
| 71 | #include "../internal.h" |
| 72 | |
| 73 | #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) |
| 74 | #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ |
| 75 | (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) |
| 76 | #define xku_reject(x, usage) \ |
| 77 | (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) |
| 78 | #define ns_reject(x, usage) \ |
| 79 | (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) |
| 80 | |
| 81 | static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x); |
| 82 | |
| 83 | static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 84 | int ca); |
| 85 | static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 86 | int ca); |
| 87 | static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 88 | int ca); |
| 89 | static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); |
| 90 | static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 91 | int ca); |
| 92 | static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 93 | int ca); |
| 94 | static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 95 | int ca); |
| 96 | static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 97 | int ca); |
| 98 | static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); |
| 99 | static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); |
| 100 | |
| 101 | static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b); |
| 102 | static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); |
| 103 | |
| 104 | static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { |
| 105 | {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, |
| 106 | check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *)"SSL client" , (char *)"sslclient" , |
| 107 | NULL}, |
| 108 | {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, |
| 109 | check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *)"SSL server" , (char *)"sslserver" , |
| 110 | NULL}, |
| 111 | {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, |
| 112 | check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, (char *)"Netscape SSL server" , |
| 113 | (char *)"nssslserver" , NULL}, |
| 114 | {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, |
| 115 | (char *)"S/MIME signing" , (char *)"smimesign" , NULL}, |
| 116 | {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, |
| 117 | check_purpose_smime_encrypt, (char *)"S/MIME encryption" , |
| 118 | (char *)"smimeencrypt" , NULL}, |
| 119 | {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, |
| 120 | (char *)"CRL signing" , (char *)"crlsign" , NULL}, |
| 121 | {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, (char *)"Any Purpose" , |
| 122 | (char *)"any" , NULL}, |
| 123 | {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, |
| 124 | (char *)"OCSP helper" , (char *)"ocsphelper" , NULL}, |
| 125 | {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, |
| 126 | check_purpose_timestamp_sign, (char *)"Time Stamp signing" , |
| 127 | (char *)"timestampsign" , NULL}, |
| 128 | }; |
| 129 | |
| 130 | #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)) |
| 131 | |
| 132 | static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL; |
| 133 | |
| 134 | static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b) |
| 135 | { |
| 136 | return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose; |
| 137 | } |
| 138 | |
| 139 | /* |
| 140 | * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I |
| 141 | * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const |
| 142 | * things. |
| 143 | */ |
| 144 | int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) |
| 145 | { |
| 146 | int idx; |
| 147 | const X509_PURPOSE *pt; |
| 148 | x509v3_cache_extensions(x); |
| 149 | if (id == -1) |
| 150 | return 1; |
| 151 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); |
| 152 | if (idx == -1) |
| 153 | return -1; |
| 154 | pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
| 155 | return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); |
| 156 | } |
| 157 | |
| 158 | int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) |
| 159 | { |
| 160 | if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { |
| 161 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); |
| 162 | return 0; |
| 163 | } |
| 164 | *p = purpose; |
| 165 | return 1; |
| 166 | } |
| 167 | |
| 168 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) |
| 169 | { |
| 170 | if (!xptable) |
| 171 | return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
| 172 | return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
| 173 | } |
| 174 | |
| 175 | X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) |
| 176 | { |
| 177 | if (idx < 0) |
| 178 | return NULL; |
| 179 | if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) |
| 180 | return xstandard + idx; |
| 181 | return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT); |
| 182 | } |
| 183 | |
| 184 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname) |
| 185 | { |
| 186 | int i; |
| 187 | X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; |
| 188 | for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { |
| 189 | xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); |
| 190 | if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) |
| 191 | return i; |
| 192 | } |
| 193 | return -1; |
| 194 | } |
| 195 | |
| 196 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) |
| 197 | { |
| 198 | X509_PURPOSE tmp; |
| 199 | size_t idx; |
| 200 | |
| 201 | if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) |
| 202 | return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; |
| 203 | tmp.purpose = purpose; |
| 204 | if (!xptable) |
| 205 | return -1; |
| 206 | |
| 207 | sk_X509_PURPOSE_sort(xptable); |
| 208 | if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp)) |
| 209 | return -1; |
| 210 | return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
| 211 | } |
| 212 | |
| 213 | int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, |
| 214 | int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), |
| 215 | char *name, char *sname, void *arg) |
| 216 | { |
| 217 | int idx; |
| 218 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
| 219 | char *name_dup, *sname_dup; |
| 220 | |
| 221 | /* |
| 222 | * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it |
| 223 | */ |
| 224 | flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
| 225 | /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ |
| 226 | flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; |
| 227 | /* Get existing entry if any */ |
| 228 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); |
| 229 | /* Need a new entry */ |
| 230 | if (idx == -1) { |
| 231 | if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) { |
| 232 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 233 | return 0; |
| 234 | } |
| 235 | ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
| 236 | } else |
| 237 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
| 238 | |
| 239 | /* Duplicate the supplied names. */ |
| 240 | name_dup = BUF_strdup(name); |
| 241 | sname_dup = BUF_strdup(sname); |
| 242 | if (name_dup == NULL || sname_dup == NULL) { |
| 243 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 244 | if (name_dup != NULL) |
| 245 | OPENSSL_free(name_dup); |
| 246 | if (sname_dup != NULL) |
| 247 | OPENSSL_free(sname_dup); |
| 248 | if (idx == -1) |
| 249 | OPENSSL_free(ptmp); |
| 250 | return 0; |
| 251 | } |
| 252 | |
| 253 | /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ |
| 254 | if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { |
| 255 | OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); |
| 256 | OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); |
| 257 | } |
| 258 | /* dup supplied name */ |
| 259 | ptmp->name = name_dup; |
| 260 | ptmp->sname = sname_dup; |
| 261 | /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ |
| 262 | ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
| 263 | /* Set all other flags */ |
| 264 | ptmp->flags |= flags; |
| 265 | |
| 266 | ptmp->purpose = id; |
| 267 | ptmp->trust = trust; |
| 268 | ptmp->check_purpose = ck; |
| 269 | ptmp->usr_data = arg; |
| 270 | |
| 271 | /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ |
| 272 | if (idx == -1) { |
| 273 | if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) { |
| 274 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 275 | xptable_free(ptmp); |
| 276 | return 0; |
| 277 | } |
| 278 | if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) { |
| 279 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 280 | xptable_free(ptmp); |
| 281 | return 0; |
| 282 | } |
| 283 | } |
| 284 | return 1; |
| 285 | } |
| 286 | |
| 287 | static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) |
| 288 | { |
| 289 | if (!p) |
| 290 | return; |
| 291 | if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) { |
| 292 | if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { |
| 293 | OPENSSL_free(p->name); |
| 294 | OPENSSL_free(p->sname); |
| 295 | } |
| 296 | OPENSSL_free(p); |
| 297 | } |
| 298 | } |
| 299 | |
| 300 | void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) |
| 301 | { |
| 302 | unsigned int i; |
| 303 | sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free); |
| 304 | for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) |
| 305 | xptable_free(xstandard + i); |
| 306 | xptable = NULL; |
| 307 | } |
| 308 | |
| 309 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| 310 | { |
| 311 | return xp->purpose; |
| 312 | } |
| 313 | |
| 314 | char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| 315 | { |
| 316 | return xp->name; |
| 317 | } |
| 318 | |
| 319 | char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| 320 | { |
| 321 | return xp->sname; |
| 322 | } |
| 323 | |
| 324 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| 325 | { |
| 326 | return xp->trust; |
| 327 | } |
| 328 | |
| 329 | static int nid_cmp(const void *void_a, const void *void_b) |
| 330 | { |
| 331 | const int *a = void_a, *b = void_b; |
| 332 | |
| 333 | return *a - *b; |
| 334 | } |
| 335 | |
| 336 | int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) |
| 337 | { |
| 338 | /* |
| 339 | * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is |
| 340 | * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is |
| 341 | * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will |
| 342 | * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical |
| 343 | * order because it will be searched using bsearch. |
| 344 | */ |
| 345 | |
| 346 | static const int supported_nids[] = { |
| 347 | NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ |
| 348 | NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ |
| 349 | NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */ |
| 350 | NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */ |
| 351 | NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */ |
| 352 | NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */ |
| 353 | NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */ |
| 354 | NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */ |
| 355 | NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */ |
| 356 | NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */ |
| 357 | NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */ |
| 358 | }; |
| 359 | |
| 360 | int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); |
| 361 | |
| 362 | if (ex_nid == NID_undef) |
| 363 | return 0; |
| 364 | |
| 365 | if (bsearch |
| 366 | (&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int), |
| 367 | sizeof(int), nid_cmp) != NULL) |
| 368 | return 1; |
| 369 | return 0; |
| 370 | } |
| 371 | |
| 372 | static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) |
| 373 | { |
| 374 | X509_NAME *iname = NULL; |
| 375 | size_t i; |
| 376 | if (dp->reasons) { |
| 377 | if (dp->reasons->length > 0) |
| 378 | dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0]; |
| 379 | if (dp->reasons->length > 1) |
| 380 | dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8); |
| 381 | dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; |
| 382 | } else |
| 383 | dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; |
| 384 | if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) |
| 385 | return; |
| 386 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { |
| 387 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); |
| 388 | if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { |
| 389 | iname = gen->d.directoryName; |
| 390 | break; |
| 391 | } |
| 392 | } |
| 393 | if (!iname) |
| 394 | iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
| 395 | |
| 396 | DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname); |
| 397 | |
| 398 | } |
| 399 | |
| 400 | static void setup_crldp(X509 *x) |
| 401 | { |
| 402 | size_t i; |
| 403 | x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); |
| 404 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) |
| 405 | setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)); |
| 406 | } |
| 407 | |
| 408 | static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) |
| 409 | { |
| 410 | BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; |
| 411 | PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; |
| 412 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; |
| 413 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; |
| 414 | EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; |
| 415 | X509_EXTENSION *ex; |
| 416 | size_t i; |
| 417 | int j; |
| 418 | |
| 419 | CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&x->lock); |
| 420 | const int is_set = x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET; |
| 421 | CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&x->lock); |
| 422 | |
| 423 | if (is_set) { |
| 424 | return; |
| 425 | } |
| 426 | |
| 427 | CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&x->lock); |
| 428 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) { |
| 429 | CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock); |
| 430 | return; |
| 431 | } |
| 432 | |
| 433 | X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL); |
| 434 | /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ |
| 435 | if (!X509_get_version(x)) |
| 436 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; |
| 437 | /* Handle basic constraints */ |
| 438 | if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) { |
| 439 | if (bs->ca) |
| 440 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; |
| 441 | if (bs->pathlen) { |
| 442 | if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) |
| 443 | || !bs->ca) { |
| 444 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| 445 | x->ex_pathlen = 0; |
| 446 | } else |
| 447 | x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); |
| 448 | } else |
| 449 | x->ex_pathlen = -1; |
| 450 | BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); |
| 451 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; |
| 452 | } |
| 453 | /* Handle proxy certificates */ |
| 454 | if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) { |
| 455 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA |
| 456 | || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 |
| 457 | || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) { |
| 458 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| 459 | } |
| 460 | if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) { |
| 461 | x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint); |
| 462 | } else |
| 463 | x->ex_pcpathlen = -1; |
| 464 | PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); |
| 465 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; |
| 466 | } |
| 467 | /* Handle key usage */ |
| 468 | if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { |
| 469 | if (usage->length > 0) { |
| 470 | x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; |
| 471 | if (usage->length > 1) |
| 472 | x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; |
| 473 | } else |
| 474 | x->ex_kusage = 0; |
| 475 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; |
| 476 | ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); |
| 477 | } |
| 478 | x->ex_xkusage = 0; |
| 479 | if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { |
| 480 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; |
| 481 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { |
| 482 | switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) { |
| 483 | case NID_server_auth: |
| 484 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; |
| 485 | break; |
| 486 | |
| 487 | case NID_client_auth: |
| 488 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; |
| 489 | break; |
| 490 | |
| 491 | case NID_email_protect: |
| 492 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; |
| 493 | break; |
| 494 | |
| 495 | case NID_code_sign: |
| 496 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; |
| 497 | break; |
| 498 | |
| 499 | case NID_ms_sgc: |
| 500 | case NID_ns_sgc: |
| 501 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; |
| 502 | break; |
| 503 | |
| 504 | case NID_OCSP_sign: |
| 505 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; |
| 506 | break; |
| 507 | |
| 508 | case NID_time_stamp: |
| 509 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; |
| 510 | break; |
| 511 | |
| 512 | case NID_dvcs: |
| 513 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; |
| 514 | break; |
| 515 | |
| 516 | case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage: |
| 517 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU; |
| 518 | break; |
| 519 | } |
| 520 | } |
| 521 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); |
| 522 | } |
| 523 | |
| 524 | if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) { |
| 525 | if (ns->length > 0) |
| 526 | x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; |
| 527 | else |
| 528 | x->ex_nscert = 0; |
| 529 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; |
| 530 | ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); |
| 531 | } |
| 532 | x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); |
| 533 | x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); |
| 534 | /* Does subject name match issuer ? */ |
| 535 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) { |
| 536 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; |
| 537 | /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */ |
| 538 | if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK && |
| 539 | !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
| 540 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; |
| 541 | } |
| 542 | x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); |
| 543 | x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL); |
| 544 | if (!x->nc && (j != -1)) |
| 545 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| 546 | setup_crldp(x); |
| 547 | |
| 548 | for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++) { |
| 549 | ex = X509_get_ext(x, j); |
| 550 | if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) |
| 551 | == NID_freshest_crl) |
| 552 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; |
| 553 | if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) |
| 554 | continue; |
| 555 | if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) { |
| 556 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; |
| 557 | break; |
| 558 | } |
| 559 | } |
| 560 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; |
| 561 | |
| 562 | CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock); |
| 563 | } |
| 564 | |
| 565 | /* check_ca returns one if |x| should be considered a CA certificate and zero |
| 566 | * otherwise. */ |
| 567 | static int check_ca(const X509 *x) |
| 568 | { |
| 569 | /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ |
| 570 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
| 571 | return 0; |
| 572 | /* Version 1 certificates are considered CAs and don't have extensions. */ |
| 573 | if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) { |
| 574 | return 1; |
| 575 | } |
| 576 | /* Otherwise, it's only a CA if basicConstraints says so. */ |
| 577 | return ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) && |
| 578 | (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)); |
| 579 | } |
| 580 | |
| 581 | int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) |
| 582 | { |
| 583 | x509v3_cache_extensions(x); |
| 584 | return check_ca(x); |
| 585 | } |
| 586 | |
| 587 | static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 588 | int ca) |
| 589 | { |
| 590 | if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) |
| 591 | return 0; |
| 592 | if (ca) |
| 593 | return check_ca(x); |
| 594 | /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */ |
| 595 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) |
| 596 | return 0; |
| 597 | /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ |
| 598 | if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) |
| 599 | return 0; |
| 600 | return 1; |
| 601 | } |
| 602 | |
| 603 | /* |
| 604 | * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or |
| 605 | * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual |
| 606 | * key types. |
| 607 | */ |
| 608 | #define KU_TLS \ |
| 609 | (KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) |
| 610 | |
| 611 | static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 612 | int ca) |
| 613 | { |
| 614 | if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC)) |
| 615 | return 0; |
| 616 | if (ca) |
| 617 | return check_ca(x); |
| 618 | |
| 619 | if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) |
| 620 | return 0; |
| 621 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS)) |
| 622 | return 0; |
| 623 | |
| 624 | return 1; |
| 625 | |
| 626 | } |
| 627 | |
| 628 | static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 629 | int ca) |
| 630 | { |
| 631 | int ret; |
| 632 | ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); |
| 633 | if (!ret || ca) |
| 634 | return ret; |
| 635 | /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ |
| 636 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) |
| 637 | return 0; |
| 638 | return ret; |
| 639 | } |
| 640 | |
| 641 | /* purpose_smime returns one if |x| is a valid S/MIME leaf (|ca| is zero) or CA |
| 642 | * (|ca| is one) certificate, and zero otherwise. */ |
| 643 | static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) |
| 644 | { |
| 645 | if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) |
| 646 | return 0; |
| 647 | if (ca) { |
| 648 | /* check nsCertType if present */ |
| 649 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && |
| 650 | (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) == 0) { |
| 651 | return 0; |
| 652 | } |
| 653 | |
| 654 | return check_ca(x); |
| 655 | } |
| 656 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { |
| 657 | return (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) == NS_SMIME; |
| 658 | } |
| 659 | return 1; |
| 660 | } |
| 661 | |
| 662 | static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 663 | int ca) |
| 664 | { |
| 665 | int ret; |
| 666 | ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); |
| 667 | if (!ret || ca) |
| 668 | return ret; |
| 669 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) |
| 670 | return 0; |
| 671 | return ret; |
| 672 | } |
| 673 | |
| 674 | static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 675 | int ca) |
| 676 | { |
| 677 | int ret; |
| 678 | ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); |
| 679 | if (!ret || ca) |
| 680 | return ret; |
| 681 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) |
| 682 | return 0; |
| 683 | return ret; |
| 684 | } |
| 685 | |
| 686 | static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 687 | int ca) |
| 688 | { |
| 689 | if (ca) { |
| 690 | return check_ca(x); |
| 691 | } |
| 692 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) |
| 693 | return 0; |
| 694 | return 1; |
| 695 | } |
| 696 | |
| 697 | /* |
| 698 | * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA |
| 699 | * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. |
| 700 | */ |
| 701 | |
| 702 | static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) |
| 703 | { |
| 704 | if (ca) |
| 705 | return check_ca(x); |
| 706 | /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ |
| 707 | return 1; |
| 708 | } |
| 709 | |
| 710 | static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 711 | int ca) |
| 712 | { |
| 713 | int i_ext; |
| 714 | |
| 715 | /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ |
| 716 | if (ca) |
| 717 | return check_ca(x); |
| 718 | |
| 719 | /* |
| 720 | * Check the optional key usage field: |
| 721 | * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature |
| 722 | * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall |
| 723 | * be rejected). |
| 724 | */ |
| 725 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) |
| 726 | && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || |
| 727 | !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) |
| 728 | return 0; |
| 729 | |
| 730 | /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ |
| 731 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) |
| 732 | return 0; |
| 733 | |
| 734 | /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ |
| 735 | i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); |
| 736 | if (i_ext >= 0) { |
| 737 | X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext); |
| 738 | if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) |
| 739 | return 0; |
| 740 | } |
| 741 | |
| 742 | return 1; |
| 743 | } |
| 744 | |
| 745 | static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) |
| 746 | { |
| 747 | return 1; |
| 748 | } |
| 749 | |
| 750 | /* |
| 751 | * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. This can be |
| 752 | * used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which have been looked |
| 753 | * up using some simple method such as by subject name. These are: 1. Check |
| 754 | * issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) 2. If akid(subject) exists |
| 755 | * check it matches issuer 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports |
| 756 | * certificate signing returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, |
| 757 | * reasons match codes for X509_verify_cert() |
| 758 | */ |
| 759 | |
| 760 | int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) |
| 761 | { |
| 762 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), |
| 763 | X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) |
| 764 | return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; |
| 765 | x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer); |
| 766 | x509v3_cache_extensions(subject); |
| 767 | |
| 768 | if (subject->akid) { |
| 769 | int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); |
| 770 | if (ret != X509_V_OK) |
| 771 | return ret; |
| 772 | } |
| 773 | |
| 774 | if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { |
| 775 | if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) |
| 776 | return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; |
| 777 | } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
| 778 | return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; |
| 779 | return X509_V_OK; |
| 780 | } |
| 781 | |
| 782 | int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) |
| 783 | { |
| 784 | |
| 785 | if (!akid) |
| 786 | return X509_V_OK; |
| 787 | |
| 788 | /* Check key ids (if present) */ |
| 789 | if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid && |
| 790 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) |
| 791 | return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; |
| 792 | /* Check serial number */ |
| 793 | if (akid->serial && |
| 794 | ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) |
| 795 | return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; |
| 796 | /* Check issuer name */ |
| 797 | if (akid->issuer) { |
| 798 | /* |
| 799 | * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF |
| 800 | * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but |
| 801 | * we only take any notice of the first. |
| 802 | */ |
| 803 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens; |
| 804 | GENERAL_NAME *gen; |
| 805 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; |
| 806 | size_t i; |
| 807 | gens = akid->issuer; |
| 808 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { |
| 809 | gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); |
| 810 | if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { |
| 811 | nm = gen->d.dirn; |
| 812 | break; |
| 813 | } |
| 814 | } |
| 815 | if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) |
| 816 | return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; |
| 817 | } |
| 818 | return X509_V_OK; |
| 819 | } |
| 820 | |
| 821 | uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x) |
| 822 | { |
| 823 | /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| 824 | X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); |
| 825 | return x->ex_flags; |
| 826 | } |
| 827 | |
| 828 | uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x) |
| 829 | { |
| 830 | /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| 831 | X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); |
| 832 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) |
| 833 | return x->ex_kusage; |
| 834 | return UINT32_MAX; |
| 835 | } |
| 836 | |
| 837 | uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x) |
| 838 | { |
| 839 | /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| 840 | X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); |
| 841 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) |
| 842 | return x->ex_xkusage; |
| 843 | return UINT32_MAX; |
| 844 | } |
| 845 | |