| 1 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | 
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| 2 | * All rights reserved. | 
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| 3 | * | 
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| 4 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | 
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| 5 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | 
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| 6 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | 
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| 7 | * | 
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| 8 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | 
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| 9 | * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions | 
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| 10 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | 
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| 11 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation | 
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| 12 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | 
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| 13 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | 
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| 14 | * | 
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| 15 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | 
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| 16 | * the code are not to be removed. | 
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| 17 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | 
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| 18 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | 
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| 19 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | 
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| 20 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | 
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| 21 | * | 
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| 22 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | 
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| 23 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | 
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| 24 | * are met: | 
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| 25 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | 
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| 26 | *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | 
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| 27 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | 
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| 28 | *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | 
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| 29 | *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | 
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| 30 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | 
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| 31 | *    must display the following acknowledgement: | 
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| 32 | *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by | 
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| 33 | *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | 
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| 34 | *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | 
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| 35 | *    being used are not cryptographic related :-). | 
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| 36 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | 
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| 37 | *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | 
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| 38 | *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | 
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| 39 | * | 
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| 40 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | 
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| 41 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | 
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| 42 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | 
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| 43 | * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | 
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| 44 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | 
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| 45 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | 
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| 46 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | 
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| 47 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | 
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| 48 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | 
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| 49 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | 
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| 50 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | 
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| 51 | * | 
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| 52 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | 
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| 53 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be | 
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| 54 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | 
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| 55 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | 
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| 56 | */ | 
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| 57 | /* ==================================================================== | 
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| 58 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved. | 
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| 59 | * | 
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| 60 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | 
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| 61 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | 
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| 62 | * are met: | 
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| 63 | * | 
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| 64 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | 
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| 65 | *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | 
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| 66 | * | 
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| 67 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | 
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| 68 | *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | 
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| 69 | *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | 
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| 70 | *    distribution. | 
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| 71 | * | 
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| 72 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | 
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| 73 | *    software must display the following acknowledgment: | 
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| 74 | *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | 
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| 75 | *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | 
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| 76 | * | 
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| 77 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | 
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| 78 | *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without | 
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| 79 | *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | 
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| 80 | *    openssl-core@openssl.org. | 
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| 81 | * | 
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| 82 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | 
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| 83 | *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | 
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| 84 | *    permission of the OpenSSL Project. | 
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| 85 | * | 
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| 86 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | 
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| 87 | *    acknowledgment: | 
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| 88 | *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | 
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| 89 | *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | 
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| 90 | * | 
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| 91 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | 
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| 92 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | 
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| 93 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | 
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| 94 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | 
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| 95 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | 
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| 96 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | 
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| 97 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | 
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| 98 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | 
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| 99 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | 
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| 100 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | 
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| 101 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | 
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| 102 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | 
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| 103 | * ==================================================================== | 
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| 104 | * | 
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| 105 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | 
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| 106 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim | 
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| 107 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ | 
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| 108 | /* ==================================================================== | 
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| 109 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | 
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| 110 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by | 
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| 111 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ | 
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| 112 |  | 
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| 113 | #include <openssl/ssl.h> | 
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| 114 |  | 
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| 115 | #include <assert.h> | 
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| 116 |  | 
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| 117 | #include <utility> | 
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| 118 |  | 
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| 119 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | 
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| 120 |  | 
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| 121 | #include "../crypto/internal.h" | 
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| 122 | #include "internal.h" | 
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| 123 |  | 
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| 124 |  | 
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| 125 | BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN | 
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| 126 |  | 
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| 127 | SSL_HANDSHAKE::SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSL *ssl_arg) | 
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| 128 | : ssl(ssl_arg), | 
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| 129 | scts_requested(false), | 
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| 130 | needs_psk_binder(false), | 
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| 131 | received_hello_retry_request(false), | 
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| 132 | sent_hello_retry_request(false), | 
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| 133 | handshake_finalized(false), | 
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| 134 | accept_psk_mode(false), | 
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| 135 | cert_request(false), | 
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| 136 | certificate_status_expected(false), | 
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| 137 | ocsp_stapling_requested(false), | 
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| 138 | delegated_credential_requested(false), | 
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| 139 | should_ack_sni(false), | 
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| 140 | in_false_start(false), | 
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| 141 | in_early_data(false), | 
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| 142 | early_data_offered(false), | 
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| 143 | can_early_read(false), | 
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| 144 | can_early_write(false), | 
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| 145 | next_proto_neg_seen(false), | 
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| 146 | ticket_expected(false), | 
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| 147 | extended_master_secret(false), | 
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| 148 | pending_private_key_op(false), | 
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| 149 | grease_seeded(false), | 
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| 150 | handback(false), | 
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| 151 | cert_compression_negotiated(false), | 
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| 152 | apply_jdk11_workaround(false) { | 
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| 153 | assert(ssl); | 
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| 154 | } | 
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| 155 |  | 
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| 156 | SSL_HANDSHAKE::~SSL_HANDSHAKE() { | 
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| 157 | ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(this); | 
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| 158 | } | 
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| 159 |  | 
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| 160 | UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> ssl_handshake_new(SSL *ssl) { | 
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| 161 | UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs = MakeUnique<SSL_HANDSHAKE>(ssl); | 
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| 162 | if (!hs || !hs->transcript.Init()) { | 
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| 163 | return nullptr; | 
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| 164 | } | 
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| 165 | hs->config = ssl->config.get(); | 
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| 166 | if (!hs->config) { | 
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| 167 | assert(hs->config); | 
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| 168 | return nullptr; | 
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| 169 | } | 
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| 170 | return hs; | 
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| 171 | } | 
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| 172 |  | 
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| 173 | bool ssl_check_message_type(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg, int type) { | 
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| 174 | if (msg.type != type) { | 
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| 175 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | 
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| 176 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | 
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| 177 | ERR_add_error_dataf( "got type %d, wanted type %d", msg.type, type); | 
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| 178 | return false; | 
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| 179 | } | 
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| 180 |  | 
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| 181 | return true; | 
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| 182 | } | 
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| 183 |  | 
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| 184 | bool ssl_add_message_cbb(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { | 
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| 185 | Array<uint8_t> msg; | 
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| 186 | if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb, &msg) || | 
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| 187 | !ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg))) { | 
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| 188 | return false; | 
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| 189 | } | 
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| 190 |  | 
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| 191 | return true; | 
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| 192 | } | 
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| 193 |  | 
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| 194 | size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) { | 
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| 195 | // kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do | 
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| 196 | // not accept peer certificate chains. | 
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| 197 | static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384; | 
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| 198 |  | 
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| 199 | if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) { | 
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| 200 | SSL_CONFIG *config = ssl->config.get();  // SSL_in_init() implies not NULL. | 
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| 201 | if ((!ssl->server || (config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) && | 
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| 202 | kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) { | 
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| 203 | return ssl->max_cert_list; | 
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| 204 | } | 
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| 205 | return kMaxMessageLen; | 
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| 206 | } | 
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| 207 |  | 
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| 208 | if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | 
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| 209 | // In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is | 
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| 210 | // a HelloRequest. | 
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| 211 | return 0; | 
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| 212 | } | 
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| 213 |  | 
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| 214 | if (ssl->server) { | 
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| 215 | // The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a | 
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| 216 | // KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth. | 
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| 217 | return 1; | 
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| 218 | } | 
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| 219 |  | 
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| 220 | // Clients must accept NewSessionTicket, so allow the default size. | 
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| 221 | return kMaxMessageLen; | 
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| 222 | } | 
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| 223 |  | 
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| 224 | bool ssl_hash_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) { | 
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| 225 | // V2ClientHello messages are pre-hashed. | 
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| 226 | if (msg.is_v2_hello) { | 
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| 227 | return true; | 
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| 228 | } | 
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| 229 |  | 
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| 230 | return hs->transcript.Update(msg.raw); | 
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| 231 | } | 
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| 232 |  | 
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| 233 | int ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert, | 
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| 234 | const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_types, | 
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| 235 | size_t num_ext_types, int ignore_unknown) { | 
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| 236 | // Reset everything. | 
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| 237 | for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) { | 
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| 238 | *ext_types[i].out_present = 0; | 
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| 239 | CBS_init(ext_types[i].out_data, NULL, 0); | 
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| 240 | } | 
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| 241 |  | 
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| 242 | CBS copy = *cbs; | 
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| 243 | while (CBS_len(©) != 0) { | 
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| 244 | uint16_t type; | 
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| 245 | CBS data; | 
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| 246 | if (!CBS_get_u16(©, &type) || | 
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| 247 | !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(©, &data)) { | 
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| 248 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); | 
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| 249 | *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | 
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| 250 | return 0; | 
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| 251 | } | 
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| 252 |  | 
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| 253 | const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_type = NULL; | 
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| 254 | for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) { | 
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| 255 | if (type == ext_types[i].type) { | 
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| 256 | ext_type = &ext_types[i]; | 
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| 257 | break; | 
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| 258 | } | 
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| 259 | } | 
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| 260 |  | 
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| 261 | if (ext_type == NULL) { | 
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| 262 | if (ignore_unknown) { | 
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| 263 | continue; | 
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| 264 | } | 
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| 265 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); | 
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| 266 | *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | 
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| 267 | return 0; | 
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| 268 | } | 
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| 269 |  | 
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| 270 | // Duplicate ext_types are forbidden. | 
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| 271 | if (*ext_type->out_present) { | 
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| 272 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION); | 
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| 273 | *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | 
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| 274 | return 0; | 
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| 275 | } | 
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| 276 |  | 
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| 277 | *ext_type->out_present = 1; | 
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| 278 | *ext_type->out_data = data; | 
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| 279 | } | 
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| 280 |  | 
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| 281 | return 1; | 
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| 282 | } | 
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| 283 |  | 
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| 284 | enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { | 
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| 285 | SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; | 
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| 286 | const SSL_SESSION *prev_session = ssl->s3->established_session.get(); | 
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| 287 | if (prev_session != NULL) { | 
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| 288 | // If renegotiating, the server must not change the server certificate. See | 
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| 289 | // https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation, | 
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| 290 | // so this check is sufficient to ensure the reported peer certificate never | 
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| 291 | // changes on renegotiation. | 
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| 292 | assert(!ssl->server); | 
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| 293 | if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(prev_session->certs.get()) != | 
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| 294 | sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get())) { | 
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| 295 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED); | 
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| 296 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); | 
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| 297 | return ssl_verify_invalid; | 
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| 298 | } | 
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| 299 |  | 
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| 300 | for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get()); | 
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| 301 | i++) { | 
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| 302 | const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert = | 
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| 303 | sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(prev_session->certs.get(), i); | 
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| 304 | const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert = | 
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| 305 | sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs.get(), i); | 
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| 306 | if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert) != CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert) || | 
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| 307 | OPENSSL_memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert), | 
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| 308 | CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert), | 
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| 309 | CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) != 0) { | 
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| 310 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED); | 
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| 311 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); | 
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| 312 | return ssl_verify_invalid; | 
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| 313 | } | 
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| 314 | } | 
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| 315 |  | 
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| 316 | // The certificate is identical, so we may skip re-verifying the | 
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| 317 | // certificate. Since we only authenticated the previous one, copy other | 
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| 318 | // authentication from the established session and ignore what was newly | 
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| 319 | // received. | 
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| 320 | hs->new_session->ocsp_response = UpRef(prev_session->ocsp_response); | 
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| 321 | hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list = | 
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| 322 | UpRef(prev_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list); | 
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| 323 | hs->new_session->verify_result = prev_session->verify_result; | 
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| 324 | return ssl_verify_ok; | 
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| 325 | } | 
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| 326 |  | 
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| 327 | uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | 
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| 328 | enum ssl_verify_result_t ret; | 
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| 329 | if (hs->config->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) { | 
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| 330 | ret = hs->config->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert); | 
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| 331 | switch (ret) { | 
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| 332 | case ssl_verify_ok: | 
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| 333 | hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | 
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| 334 | break; | 
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| 335 | case ssl_verify_invalid: | 
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| 336 | // If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result. | 
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| 337 | if (hs->config->verify_mode == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { | 
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| 338 | ERR_clear_error(); | 
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| 339 | ret = ssl_verify_ok; | 
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| 340 | } | 
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| 341 | hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION; | 
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| 342 | break; | 
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| 343 | case ssl_verify_retry: | 
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| 344 | break; | 
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| 345 | } | 
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| 346 | } else { | 
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| 347 | ret = ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain( | 
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| 348 | hs->new_session.get(), hs, &alert) | 
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| 349 | ? ssl_verify_ok | 
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| 350 | : ssl_verify_invalid; | 
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| 351 | } | 
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| 352 |  | 
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| 353 | if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) { | 
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| 354 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); | 
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| 355 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); | 
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| 356 | } | 
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| 357 |  | 
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| 358 | // Emulate OpenSSL's client OCSP callback. OpenSSL verifies certificates | 
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| 359 | // before it receives the OCSP, so it needs a second callback for OCSP. | 
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| 360 | if (ret == ssl_verify_ok && !ssl->server && | 
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| 361 | hs->config->ocsp_stapling_enabled && | 
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| 362 | ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback != nullptr) { | 
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| 363 | int cb_ret = | 
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| 364 | ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback(ssl, ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback_arg); | 
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| 365 | if (cb_ret <= 0) { | 
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| 366 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OCSP_CB_ERROR); | 
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| 367 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, | 
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| 368 | cb_ret == 0 ? SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE | 
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| 369 | : SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | 
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| 370 | ret = ssl_verify_invalid; | 
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| 371 | } | 
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| 372 | } | 
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| 373 |  | 
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| 374 | return ret; | 
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| 375 | } | 
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| 376 |  | 
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| 377 | // Verifies a stored certificate when resuming a session. A few things are | 
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| 378 | // different from verify_peer_cert: | 
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| 379 | // 1. We can't be renegotiating if we're resuming a session. | 
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| 380 | // 2. The session is immutable, so we don't support verify_mode == | 
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| 381 | // SSL_VERIFY_NONE | 
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| 382 | // 3. We don't call the OCSP callback. | 
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| 383 | // 4. We only support custom verify callbacks. | 
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| 384 | enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_reverify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { | 
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| 385 | SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; | 
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| 386 | assert(ssl->s3->established_session == nullptr); | 
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| 387 | assert(hs->config->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE); | 
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| 388 |  | 
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| 389 | uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | 
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| 390 | enum ssl_verify_result_t ret = ssl_verify_invalid; | 
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| 391 | if (hs->config->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) { | 
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| 392 | ret = hs->config->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert); | 
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| 393 | } | 
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| 394 |  | 
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| 395 | if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) { | 
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| 396 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); | 
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| 397 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); | 
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| 398 | } | 
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| 399 |  | 
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| 400 | return ret; | 
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| 401 | } | 
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| 402 |  | 
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| 403 | uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, | 
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| 404 | enum ssl_grease_index_t index) { | 
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| 405 | // Draw entropy for all GREASE values at once. This avoids calling | 
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| 406 | // |RAND_bytes| repeatedly and makes the values consistent within a | 
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| 407 | // connection. The latter is so the second ClientHello matches after | 
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| 408 | // HelloRetryRequest and so supported_groups and key_shares are consistent. | 
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| 409 | if (!hs->grease_seeded) { | 
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| 410 | RAND_bytes(hs->grease_seed, sizeof(hs->grease_seed)); | 
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| 411 | hs->grease_seeded = true; | 
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| 412 | } | 
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| 413 |  | 
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| 414 | // This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16. | 
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| 415 | uint16_t ret = hs->grease_seed[index]; | 
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| 416 | ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a; | 
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| 417 | ret |= ret << 8; | 
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| 418 | return ret; | 
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| 419 | } | 
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| 420 |  | 
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| 421 | enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { | 
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| 422 | SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; | 
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| 423 | SSLMessage msg; | 
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| 424 | if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) { | 
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| 425 | return ssl_hs_read_message; | 
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| 426 | } | 
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| 427 |  | 
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| 428 | if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) { | 
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| 429 | return ssl_hs_error; | 
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| 430 | } | 
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| 431 |  | 
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| 432 | // Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. | 
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| 433 | uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | 
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| 434 | size_t finished_len; | 
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| 435 | if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, | 
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| 436 | SSL_get_session(ssl), !ssl->server) || | 
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| 437 | !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) { | 
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| 438 | return ssl_hs_error; | 
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| 439 | } | 
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| 440 |  | 
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| 441 | int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, finished, finished_len); | 
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| 442 | #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) | 
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| 443 | finished_ok = 1; | 
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| 444 | #endif | 
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| 445 | if (!finished_ok) { | 
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| 446 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); | 
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| 447 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); | 
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| 448 | return ssl_hs_error; | 
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| 449 | } | 
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| 450 |  | 
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| 451 | // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. | 
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| 452 | if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) || | 
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| 453 | finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) { | 
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| 454 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | 
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| 455 | return ssl_hs_error; | 
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| 456 | } | 
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| 457 |  | 
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| 458 | if (ssl->server) { | 
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| 459 | OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len); | 
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| 460 | ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len; | 
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| 461 | } else { | 
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| 462 | OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len); | 
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| 463 | ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len; | 
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| 464 | } | 
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| 465 |  | 
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| 466 | ssl->method->next_message(ssl); | 
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| 467 | return ssl_hs_ok; | 
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| 468 | } | 
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| 469 |  | 
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| 470 | bool ssl_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { | 
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| 471 | SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; | 
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| 472 | const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl); | 
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| 473 |  | 
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| 474 | uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | 
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| 475 | size_t finished_len; | 
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| 476 | if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, session, | 
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| 477 | ssl->server)) { | 
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| 478 | return 0; | 
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| 479 | } | 
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| 480 |  | 
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| 481 | // Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. | 
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| 482 | if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM", session->master_key, | 
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| 483 | session->master_key_length)) { | 
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| 484 | return 0; | 
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| 485 | } | 
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| 486 |  | 
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| 487 | // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. | 
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| 488 | if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) || | 
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| 489 | finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) { | 
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| 490 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | 
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| 491 | return 0; | 
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| 492 | } | 
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| 493 |  | 
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| 494 | if (ssl->server) { | 
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| 495 | OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len); | 
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| 496 | ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len; | 
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| 497 | } else { | 
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| 498 | OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len); | 
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| 499 | ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len; | 
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| 500 | } | 
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| 501 |  | 
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| 502 | ScopedCBB cbb; | 
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| 503 | CBB body; | 
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| 504 | if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || | 
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| 505 | !CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished, finished_len) || | 
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| 506 | !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) { | 
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| 507 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | 
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| 508 | return 0; | 
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| 509 | } | 
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| 510 |  | 
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| 511 | return 1; | 
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| 512 | } | 
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| 513 |  | 
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| 514 | bool ssl_output_cert_chain(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { | 
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| 515 | ScopedCBB cbb; | 
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| 516 | CBB body; | 
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| 517 | if (!hs->ssl->method->init_message(hs->ssl, cbb.get(), &body, | 
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| 518 | SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) || | 
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| 519 | !ssl_add_cert_chain(hs, &body) || | 
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| 520 | !ssl_add_message_cbb(hs->ssl, cbb.get())) { | 
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| 521 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | 
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| 522 | return false; | 
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| 523 | } | 
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| 524 |  | 
|---|
| 525 | return true; | 
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| 526 | } | 
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| 527 |  | 
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| 528 | int ssl_run_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_early_return) { | 
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| 529 | SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; | 
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| 530 | for (;;) { | 
|---|
| 531 | // Resolve the operation the handshake was waiting on. | 
|---|
| 532 | switch (hs->wait) { | 
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| 533 | case ssl_hs_error: | 
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| 534 | ERR_restore_state(hs->error.get()); | 
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| 535 | return -1; | 
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| 536 |  | 
|---|
| 537 | case ssl_hs_flush: { | 
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| 538 | int ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl); | 
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| 539 | if (ret <= 0) { | 
|---|
| 540 | return ret; | 
|---|
| 541 | } | 
|---|
| 542 | break; | 
|---|
| 543 | } | 
|---|
| 544 |  | 
|---|
| 545 | case ssl_hs_read_server_hello: | 
|---|
| 546 | case ssl_hs_read_message: | 
|---|
| 547 | case ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec: { | 
|---|
| 548 | if (ssl->quic_method) { | 
|---|
| 549 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; | 
|---|
| 550 | // The change cipher spec is omitted in QUIC. | 
|---|
| 551 | if (hs->wait != ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec) { | 
|---|
| 552 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_READING; | 
|---|
| 553 | return -1; | 
|---|
| 554 | } | 
|---|
| 555 | break; | 
|---|
| 556 | } | 
|---|
| 557 |  | 
|---|
| 558 | uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | 
|---|
| 559 | size_t consumed = 0; | 
|---|
| 560 | ssl_open_record_t ret; | 
|---|
| 561 | if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec) { | 
|---|
| 562 | ret = ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(ssl, &consumed, &alert, | 
|---|
| 563 | ssl->s3->read_buffer.span()); | 
|---|
| 564 | } else { | 
|---|
| 565 | ret = ssl_open_handshake(ssl, &consumed, &alert, | 
|---|
| 566 | ssl->s3->read_buffer.span()); | 
|---|
| 567 | } | 
|---|
| 568 | if (ret == ssl_open_record_error && | 
|---|
| 569 | hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_server_hello) { | 
|---|
| 570 | uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error(); | 
|---|
| 571 | if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL && | 
|---|
| 572 | ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) { | 
|---|
| 573 | // Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure | 
|---|
| 574 | // alert in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client | 
|---|
| 575 | // behavior and gives a better error on a (probable) failure to | 
|---|
| 576 | // negotiate initial parameters. Note: this error code comes after | 
|---|
| 577 | // the original one. | 
|---|
| 578 | // | 
|---|
| 579 | // See https://crbug.com/446505. | 
|---|
| 580 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO); | 
|---|
| 581 | } | 
|---|
| 582 | } | 
|---|
| 583 | bool retry; | 
|---|
| 584 | int bio_ret = ssl_handle_open_record(ssl, &retry, ret, consumed, alert); | 
|---|
| 585 | if (bio_ret <= 0) { | 
|---|
| 586 | return bio_ret; | 
|---|
| 587 | } | 
|---|
| 588 | if (retry) { | 
|---|
| 589 | continue; | 
|---|
| 590 | } | 
|---|
| 591 | ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed(); | 
|---|
| 592 | break; | 
|---|
| 593 | } | 
|---|
| 594 |  | 
|---|
| 595 | case ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data: { | 
|---|
| 596 | if (ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read) { | 
|---|
| 597 | // While we are processing early data, the handshake returns early. | 
|---|
| 598 | *out_early_return = true; | 
|---|
| 599 | return 1; | 
|---|
| 600 | } | 
|---|
| 601 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; | 
|---|
| 602 | break; | 
|---|
| 603 | } | 
|---|
| 604 |  | 
|---|
| 605 | case ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending: | 
|---|
| 606 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING; | 
|---|
| 607 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; | 
|---|
| 608 | return -1; | 
|---|
| 609 |  | 
|---|
| 610 | case ssl_hs_handoff: | 
|---|
| 611 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_HANDOFF; | 
|---|
| 612 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; | 
|---|
| 613 | return -1; | 
|---|
| 614 |  | 
|---|
| 615 | case ssl_hs_handback: | 
|---|
| 616 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_HANDBACK; | 
|---|
| 617 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_handback; | 
|---|
| 618 | return -1; | 
|---|
| 619 |  | 
|---|
| 620 | case ssl_hs_x509_lookup: | 
|---|
| 621 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | 
|---|
| 622 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; | 
|---|
| 623 | return -1; | 
|---|
| 624 |  | 
|---|
| 625 | case ssl_hs_channel_id_lookup: | 
|---|
| 626 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; | 
|---|
| 627 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; | 
|---|
| 628 | return -1; | 
|---|
| 629 |  | 
|---|
| 630 | case ssl_hs_private_key_operation: | 
|---|
| 631 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; | 
|---|
| 632 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; | 
|---|
| 633 | return -1; | 
|---|
| 634 |  | 
|---|
| 635 | case ssl_hs_pending_session: | 
|---|
| 636 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION; | 
|---|
| 637 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; | 
|---|
| 638 | return -1; | 
|---|
| 639 |  | 
|---|
| 640 | case ssl_hs_pending_ticket: | 
|---|
| 641 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_TICKET; | 
|---|
| 642 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; | 
|---|
| 643 | return -1; | 
|---|
| 644 |  | 
|---|
| 645 | case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: | 
|---|
| 646 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; | 
|---|
| 647 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; | 
|---|
| 648 | return -1; | 
|---|
| 649 |  | 
|---|
| 650 | case ssl_hs_early_data_rejected: | 
|---|
| 651 | assert(ssl->s3->early_data_reason != ssl_early_data_unknown); | 
|---|
| 652 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; | 
|---|
| 653 | // Cause |SSL_write| to start failing immediately. | 
|---|
| 654 | hs->can_early_write = false; | 
|---|
| 655 | return -1; | 
|---|
| 656 |  | 
|---|
| 657 | case ssl_hs_early_return: | 
|---|
| 658 | *out_early_return = true; | 
|---|
| 659 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; | 
|---|
| 660 | return 1; | 
|---|
| 661 |  | 
|---|
| 662 | case ssl_hs_ok: | 
|---|
| 663 | break; | 
|---|
| 664 | } | 
|---|
| 665 |  | 
|---|
| 666 | // Run the state machine again. | 
|---|
| 667 | hs->wait = ssl->do_handshake(hs); | 
|---|
| 668 | if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_error) { | 
|---|
| 669 | hs->error.reset(ERR_save_state()); | 
|---|
| 670 | return -1; | 
|---|
| 671 | } | 
|---|
| 672 | if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_ok) { | 
|---|
| 673 | // The handshake has completed. | 
|---|
| 674 | *out_early_return = false; | 
|---|
| 675 | return 1; | 
|---|
| 676 | } | 
|---|
| 677 |  | 
|---|
| 678 | // Otherwise, loop to the beginning and resolve what was blocking the | 
|---|
| 679 | // handshake. | 
|---|
| 680 | } | 
|---|
| 681 | } | 
|---|
| 682 |  | 
|---|
| 683 | BSSL_NAMESPACE_END | 
|---|
| 684 |  | 
|---|