1 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
2 | * All rights reserved. |
3 | * |
4 | * This package is an SSL implementation written |
5 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
6 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
7 | * |
8 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
9 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
10 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
11 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
12 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
13 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
14 | * |
15 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
16 | * the code are not to be removed. |
17 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
18 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
19 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
20 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
21 | * |
22 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
23 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
24 | * are met: |
25 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
26 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
27 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
28 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
29 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
30 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
31 | * must display the following acknowledgement: |
32 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
33 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
34 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
35 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
36 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
37 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
38 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
39 | * |
40 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
41 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
42 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
43 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
44 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
45 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
46 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
47 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
48 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
49 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
50 | * SUCH DAMAGE. |
51 | * |
52 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
53 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
54 | * copied and put under another distribution licence |
55 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
56 | */ |
57 | /* ==================================================================== |
58 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
59 | * |
60 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
61 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
62 | * are met: |
63 | * |
64 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
65 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
66 | * |
67 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
68 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
69 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
70 | * distribution. |
71 | * |
72 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
73 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
74 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
75 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
76 | * |
77 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
78 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
79 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
80 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
81 | * |
82 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
83 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
84 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
85 | * |
86 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
87 | * acknowledgment: |
88 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
89 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
90 | * |
91 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
92 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
93 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
94 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
95 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
96 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
97 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
98 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
99 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
100 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
101 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
102 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
103 | * ==================================================================== |
104 | * |
105 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
106 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
107 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ |
108 | /* ==================================================================== |
109 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
110 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
111 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ |
112 | |
113 | #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
114 | |
115 | #include <assert.h> |
116 | #include <limits.h> |
117 | #include <string.h> |
118 | |
119 | #include <tuple> |
120 | |
121 | #include <openssl/buf.h> |
122 | #include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
123 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
124 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
125 | #include <openssl/mem.h> |
126 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
127 | #include <openssl/nid.h> |
128 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
129 | #include <openssl/sha.h> |
130 | |
131 | #include "../crypto/internal.h" |
132 | #include "internal.h" |
133 | |
134 | |
135 | BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN |
136 | |
137 | static bool add_record_to_flight(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, |
138 | Span<const uint8_t> in) { |
139 | // The caller should have flushed |pending_hs_data| first. |
140 | assert(!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data); |
141 | // We'll never add a flight while in the process of writing it out. |
142 | assert(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset == 0); |
143 | |
144 | if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) { |
145 | ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset(BUF_MEM_new()); |
146 | if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) { |
147 | return false; |
148 | } |
149 | } |
150 | |
151 | size_t max_out = in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl); |
152 | size_t new_cap = ssl->s3->pending_flight->length + max_out; |
153 | if (max_out < in.size() || new_cap < max_out) { |
154 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); |
155 | return false; |
156 | } |
157 | |
158 | size_t len; |
159 | if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->pending_flight.get(), new_cap) || |
160 | !tls_seal_record(ssl, |
161 | (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + |
162 | ssl->s3->pending_flight->length, |
163 | &len, max_out, type, in.data(), in.size())) { |
164 | return false; |
165 | } |
166 | |
167 | ssl->s3->pending_flight->length += len; |
168 | return true; |
169 | } |
170 | |
171 | bool ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) { |
172 | // Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls. |
173 | if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) || |
174 | !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) || |
175 | !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) { |
176 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
177 | CBB_cleanup(cbb); |
178 | return false; |
179 | } |
180 | |
181 | return true; |
182 | } |
183 | |
184 | bool ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg) { |
185 | return CBBFinishArray(cbb, out_msg); |
186 | } |
187 | |
188 | bool ssl3_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) { |
189 | // Pack handshake data into the minimal number of records. This avoids |
190 | // unnecessary encryption overhead, notably in TLS 1.3 where we send several |
191 | // encrypted messages in a row. For now, we do not do this for the null |
192 | // cipher. The benefit is smaller and there is a risk of breaking buggy |
193 | // implementations. |
194 | // |
195 | // TODO(davidben): See if we can do this uniformly. |
196 | Span<const uint8_t> rest = msg; |
197 | if (ssl->quic_method == nullptr && |
198 | ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher()) { |
199 | while (!rest.empty()) { |
200 | Span<const uint8_t> chunk = rest.subspan(0, ssl->max_send_fragment); |
201 | rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size()); |
202 | |
203 | if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, chunk)) { |
204 | return false; |
205 | } |
206 | } |
207 | } else { |
208 | while (!rest.empty()) { |
209 | // Flush if |pending_hs_data| is full. |
210 | if (ssl->s3->pending_hs_data && |
211 | ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length >= ssl->max_send_fragment && |
212 | !tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) { |
213 | return false; |
214 | } |
215 | |
216 | size_t pending_len = |
217 | ssl->s3->pending_hs_data ? ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length : 0; |
218 | Span<const uint8_t> chunk = |
219 | rest.subspan(0, ssl->max_send_fragment - pending_len); |
220 | assert(!chunk.empty()); |
221 | rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size()); |
222 | |
223 | if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data) { |
224 | ssl->s3->pending_hs_data.reset(BUF_MEM_new()); |
225 | } |
226 | if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data || |
227 | !BUF_MEM_append(ssl->s3->pending_hs_data.get(), chunk.data(), |
228 | chunk.size())) { |
229 | return false; |
230 | } |
231 | } |
232 | } |
233 | |
234 | ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, msg); |
235 | // TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript on |
236 | // hs. |
237 | if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL && |
238 | !ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(msg)) { |
239 | return false; |
240 | } |
241 | return true; |
242 | } |
243 | |
244 | bool tls_flush_pending_hs_data(SSL *ssl) { |
245 | if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data || ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length == 0) { |
246 | return true; |
247 | } |
248 | |
249 | UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> pending_hs_data = std::move(ssl->s3->pending_hs_data); |
250 | auto data = |
251 | MakeConstSpan(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(pending_hs_data->data), |
252 | pending_hs_data->length); |
253 | if (ssl->quic_method) { |
254 | if (!ssl->quic_method->add_handshake_data(ssl, ssl->s3->write_level, |
255 | data.data(), data.size())) { |
256 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
257 | return false; |
258 | } |
259 | return true; |
260 | } |
261 | |
262 | return add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data); |
263 | } |
264 | |
265 | bool ssl3_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) { |
266 | static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS}; |
267 | |
268 | if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) { |
269 | return false; |
270 | } |
271 | |
272 | if (!ssl->quic_method && |
273 | !add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
274 | kChangeCipherSpec)) { |
275 | return false; |
276 | } |
277 | |
278 | ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
279 | kChangeCipherSpec); |
280 | return true; |
281 | } |
282 | |
283 | int ssl3_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) { |
284 | if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) { |
285 | return -1; |
286 | } |
287 | |
288 | if (ssl->quic_method) { |
289 | if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) { |
290 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); |
291 | return -1; |
292 | } |
293 | |
294 | if (!ssl->quic_method->flush_flight(ssl)) { |
295 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
296 | return -1; |
297 | } |
298 | } |
299 | |
300 | if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) { |
301 | return 1; |
302 | } |
303 | |
304 | if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) { |
305 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); |
306 | return -1; |
307 | } |
308 | |
309 | static_assert(INT_MAX <= 0xffffffff, "int is larger than 32 bits" ); |
310 | if (ssl->s3->pending_flight->length > INT_MAX) { |
311 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
312 | return -1; |
313 | } |
314 | |
315 | // If there is pending data in the write buffer, it must be flushed out before |
316 | // any new data in pending_flight. |
317 | if (!ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty()) { |
318 | int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl); |
319 | if (ret <= 0) { |
320 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; |
321 | return ret; |
322 | } |
323 | } |
324 | |
325 | // Write the pending flight. |
326 | while (ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset < ssl->s3->pending_flight->length) { |
327 | int ret = BIO_write( |
328 | ssl->wbio.get(), |
329 | ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset, |
330 | ssl->s3->pending_flight->length - ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset); |
331 | if (ret <= 0) { |
332 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; |
333 | return ret; |
334 | } |
335 | |
336 | ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset += ret; |
337 | } |
338 | |
339 | if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio.get()) <= 0) { |
340 | ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; |
341 | return -1; |
342 | } |
343 | |
344 | ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset(); |
345 | ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0; |
346 | return 1; |
347 | } |
348 | |
349 | static ssl_open_record_t read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed, |
350 | Span<const uint8_t> in) { |
351 | *out_consumed = 0; |
352 | assert(in.size() >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); |
353 | // Determine the length of the V2ClientHello. |
354 | size_t msg_length = ((in[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | in[1]; |
355 | if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) { |
356 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); |
357 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
358 | } |
359 | if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) { |
360 | // Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read |
361 | // |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an |
362 | // (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. |
363 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
364 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
365 | } |
366 | |
367 | // Ask for the remainder of the V2ClientHello. |
368 | if (in.size() < 2 + msg_length) { |
369 | *out_consumed = 2 + msg_length; |
370 | return ssl_open_record_partial; |
371 | } |
372 | |
373 | CBS v2_client_hello = CBS(ssl->s3->read_buffer.span().subspan(2, msg_length)); |
374 | // The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake |
375 | // hash. This is only ever called at the start of the handshake, so hs is |
376 | // guaranteed to be non-NULL. |
377 | if (!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(v2_client_hello)) { |
378 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
379 | } |
380 | |
381 | ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, 0 /* V2ClientHello */, |
382 | v2_client_hello); |
383 | |
384 | uint8_t msg_type; |
385 | uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length; |
386 | CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge; |
387 | if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) || |
388 | !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) || |
389 | !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) || |
390 | !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) || |
391 | !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) || |
392 | !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) || |
393 | !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) || |
394 | !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) || |
395 | CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) { |
396 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
397 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
398 | } |
399 | |
400 | // msg_type has already been checked. |
401 | assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO); |
402 | |
403 | // The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or left-pad with |
404 | // zeros as needed. |
405 | size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge); |
406 | if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) { |
407 | rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
408 | } |
409 | uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; |
410 | OPENSSL_memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
411 | OPENSSL_memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge), |
412 | rand_len); |
413 | |
414 | // Write out an equivalent TLS ClientHello directly to the handshake buffer. |
415 | size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ + |
416 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ + |
417 | 2 /* cipher list length */ + |
418 | CBS_len(&cipher_specs) / 3 * 2 + |
419 | 1 /* compression length */ + 1 /* compression */; |
420 | ScopedCBB client_hello; |
421 | CBB hello_body, cipher_suites; |
422 | if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) { |
423 | ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(BUF_MEM_new()); |
424 | } |
425 | if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf || |
426 | !BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), max_v3_client_hello) || |
427 | !CBB_init_fixed(client_hello.get(), (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->hs_buf->data, |
428 | ssl->s3->hs_buf->max) || |
429 | !CBB_add_u8(client_hello.get(), SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) || |
430 | !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(client_hello.get(), &hello_body) || |
431 | !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) || |
432 | !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
433 | // No session id. |
434 | !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) || |
435 | !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) { |
436 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
437 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
438 | } |
439 | |
440 | // Copy the cipher suites. |
441 | while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) { |
442 | uint32_t cipher_spec; |
443 | if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) { |
444 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
445 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
446 | } |
447 | |
448 | // Skip SSLv2 ciphers. |
449 | if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) { |
450 | continue; |
451 | } |
452 | if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) { |
453 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
454 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
455 | } |
456 | } |
457 | |
458 | // Add the null compression scheme and finish. |
459 | if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || |
460 | !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) || |
461 | !CBB_finish(client_hello.get(), NULL, &ssl->s3->hs_buf->length)) { |
462 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
463 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
464 | } |
465 | |
466 | *out_consumed = 2 + msg_length; |
467 | ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = true; |
468 | return ssl_open_record_success; |
469 | } |
470 | |
471 | static bool parse_message(const SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out, |
472 | size_t *out_bytes_needed) { |
473 | if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) { |
474 | *out_bytes_needed = 4; |
475 | return false; |
476 | } |
477 | |
478 | CBS cbs; |
479 | uint32_t len; |
480 | CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data), |
481 | ssl->s3->hs_buf->length); |
482 | if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &out->type) || |
483 | !CBS_get_u24(&cbs, &len)) { |
484 | *out_bytes_needed = 4; |
485 | return false; |
486 | } |
487 | |
488 | if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &out->body, len)) { |
489 | *out_bytes_needed = 4 + len; |
490 | return false; |
491 | } |
492 | |
493 | CBS_init(&out->raw, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data), |
494 | 4 + len); |
495 | out->is_v2_hello = ssl->s3->is_v2_hello; |
496 | return true; |
497 | } |
498 | |
499 | bool ssl3_get_message(const SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out) { |
500 | size_t unused; |
501 | if (!parse_message(ssl, out, &unused)) { |
502 | return false; |
503 | } |
504 | if (!ssl->s3->has_message) { |
505 | if (!out->is_v2_hello) { |
506 | ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, out->raw); |
507 | } |
508 | ssl->s3->has_message = true; |
509 | } |
510 | return true; |
511 | } |
512 | |
513 | bool tls_can_accept_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert) { |
514 | // If there is a complete message, the caller must have consumed it first. |
515 | SSLMessage msg; |
516 | size_t bytes_needed; |
517 | if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &bytes_needed)) { |
518 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
519 | *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
520 | return false; |
521 | } |
522 | |
523 | // Enforce the limit so the peer cannot force us to buffer 16MB. |
524 | if (bytes_needed > 4 + ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) { |
525 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
526 | *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
527 | return false; |
528 | } |
529 | |
530 | return true; |
531 | } |
532 | |
533 | bool tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl) { |
534 | size_t msg_len = 0; |
535 | if (ssl->s3->has_message) { |
536 | SSLMessage msg; |
537 | size_t unused; |
538 | if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &unused)) { |
539 | msg_len = CBS_len(&msg.raw); |
540 | } |
541 | } |
542 | |
543 | return ssl->s3->hs_buf && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length > msg_len; |
544 | } |
545 | |
546 | bool tls_append_handshake_data(SSL *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> data) { |
547 | // Re-create the handshake buffer if needed. |
548 | if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) { |
549 | ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(BUF_MEM_new()); |
550 | } |
551 | return ssl->s3->hs_buf && |
552 | BUF_MEM_append(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), data.data(), data.size()); |
553 | } |
554 | |
555 | ssl_open_record_t ssl3_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed, |
556 | uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) { |
557 | *out_consumed = 0; |
558 | // Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello. |
559 | if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) { |
560 | // Ask for the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is |
561 | // sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read |
562 | // beyond the first record. |
563 | if (in.size() < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
564 | *out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
565 | return ssl_open_record_partial; |
566 | } |
567 | |
568 | // Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application |
569 | // wish to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with |
570 | // ClientHello or V2ClientHello.) |
571 | const char *str = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(in.data()); |
572 | if (strncmp("GET " , str, 4) == 0 || |
573 | strncmp("POST " , str, 5) == 0 || |
574 | strncmp("HEAD " , str, 5) == 0 || |
575 | strncmp("PUT " , str, 4) == 0) { |
576 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); |
577 | *out_alert = 0; |
578 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
579 | } |
580 | if (strncmp("CONNE" , str, 5) == 0) { |
581 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); |
582 | *out_alert = 0; |
583 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
584 | } |
585 | |
586 | // Check for a V2ClientHello. |
587 | if ((in[0] & 0x80) != 0 && in[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO && |
588 | in[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { |
589 | auto ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl, out_consumed, in); |
590 | if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) { |
591 | *out_alert = 0; |
592 | } else if (ret == ssl_open_record_success) { |
593 | ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true; |
594 | } |
595 | return ret; |
596 | } |
597 | |
598 | ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true; |
599 | } |
600 | |
601 | uint8_t type; |
602 | Span<uint8_t> body; |
603 | auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in); |
604 | if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) { |
605 | return ret; |
606 | } |
607 | |
608 | // WatchGuard's TLS 1.3 interference bug is very distinctive: they drop the |
609 | // ServerHello and send the remaining encrypted application data records |
610 | // as-is. This manifests as an application data record when we expect |
611 | // handshake. Report a dedicated error code for this case. |
612 | if (!ssl->server && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && |
613 | ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) { |
614 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_INSTEAD_OF_HANDSHAKE); |
615 | *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
616 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
617 | } |
618 | |
619 | if (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { |
620 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
621 | *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
622 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
623 | } |
624 | |
625 | // Append the entire handshake record to the buffer. |
626 | if (!tls_append_handshake_data(ssl, body)) { |
627 | *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
628 | return ssl_open_record_error; |
629 | } |
630 | |
631 | return ssl_open_record_success; |
632 | } |
633 | |
634 | void ssl3_next_message(SSL *ssl) { |
635 | SSLMessage msg; |
636 | if (!ssl3_get_message(ssl, &msg) || |
637 | !ssl->s3->hs_buf || |
638 | ssl->s3->hs_buf->length < CBS_len(&msg.raw)) { |
639 | assert(0); |
640 | return; |
641 | } |
642 | |
643 | OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data, |
644 | ssl->s3->hs_buf->data + CBS_len(&msg.raw), |
645 | ssl->s3->hs_buf->length - CBS_len(&msg.raw)); |
646 | ssl->s3->hs_buf->length -= CBS_len(&msg.raw); |
647 | ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = false; |
648 | ssl->s3->has_message = false; |
649 | |
650 | // Post-handshake messages are rare, so release the buffer after every |
651 | // message. During the handshake, |on_handshake_complete| will release it. |
652 | if (!SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0) { |
653 | ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(); |
654 | } |
655 | } |
656 | |
657 | // CipherScorer produces a "score" for each possible cipher suite offered by |
658 | // the client. |
659 | class CipherScorer { |
660 | public: |
661 | CipherScorer(uint16_t group_id) |
662 | : aes_is_fine_(EVP_has_aes_hardware()), |
663 | security_128_is_fine_(group_id != SSL_CURVE_CECPQ2 && |
664 | group_id != SSL_CURVE_CECPQ2b) {} |
665 | |
666 | typedef std::tuple<bool, bool, bool> Score; |
667 | |
668 | // MinScore returns a |Score| that will compare less than the score of all |
669 | // cipher suites. |
670 | Score MinScore() const { |
671 | return Score(false, false, false); |
672 | } |
673 | |
674 | Score Evaluate(const SSL_CIPHER *a) const { |
675 | return Score( |
676 | // Something is always preferable to nothing. |
677 | true, |
678 | // Either 128-bit is fine, or 256-bit is preferred. |
679 | security_128_is_fine_ || a->algorithm_enc != SSL_AES128GCM, |
680 | // Either AES is fine, or else ChaCha20 is preferred. |
681 | aes_is_fine_ || a->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305); |
682 | } |
683 | |
684 | private: |
685 | const bool aes_is_fine_; |
686 | const bool security_128_is_fine_; |
687 | }; |
688 | |
689 | const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_choose_tls13_cipher(CBS cipher_suites, uint16_t version, |
690 | uint16_t group_id) { |
691 | if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0) { |
692 | return nullptr; |
693 | } |
694 | |
695 | const SSL_CIPHER *best = nullptr; |
696 | CipherScorer scorer(group_id); |
697 | CipherScorer::Score best_score = scorer.MinScore(); |
698 | |
699 | while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { |
700 | uint16_t cipher_suite; |
701 | if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) { |
702 | return nullptr; |
703 | } |
704 | |
705 | // Limit to TLS 1.3 ciphers we know about. |
706 | const SSL_CIPHER *candidate = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); |
707 | if (candidate == nullptr || |
708 | SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(candidate) > version || |
709 | SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(candidate) < version) { |
710 | continue; |
711 | } |
712 | |
713 | const CipherScorer::Score candidate_score = scorer.Evaluate(candidate); |
714 | // |candidate_score| must be larger to displace the current choice. That way |
715 | // the client's order controls between ciphers with an equal score. |
716 | if (candidate_score > best_score) { |
717 | best = candidate; |
718 | best_score = candidate_score; |
719 | } |
720 | } |
721 | |
722 | return best; |
723 | } |
724 | |
725 | BSSL_NAMESPACE_END |
726 | |