1 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
2 | * All rights reserved. |
3 | * |
4 | * This package is an SSL implementation written |
5 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
6 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
7 | * |
8 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
9 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
10 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
11 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
12 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
13 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
14 | * |
15 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
16 | * the code are not to be removed. |
17 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
18 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
19 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
20 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
21 | * |
22 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
23 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
24 | * are met: |
25 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
26 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
27 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
28 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
29 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
30 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
31 | * must display the following acknowledgement: |
32 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
33 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
34 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
35 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
36 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
37 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
38 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
39 | * |
40 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
41 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
42 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
43 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
44 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
45 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
46 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
47 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
48 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
49 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
50 | * SUCH DAMAGE. |
51 | * |
52 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
53 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
54 | * copied and put under another distribution licence |
55 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
56 | */ |
57 | /* ==================================================================== |
58 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
59 | * |
60 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
61 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
62 | * are met: |
63 | * |
64 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
65 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
66 | * |
67 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
68 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
69 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
70 | * distribution. |
71 | * |
72 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
73 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
74 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
75 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
76 | * |
77 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
78 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
79 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
80 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
81 | * |
82 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
83 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
84 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
85 | * |
86 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
87 | * acknowledgment: |
88 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
89 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
90 | * |
91 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
92 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
93 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
94 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
95 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
96 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
97 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
98 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
99 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
100 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
101 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
102 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
103 | * ==================================================================== |
104 | * |
105 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
106 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
107 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ |
108 | /* ==================================================================== |
109 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
110 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
111 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ |
112 | |
113 | #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
114 | |
115 | #include <assert.h> |
116 | |
117 | #include <utility> |
118 | |
119 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
120 | |
121 | #include "../crypto/internal.h" |
122 | #include "internal.h" |
123 | |
124 | |
125 | BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN |
126 | |
127 | SSL_HANDSHAKE::SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSL *ssl_arg) |
128 | : ssl(ssl_arg), |
129 | scts_requested(false), |
130 | needs_psk_binder(false), |
131 | received_hello_retry_request(false), |
132 | sent_hello_retry_request(false), |
133 | handshake_finalized(false), |
134 | accept_psk_mode(false), |
135 | cert_request(false), |
136 | certificate_status_expected(false), |
137 | ocsp_stapling_requested(false), |
138 | delegated_credential_requested(false), |
139 | should_ack_sni(false), |
140 | in_false_start(false), |
141 | in_early_data(false), |
142 | early_data_offered(false), |
143 | can_early_read(false), |
144 | can_early_write(false), |
145 | next_proto_neg_seen(false), |
146 | ticket_expected(false), |
147 | extended_master_secret(false), |
148 | pending_private_key_op(false), |
149 | grease_seeded(false), |
150 | handback(false), |
151 | cert_compression_negotiated(false), |
152 | apply_jdk11_workaround(false) { |
153 | assert(ssl); |
154 | } |
155 | |
156 | SSL_HANDSHAKE::~SSL_HANDSHAKE() { |
157 | ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(this); |
158 | } |
159 | |
160 | UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> ssl_handshake_new(SSL *ssl) { |
161 | UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs = MakeUnique<SSL_HANDSHAKE>(ssl); |
162 | if (!hs || !hs->transcript.Init()) { |
163 | return nullptr; |
164 | } |
165 | hs->config = ssl->config.get(); |
166 | if (!hs->config) { |
167 | assert(hs->config); |
168 | return nullptr; |
169 | } |
170 | return hs; |
171 | } |
172 | |
173 | bool ssl_check_message_type(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg, int type) { |
174 | if (msg.type != type) { |
175 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
176 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
177 | ERR_add_error_dataf("got type %d, wanted type %d" , msg.type, type); |
178 | return false; |
179 | } |
180 | |
181 | return true; |
182 | } |
183 | |
184 | bool ssl_add_message_cbb(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { |
185 | Array<uint8_t> msg; |
186 | if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb, &msg) || |
187 | !ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg))) { |
188 | return false; |
189 | } |
190 | |
191 | return true; |
192 | } |
193 | |
194 | size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) { |
195 | // kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do |
196 | // not accept peer certificate chains. |
197 | static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384; |
198 | |
199 | if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) { |
200 | SSL_CONFIG *config = ssl->config.get(); // SSL_in_init() implies not NULL. |
201 | if ((!ssl->server || (config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) && |
202 | kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) { |
203 | return ssl->max_cert_list; |
204 | } |
205 | return kMaxMessageLen; |
206 | } |
207 | |
208 | if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
209 | // In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is |
210 | // a HelloRequest. |
211 | return 0; |
212 | } |
213 | |
214 | if (ssl->server) { |
215 | // The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a |
216 | // KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth. |
217 | return 1; |
218 | } |
219 | |
220 | // Clients must accept NewSessionTicket, so allow the default size. |
221 | return kMaxMessageLen; |
222 | } |
223 | |
224 | bool ssl_hash_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) { |
225 | // V2ClientHello messages are pre-hashed. |
226 | if (msg.is_v2_hello) { |
227 | return true; |
228 | } |
229 | |
230 | return hs->transcript.Update(msg.raw); |
231 | } |
232 | |
233 | int ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert, |
234 | const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_types, |
235 | size_t num_ext_types, int ignore_unknown) { |
236 | // Reset everything. |
237 | for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) { |
238 | *ext_types[i].out_present = 0; |
239 | CBS_init(ext_types[i].out_data, NULL, 0); |
240 | } |
241 | |
242 | CBS copy = *cbs; |
243 | while (CBS_len(©) != 0) { |
244 | uint16_t type; |
245 | CBS data; |
246 | if (!CBS_get_u16(©, &type) || |
247 | !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(©, &data)) { |
248 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
249 | *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
250 | return 0; |
251 | } |
252 | |
253 | const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_type = NULL; |
254 | for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) { |
255 | if (type == ext_types[i].type) { |
256 | ext_type = &ext_types[i]; |
257 | break; |
258 | } |
259 | } |
260 | |
261 | if (ext_type == NULL) { |
262 | if (ignore_unknown) { |
263 | continue; |
264 | } |
265 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); |
266 | *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
267 | return 0; |
268 | } |
269 | |
270 | // Duplicate ext_types are forbidden. |
271 | if (*ext_type->out_present) { |
272 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION); |
273 | *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
274 | return 0; |
275 | } |
276 | |
277 | *ext_type->out_present = 1; |
278 | *ext_type->out_data = data; |
279 | } |
280 | |
281 | return 1; |
282 | } |
283 | |
284 | enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
285 | SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
286 | const SSL_SESSION *prev_session = ssl->s3->established_session.get(); |
287 | if (prev_session != NULL) { |
288 | // If renegotiating, the server must not change the server certificate. See |
289 | // https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation, |
290 | // so this check is sufficient to ensure the reported peer certificate never |
291 | // changes on renegotiation. |
292 | assert(!ssl->server); |
293 | if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(prev_session->certs.get()) != |
294 | sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get())) { |
295 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED); |
296 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
297 | return ssl_verify_invalid; |
298 | } |
299 | |
300 | for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get()); |
301 | i++) { |
302 | const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert = |
303 | sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(prev_session->certs.get(), i); |
304 | const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert = |
305 | sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs.get(), i); |
306 | if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert) != CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert) || |
307 | OPENSSL_memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert), |
308 | CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert), |
309 | CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) != 0) { |
310 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED); |
311 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
312 | return ssl_verify_invalid; |
313 | } |
314 | } |
315 | |
316 | // The certificate is identical, so we may skip re-verifying the |
317 | // certificate. Since we only authenticated the previous one, copy other |
318 | // authentication from the established session and ignore what was newly |
319 | // received. |
320 | hs->new_session->ocsp_response = UpRef(prev_session->ocsp_response); |
321 | hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list = |
322 | UpRef(prev_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list); |
323 | hs->new_session->verify_result = prev_session->verify_result; |
324 | return ssl_verify_ok; |
325 | } |
326 | |
327 | uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; |
328 | enum ssl_verify_result_t ret; |
329 | if (hs->config->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) { |
330 | ret = hs->config->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert); |
331 | switch (ret) { |
332 | case ssl_verify_ok: |
333 | hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; |
334 | break; |
335 | case ssl_verify_invalid: |
336 | // If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result. |
337 | if (hs->config->verify_mode == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { |
338 | ERR_clear_error(); |
339 | ret = ssl_verify_ok; |
340 | } |
341 | hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION; |
342 | break; |
343 | case ssl_verify_retry: |
344 | break; |
345 | } |
346 | } else { |
347 | ret = ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain( |
348 | hs->new_session.get(), hs, &alert) |
349 | ? ssl_verify_ok |
350 | : ssl_verify_invalid; |
351 | } |
352 | |
353 | if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) { |
354 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
355 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); |
356 | } |
357 | |
358 | // Emulate OpenSSL's client OCSP callback. OpenSSL verifies certificates |
359 | // before it receives the OCSP, so it needs a second callback for OCSP. |
360 | if (ret == ssl_verify_ok && !ssl->server && |
361 | hs->config->ocsp_stapling_enabled && |
362 | ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback != nullptr) { |
363 | int cb_ret = |
364 | ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback(ssl, ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback_arg); |
365 | if (cb_ret <= 0) { |
366 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OCSP_CB_ERROR); |
367 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, |
368 | cb_ret == 0 ? SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE |
369 | : SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
370 | ret = ssl_verify_invalid; |
371 | } |
372 | } |
373 | |
374 | return ret; |
375 | } |
376 | |
377 | // Verifies a stored certificate when resuming a session. A few things are |
378 | // different from verify_peer_cert: |
379 | // 1. We can't be renegotiating if we're resuming a session. |
380 | // 2. The session is immutable, so we don't support verify_mode == |
381 | // SSL_VERIFY_NONE |
382 | // 3. We don't call the OCSP callback. |
383 | // 4. We only support custom verify callbacks. |
384 | enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_reverify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
385 | SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
386 | assert(ssl->s3->established_session == nullptr); |
387 | assert(hs->config->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE); |
388 | |
389 | uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; |
390 | enum ssl_verify_result_t ret = ssl_verify_invalid; |
391 | if (hs->config->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) { |
392 | ret = hs->config->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert); |
393 | } |
394 | |
395 | if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) { |
396 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
397 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); |
398 | } |
399 | |
400 | return ret; |
401 | } |
402 | |
403 | uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, |
404 | enum ssl_grease_index_t index) { |
405 | // Draw entropy for all GREASE values at once. This avoids calling |
406 | // |RAND_bytes| repeatedly and makes the values consistent within a |
407 | // connection. The latter is so the second ClientHello matches after |
408 | // HelloRetryRequest and so supported_groups and key_shares are consistent. |
409 | if (!hs->grease_seeded) { |
410 | RAND_bytes(hs->grease_seed, sizeof(hs->grease_seed)); |
411 | hs->grease_seeded = true; |
412 | } |
413 | |
414 | // This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16. |
415 | uint16_t ret = hs->grease_seed[index]; |
416 | ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a; |
417 | ret |= ret << 8; |
418 | return ret; |
419 | } |
420 | |
421 | enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
422 | SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
423 | SSLMessage msg; |
424 | if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) { |
425 | return ssl_hs_read_message; |
426 | } |
427 | |
428 | if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) { |
429 | return ssl_hs_error; |
430 | } |
431 | |
432 | // Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. |
433 | uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
434 | size_t finished_len; |
435 | if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, |
436 | SSL_get_session(ssl), !ssl->server) || |
437 | !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) { |
438 | return ssl_hs_error; |
439 | } |
440 | |
441 | int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, finished, finished_len); |
442 | #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) |
443 | finished_ok = 1; |
444 | #endif |
445 | if (!finished_ok) { |
446 | ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); |
447 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
448 | return ssl_hs_error; |
449 | } |
450 | |
451 | // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. |
452 | if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) || |
453 | finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) { |
454 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
455 | return ssl_hs_error; |
456 | } |
457 | |
458 | if (ssl->server) { |
459 | OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len); |
460 | ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len; |
461 | } else { |
462 | OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len); |
463 | ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len; |
464 | } |
465 | |
466 | ssl->method->next_message(ssl); |
467 | return ssl_hs_ok; |
468 | } |
469 | |
470 | bool ssl_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
471 | SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
472 | const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl); |
473 | |
474 | uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
475 | size_t finished_len; |
476 | if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, session, |
477 | ssl->server)) { |
478 | return 0; |
479 | } |
480 | |
481 | // Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. |
482 | if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM" , session->master_key, |
483 | session->master_key_length)) { |
484 | return 0; |
485 | } |
486 | |
487 | // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. |
488 | if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) || |
489 | finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) { |
490 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
491 | return 0; |
492 | } |
493 | |
494 | if (ssl->server) { |
495 | OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len); |
496 | ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len; |
497 | } else { |
498 | OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len); |
499 | ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len; |
500 | } |
501 | |
502 | ScopedCBB cbb; |
503 | CBB body; |
504 | if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || |
505 | !CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished, finished_len) || |
506 | !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) { |
507 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
508 | return 0; |
509 | } |
510 | |
511 | return 1; |
512 | } |
513 | |
514 | bool ssl_output_cert_chain(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
515 | ScopedCBB cbb; |
516 | CBB body; |
517 | if (!hs->ssl->method->init_message(hs->ssl, cbb.get(), &body, |
518 | SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) || |
519 | !ssl_add_cert_chain(hs, &body) || |
520 | !ssl_add_message_cbb(hs->ssl, cbb.get())) { |
521 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
522 | return false; |
523 | } |
524 | |
525 | return true; |
526 | } |
527 | |
528 | int ssl_run_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_early_return) { |
529 | SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
530 | for (;;) { |
531 | // Resolve the operation the handshake was waiting on. |
532 | switch (hs->wait) { |
533 | case ssl_hs_error: |
534 | ERR_restore_state(hs->error.get()); |
535 | return -1; |
536 | |
537 | case ssl_hs_flush: { |
538 | int ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl); |
539 | if (ret <= 0) { |
540 | return ret; |
541 | } |
542 | break; |
543 | } |
544 | |
545 | case ssl_hs_read_server_hello: |
546 | case ssl_hs_read_message: |
547 | case ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec: { |
548 | if (ssl->quic_method) { |
549 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; |
550 | // The change cipher spec is omitted in QUIC. |
551 | if (hs->wait != ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec) { |
552 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_READING; |
553 | return -1; |
554 | } |
555 | break; |
556 | } |
557 | |
558 | uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
559 | size_t consumed = 0; |
560 | ssl_open_record_t ret; |
561 | if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec) { |
562 | ret = ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(ssl, &consumed, &alert, |
563 | ssl->s3->read_buffer.span()); |
564 | } else { |
565 | ret = ssl_open_handshake(ssl, &consumed, &alert, |
566 | ssl->s3->read_buffer.span()); |
567 | } |
568 | if (ret == ssl_open_record_error && |
569 | hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_server_hello) { |
570 | uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error(); |
571 | if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL && |
572 | ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) { |
573 | // Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure |
574 | // alert in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client |
575 | // behavior and gives a better error on a (probable) failure to |
576 | // negotiate initial parameters. Note: this error code comes after |
577 | // the original one. |
578 | // |
579 | // See https://crbug.com/446505. |
580 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO); |
581 | } |
582 | } |
583 | bool retry; |
584 | int bio_ret = ssl_handle_open_record(ssl, &retry, ret, consumed, alert); |
585 | if (bio_ret <= 0) { |
586 | return bio_ret; |
587 | } |
588 | if (retry) { |
589 | continue; |
590 | } |
591 | ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed(); |
592 | break; |
593 | } |
594 | |
595 | case ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data: { |
596 | if (ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read) { |
597 | // While we are processing early data, the handshake returns early. |
598 | *out_early_return = true; |
599 | return 1; |
600 | } |
601 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; |
602 | break; |
603 | } |
604 | |
605 | case ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending: |
606 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING; |
607 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; |
608 | return -1; |
609 | |
610 | case ssl_hs_handoff: |
611 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_HANDOFF; |
612 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; |
613 | return -1; |
614 | |
615 | case ssl_hs_handback: |
616 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_HANDBACK; |
617 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_handback; |
618 | return -1; |
619 | |
620 | case ssl_hs_x509_lookup: |
621 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; |
622 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; |
623 | return -1; |
624 | |
625 | case ssl_hs_channel_id_lookup: |
626 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; |
627 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; |
628 | return -1; |
629 | |
630 | case ssl_hs_private_key_operation: |
631 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; |
632 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; |
633 | return -1; |
634 | |
635 | case ssl_hs_pending_session: |
636 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION; |
637 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; |
638 | return -1; |
639 | |
640 | case ssl_hs_pending_ticket: |
641 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_TICKET; |
642 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; |
643 | return -1; |
644 | |
645 | case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: |
646 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; |
647 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; |
648 | return -1; |
649 | |
650 | case ssl_hs_early_data_rejected: |
651 | assert(ssl->s3->early_data_reason != ssl_early_data_unknown); |
652 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; |
653 | // Cause |SSL_write| to start failing immediately. |
654 | hs->can_early_write = false; |
655 | return -1; |
656 | |
657 | case ssl_hs_early_return: |
658 | *out_early_return = true; |
659 | hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; |
660 | return 1; |
661 | |
662 | case ssl_hs_ok: |
663 | break; |
664 | } |
665 | |
666 | // Run the state machine again. |
667 | hs->wait = ssl->do_handshake(hs); |
668 | if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_error) { |
669 | hs->error.reset(ERR_save_state()); |
670 | return -1; |
671 | } |
672 | if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_ok) { |
673 | // The handshake has completed. |
674 | *out_early_return = false; |
675 | return 1; |
676 | } |
677 | |
678 | // Otherwise, loop to the beginning and resolve what was blocking the |
679 | // handshake. |
680 | } |
681 | } |
682 | |
683 | BSSL_NAMESPACE_END |
684 | |