1 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
2 | * All rights reserved. |
3 | * |
4 | * This package is an SSL implementation written |
5 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
6 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
7 | * |
8 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
9 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
10 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
11 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
12 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
13 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
14 | * |
15 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
16 | * the code are not to be removed. |
17 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
18 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
19 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
20 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
21 | * |
22 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
23 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
24 | * are met: |
25 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
26 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
27 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
28 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
29 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
30 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
31 | * must display the following acknowledgement: |
32 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
33 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
34 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
35 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
36 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
37 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
38 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
39 | * |
40 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
41 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
42 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
43 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
44 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
45 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
46 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
47 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
48 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
49 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
50 | * SUCH DAMAGE. |
51 | * |
52 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
53 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
54 | * copied and put under another distribution licence |
55 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
56 | */ |
57 | /* ==================================================================== |
58 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
59 | * |
60 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
61 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
62 | * are met: |
63 | * |
64 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
65 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
66 | * |
67 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
68 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
69 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
70 | * distribution. |
71 | * |
72 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
73 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
74 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
75 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
76 | * |
77 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
78 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
79 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
80 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
81 | * |
82 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
83 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
84 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
85 | * |
86 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
87 | * acknowledgment: |
88 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
89 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
90 | * |
91 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
92 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
93 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
94 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
95 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
96 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
97 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
98 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
99 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
100 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
101 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
102 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
103 | * ==================================================================== |
104 | * |
105 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
106 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
107 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ |
108 | |
109 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
110 | |
111 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
112 | #include <openssl/mem.h> |
113 | |
114 | #include "internal.h" |
115 | #include "../../internal.h" |
116 | |
117 | |
118 | // The quick sieve algorithm approach to weeding out primes is Philip |
119 | // Zimmermann's, as implemented in PGP. I have had a read of his comments and |
120 | // implemented my own version. |
121 | |
122 | // kPrimes contains the first 2048 primes. |
123 | static const uint16_t kPrimes[] = { |
124 | 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, |
125 | 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, |
126 | 83, 89, 97, 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, |
127 | 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, 181, 191, 193, |
128 | 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, |
129 | 263, 269, 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, 317, |
130 | 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, 373, 379, 383, 389, |
131 | 397, 401, 409, 419, 421, 431, 433, 439, 443, 449, 457, |
132 | 461, 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503, 509, 521, 523, |
133 | 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, 577, 587, 593, 599, 601, |
134 | 607, 613, 617, 619, 631, 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, |
135 | 673, 677, 683, 691, 701, 709, 719, 727, 733, 739, 743, |
136 | 751, 757, 761, 769, 773, 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, |
137 | 827, 829, 839, 853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, 887, |
138 | 907, 911, 919, 929, 937, 941, 947, 953, 967, 971, 977, |
139 | 983, 991, 997, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1021, 1031, 1033, 1039, 1049, |
140 | 1051, 1061, 1063, 1069, 1087, 1091, 1093, 1097, 1103, 1109, 1117, |
141 | 1123, 1129, 1151, 1153, 1163, 1171, 1181, 1187, 1193, 1201, 1213, |
142 | 1217, 1223, 1229, 1231, 1237, 1249, 1259, 1277, 1279, 1283, 1289, |
143 | 1291, 1297, 1301, 1303, 1307, 1319, 1321, 1327, 1361, 1367, 1373, |
144 | 1381, 1399, 1409, 1423, 1427, 1429, 1433, 1439, 1447, 1451, 1453, |
145 | 1459, 1471, 1481, 1483, 1487, 1489, 1493, 1499, 1511, 1523, 1531, |
146 | 1543, 1549, 1553, 1559, 1567, 1571, 1579, 1583, 1597, 1601, 1607, |
147 | 1609, 1613, 1619, 1621, 1627, 1637, 1657, 1663, 1667, 1669, 1693, |
148 | 1697, 1699, 1709, 1721, 1723, 1733, 1741, 1747, 1753, 1759, 1777, |
149 | 1783, 1787, 1789, 1801, 1811, 1823, 1831, 1847, 1861, 1867, 1871, |
150 | 1873, 1877, 1879, 1889, 1901, 1907, 1913, 1931, 1933, 1949, 1951, |
151 | 1973, 1979, 1987, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2011, 2017, 2027, 2029, |
152 | 2039, 2053, 2063, 2069, 2081, 2083, 2087, 2089, 2099, 2111, 2113, |
153 | 2129, 2131, 2137, 2141, 2143, 2153, 2161, 2179, 2203, 2207, 2213, |
154 | 2221, 2237, 2239, 2243, 2251, 2267, 2269, 2273, 2281, 2287, 2293, |
155 | 2297, 2309, 2311, 2333, 2339, 2341, 2347, 2351, 2357, 2371, 2377, |
156 | 2381, 2383, 2389, 2393, 2399, 2411, 2417, 2423, 2437, 2441, 2447, |
157 | 2459, 2467, 2473, 2477, 2503, 2521, 2531, 2539, 2543, 2549, 2551, |
158 | 2557, 2579, 2591, 2593, 2609, 2617, 2621, 2633, 2647, 2657, 2659, |
159 | 2663, 2671, 2677, 2683, 2687, 2689, 2693, 2699, 2707, 2711, 2713, |
160 | 2719, 2729, 2731, 2741, 2749, 2753, 2767, 2777, 2789, 2791, 2797, |
161 | 2801, 2803, 2819, 2833, 2837, 2843, 2851, 2857, 2861, 2879, 2887, |
162 | 2897, 2903, 2909, 2917, 2927, 2939, 2953, 2957, 2963, 2969, 2971, |
163 | 2999, 3001, 3011, 3019, 3023, 3037, 3041, 3049, 3061, 3067, 3079, |
164 | 3083, 3089, 3109, 3119, 3121, 3137, 3163, 3167, 3169, 3181, 3187, |
165 | 3191, 3203, 3209, 3217, 3221, 3229, 3251, 3253, 3257, 3259, 3271, |
166 | 3299, 3301, 3307, 3313, 3319, 3323, 3329, 3331, 3343, 3347, 3359, |
167 | 3361, 3371, 3373, 3389, 3391, 3407, 3413, 3433, 3449, 3457, 3461, |
168 | 3463, 3467, 3469, 3491, 3499, 3511, 3517, 3527, 3529, 3533, 3539, |
169 | 3541, 3547, 3557, 3559, 3571, 3581, 3583, 3593, 3607, 3613, 3617, |
170 | 3623, 3631, 3637, 3643, 3659, 3671, 3673, 3677, 3691, 3697, 3701, |
171 | 3709, 3719, 3727, 3733, 3739, 3761, 3767, 3769, 3779, 3793, 3797, |
172 | 3803, 3821, 3823, 3833, 3847, 3851, 3853, 3863, 3877, 3881, 3889, |
173 | 3907, 3911, 3917, 3919, 3923, 3929, 3931, 3943, 3947, 3967, 3989, |
174 | 4001, 4003, 4007, 4013, 4019, 4021, 4027, 4049, 4051, 4057, 4073, |
175 | 4079, 4091, 4093, 4099, 4111, 4127, 4129, 4133, 4139, 4153, 4157, |
176 | 4159, 4177, 4201, 4211, 4217, 4219, 4229, 4231, 4241, 4243, 4253, |
177 | 4259, 4261, 4271, 4273, 4283, 4289, 4297, 4327, 4337, 4339, 4349, |
178 | 4357, 4363, 4373, 4391, 4397, 4409, 4421, 4423, 4441, 4447, 4451, |
179 | 4457, 4463, 4481, 4483, 4493, 4507, 4513, 4517, 4519, 4523, 4547, |
180 | 4549, 4561, 4567, 4583, 4591, 4597, 4603, 4621, 4637, 4639, 4643, |
181 | 4649, 4651, 4657, 4663, 4673, 4679, 4691, 4703, 4721, 4723, 4729, |
182 | 4733, 4751, 4759, 4783, 4787, 4789, 4793, 4799, 4801, 4813, 4817, |
183 | 4831, 4861, 4871, 4877, 4889, 4903, 4909, 4919, 4931, 4933, 4937, |
184 | 4943, 4951, 4957, 4967, 4969, 4973, 4987, 4993, 4999, 5003, 5009, |
185 | 5011, 5021, 5023, 5039, 5051, 5059, 5077, 5081, 5087, 5099, 5101, |
186 | 5107, 5113, 5119, 5147, 5153, 5167, 5171, 5179, 5189, 5197, 5209, |
187 | 5227, 5231, 5233, 5237, 5261, 5273, 5279, 5281, 5297, 5303, 5309, |
188 | 5323, 5333, 5347, 5351, 5381, 5387, 5393, 5399, 5407, 5413, 5417, |
189 | 5419, 5431, 5437, 5441, 5443, 5449, 5471, 5477, 5479, 5483, 5501, |
190 | 5503, 5507, 5519, 5521, 5527, 5531, 5557, 5563, 5569, 5573, 5581, |
191 | 5591, 5623, 5639, 5641, 5647, 5651, 5653, 5657, 5659, 5669, 5683, |
192 | 5689, 5693, 5701, 5711, 5717, 5737, 5741, 5743, 5749, 5779, 5783, |
193 | 5791, 5801, 5807, 5813, 5821, 5827, 5839, 5843, 5849, 5851, 5857, |
194 | 5861, 5867, 5869, 5879, 5881, 5897, 5903, 5923, 5927, 5939, 5953, |
195 | 5981, 5987, 6007, 6011, 6029, 6037, 6043, 6047, 6053, 6067, 6073, |
196 | 6079, 6089, 6091, 6101, 6113, 6121, 6131, 6133, 6143, 6151, 6163, |
197 | 6173, 6197, 6199, 6203, 6211, 6217, 6221, 6229, 6247, 6257, 6263, |
198 | 6269, 6271, 6277, 6287, 6299, 6301, 6311, 6317, 6323, 6329, 6337, |
199 | 6343, 6353, 6359, 6361, 6367, 6373, 6379, 6389, 6397, 6421, 6427, |
200 | 6449, 6451, 6469, 6473, 6481, 6491, 6521, 6529, 6547, 6551, 6553, |
201 | 6563, 6569, 6571, 6577, 6581, 6599, 6607, 6619, 6637, 6653, 6659, |
202 | 6661, 6673, 6679, 6689, 6691, 6701, 6703, 6709, 6719, 6733, 6737, |
203 | 6761, 6763, 6779, 6781, 6791, 6793, 6803, 6823, 6827, 6829, 6833, |
204 | 6841, 6857, 6863, 6869, 6871, 6883, 6899, 6907, 6911, 6917, 6947, |
205 | 6949, 6959, 6961, 6967, 6971, 6977, 6983, 6991, 6997, 7001, 7013, |
206 | 7019, 7027, 7039, 7043, 7057, 7069, 7079, 7103, 7109, 7121, 7127, |
207 | 7129, 7151, 7159, 7177, 7187, 7193, 7207, 7211, 7213, 7219, 7229, |
208 | 7237, 7243, 7247, 7253, 7283, 7297, 7307, 7309, 7321, 7331, 7333, |
209 | 7349, 7351, 7369, 7393, 7411, 7417, 7433, 7451, 7457, 7459, 7477, |
210 | 7481, 7487, 7489, 7499, 7507, 7517, 7523, 7529, 7537, 7541, 7547, |
211 | 7549, 7559, 7561, 7573, 7577, 7583, 7589, 7591, 7603, 7607, 7621, |
212 | 7639, 7643, 7649, 7669, 7673, 7681, 7687, 7691, 7699, 7703, 7717, |
213 | 7723, 7727, 7741, 7753, 7757, 7759, 7789, 7793, 7817, 7823, 7829, |
214 | 7841, 7853, 7867, 7873, 7877, 7879, 7883, 7901, 7907, 7919, 7927, |
215 | 7933, 7937, 7949, 7951, 7963, 7993, 8009, 8011, 8017, 8039, 8053, |
216 | 8059, 8069, 8081, 8087, 8089, 8093, 8101, 8111, 8117, 8123, 8147, |
217 | 8161, 8167, 8171, 8179, 8191, 8209, 8219, 8221, 8231, 8233, 8237, |
218 | 8243, 8263, 8269, 8273, 8287, 8291, 8293, 8297, 8311, 8317, 8329, |
219 | 8353, 8363, 8369, 8377, 8387, 8389, 8419, 8423, 8429, 8431, 8443, |
220 | 8447, 8461, 8467, 8501, 8513, 8521, 8527, 8537, 8539, 8543, 8563, |
221 | 8573, 8581, 8597, 8599, 8609, 8623, 8627, 8629, 8641, 8647, 8663, |
222 | 8669, 8677, 8681, 8689, 8693, 8699, 8707, 8713, 8719, 8731, 8737, |
223 | 8741, 8747, 8753, 8761, 8779, 8783, 8803, 8807, 8819, 8821, 8831, |
224 | 8837, 8839, 8849, 8861, 8863, 8867, 8887, 8893, 8923, 8929, 8933, |
225 | 8941, 8951, 8963, 8969, 8971, 8999, 9001, 9007, 9011, 9013, 9029, |
226 | 9041, 9043, 9049, 9059, 9067, 9091, 9103, 9109, 9127, 9133, 9137, |
227 | 9151, 9157, 9161, 9173, 9181, 9187, 9199, 9203, 9209, 9221, 9227, |
228 | 9239, 9241, 9257, 9277, 9281, 9283, 9293, 9311, 9319, 9323, 9337, |
229 | 9341, 9343, 9349, 9371, 9377, 9391, 9397, 9403, 9413, 9419, 9421, |
230 | 9431, 9433, 9437, 9439, 9461, 9463, 9467, 9473, 9479, 9491, 9497, |
231 | 9511, 9521, 9533, 9539, 9547, 9551, 9587, 9601, 9613, 9619, 9623, |
232 | 9629, 9631, 9643, 9649, 9661, 9677, 9679, 9689, 9697, 9719, 9721, |
233 | 9733, 9739, 9743, 9749, 9767, 9769, 9781, 9787, 9791, 9803, 9811, |
234 | 9817, 9829, 9833, 9839, 9851, 9857, 9859, 9871, 9883, 9887, 9901, |
235 | 9907, 9923, 9929, 9931, 9941, 9949, 9967, 9973, 10007, 10009, 10037, |
236 | 10039, 10061, 10067, 10069, 10079, 10091, 10093, 10099, 10103, 10111, 10133, |
237 | 10139, 10141, 10151, 10159, 10163, 10169, 10177, 10181, 10193, 10211, 10223, |
238 | 10243, 10247, 10253, 10259, 10267, 10271, 10273, 10289, 10301, 10303, 10313, |
239 | 10321, 10331, 10333, 10337, 10343, 10357, 10369, 10391, 10399, 10427, 10429, |
240 | 10433, 10453, 10457, 10459, 10463, 10477, 10487, 10499, 10501, 10513, 10529, |
241 | 10531, 10559, 10567, 10589, 10597, 10601, 10607, 10613, 10627, 10631, 10639, |
242 | 10651, 10657, 10663, 10667, 10687, 10691, 10709, 10711, 10723, 10729, 10733, |
243 | 10739, 10753, 10771, 10781, 10789, 10799, 10831, 10837, 10847, 10853, 10859, |
244 | 10861, 10867, 10883, 10889, 10891, 10903, 10909, 10937, 10939, 10949, 10957, |
245 | 10973, 10979, 10987, 10993, 11003, 11027, 11047, 11057, 11059, 11069, 11071, |
246 | 11083, 11087, 11093, 11113, 11117, 11119, 11131, 11149, 11159, 11161, 11171, |
247 | 11173, 11177, 11197, 11213, 11239, 11243, 11251, 11257, 11261, 11273, 11279, |
248 | 11287, 11299, 11311, 11317, 11321, 11329, 11351, 11353, 11369, 11383, 11393, |
249 | 11399, 11411, 11423, 11437, 11443, 11447, 11467, 11471, 11483, 11489, 11491, |
250 | 11497, 11503, 11519, 11527, 11549, 11551, 11579, 11587, 11593, 11597, 11617, |
251 | 11621, 11633, 11657, 11677, 11681, 11689, 11699, 11701, 11717, 11719, 11731, |
252 | 11743, 11777, 11779, 11783, 11789, 11801, 11807, 11813, 11821, 11827, 11831, |
253 | 11833, 11839, 11863, 11867, 11887, 11897, 11903, 11909, 11923, 11927, 11933, |
254 | 11939, 11941, 11953, 11959, 11969, 11971, 11981, 11987, 12007, 12011, 12037, |
255 | 12041, 12043, 12049, 12071, 12073, 12097, 12101, 12107, 12109, 12113, 12119, |
256 | 12143, 12149, 12157, 12161, 12163, 12197, 12203, 12211, 12227, 12239, 12241, |
257 | 12251, 12253, 12263, 12269, 12277, 12281, 12289, 12301, 12323, 12329, 12343, |
258 | 12347, 12373, 12377, 12379, 12391, 12401, 12409, 12413, 12421, 12433, 12437, |
259 | 12451, 12457, 12473, 12479, 12487, 12491, 12497, 12503, 12511, 12517, 12527, |
260 | 12539, 12541, 12547, 12553, 12569, 12577, 12583, 12589, 12601, 12611, 12613, |
261 | 12619, 12637, 12641, 12647, 12653, 12659, 12671, 12689, 12697, 12703, 12713, |
262 | 12721, 12739, 12743, 12757, 12763, 12781, 12791, 12799, 12809, 12821, 12823, |
263 | 12829, 12841, 12853, 12889, 12893, 12899, 12907, 12911, 12917, 12919, 12923, |
264 | 12941, 12953, 12959, 12967, 12973, 12979, 12983, 13001, 13003, 13007, 13009, |
265 | 13033, 13037, 13043, 13049, 13063, 13093, 13099, 13103, 13109, 13121, 13127, |
266 | 13147, 13151, 13159, 13163, 13171, 13177, 13183, 13187, 13217, 13219, 13229, |
267 | 13241, 13249, 13259, 13267, 13291, 13297, 13309, 13313, 13327, 13331, 13337, |
268 | 13339, 13367, 13381, 13397, 13399, 13411, 13417, 13421, 13441, 13451, 13457, |
269 | 13463, 13469, 13477, 13487, 13499, 13513, 13523, 13537, 13553, 13567, 13577, |
270 | 13591, 13597, 13613, 13619, 13627, 13633, 13649, 13669, 13679, 13681, 13687, |
271 | 13691, 13693, 13697, 13709, 13711, 13721, 13723, 13729, 13751, 13757, 13759, |
272 | 13763, 13781, 13789, 13799, 13807, 13829, 13831, 13841, 13859, 13873, 13877, |
273 | 13879, 13883, 13901, 13903, 13907, 13913, 13921, 13931, 13933, 13963, 13967, |
274 | 13997, 13999, 14009, 14011, 14029, 14033, 14051, 14057, 14071, 14081, 14083, |
275 | 14087, 14107, 14143, 14149, 14153, 14159, 14173, 14177, 14197, 14207, 14221, |
276 | 14243, 14249, 14251, 14281, 14293, 14303, 14321, 14323, 14327, 14341, 14347, |
277 | 14369, 14387, 14389, 14401, 14407, 14411, 14419, 14423, 14431, 14437, 14447, |
278 | 14449, 14461, 14479, 14489, 14503, 14519, 14533, 14537, 14543, 14549, 14551, |
279 | 14557, 14561, 14563, 14591, 14593, 14621, 14627, 14629, 14633, 14639, 14653, |
280 | 14657, 14669, 14683, 14699, 14713, 14717, 14723, 14731, 14737, 14741, 14747, |
281 | 14753, 14759, 14767, 14771, 14779, 14783, 14797, 14813, 14821, 14827, 14831, |
282 | 14843, 14851, 14867, 14869, 14879, 14887, 14891, 14897, 14923, 14929, 14939, |
283 | 14947, 14951, 14957, 14969, 14983, 15013, 15017, 15031, 15053, 15061, 15073, |
284 | 15077, 15083, 15091, 15101, 15107, 15121, 15131, 15137, 15139, 15149, 15161, |
285 | 15173, 15187, 15193, 15199, 15217, 15227, 15233, 15241, 15259, 15263, 15269, |
286 | 15271, 15277, 15287, 15289, 15299, 15307, 15313, 15319, 15329, 15331, 15349, |
287 | 15359, 15361, 15373, 15377, 15383, 15391, 15401, 15413, 15427, 15439, 15443, |
288 | 15451, 15461, 15467, 15473, 15493, 15497, 15511, 15527, 15541, 15551, 15559, |
289 | 15569, 15581, 15583, 15601, 15607, 15619, 15629, 15641, 15643, 15647, 15649, |
290 | 15661, 15667, 15671, 15679, 15683, 15727, 15731, 15733, 15737, 15739, 15749, |
291 | 15761, 15767, 15773, 15787, 15791, 15797, 15803, 15809, 15817, 15823, 15859, |
292 | 15877, 15881, 15887, 15889, 15901, 15907, 15913, 15919, 15923, 15937, 15959, |
293 | 15971, 15973, 15991, 16001, 16007, 16033, 16057, 16061, 16063, 16067, 16069, |
294 | 16073, 16087, 16091, 16097, 16103, 16111, 16127, 16139, 16141, 16183, 16187, |
295 | 16189, 16193, 16217, 16223, 16229, 16231, 16249, 16253, 16267, 16273, 16301, |
296 | 16319, 16333, 16339, 16349, 16361, 16363, 16369, 16381, 16411, 16417, 16421, |
297 | 16427, 16433, 16447, 16451, 16453, 16477, 16481, 16487, 16493, 16519, 16529, |
298 | 16547, 16553, 16561, 16567, 16573, 16603, 16607, 16619, 16631, 16633, 16649, |
299 | 16651, 16657, 16661, 16673, 16691, 16693, 16699, 16703, 16729, 16741, 16747, |
300 | 16759, 16763, 16787, 16811, 16823, 16829, 16831, 16843, 16871, 16879, 16883, |
301 | 16889, 16901, 16903, 16921, 16927, 16931, 16937, 16943, 16963, 16979, 16981, |
302 | 16987, 16993, 17011, 17021, 17027, 17029, 17033, 17041, 17047, 17053, 17077, |
303 | 17093, 17099, 17107, 17117, 17123, 17137, 17159, 17167, 17183, 17189, 17191, |
304 | 17203, 17207, 17209, 17231, 17239, 17257, 17291, 17293, 17299, 17317, 17321, |
305 | 17327, 17333, 17341, 17351, 17359, 17377, 17383, 17387, 17389, 17393, 17401, |
306 | 17417, 17419, 17431, 17443, 17449, 17467, 17471, 17477, 17483, 17489, 17491, |
307 | 17497, 17509, 17519, 17539, 17551, 17569, 17573, 17579, 17581, 17597, 17599, |
308 | 17609, 17623, 17627, 17657, 17659, 17669, 17681, 17683, 17707, 17713, 17729, |
309 | 17737, 17747, 17749, 17761, 17783, 17789, 17791, 17807, 17827, 17837, 17839, |
310 | 17851, 17863, |
311 | }; |
312 | |
313 | // BN_prime_checks_for_size returns the number of Miller-Rabin iterations |
314 | // necessary for a 'bits'-bit prime. |
315 | // |
316 | // |
317 | // This table is generated using the algorithm of FIPS PUB 186-4 |
318 | // Digital Signature Standard (DSS), section F.1, page 117. |
319 | // (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4) |
320 | // The following magma script was used to generate the output: |
321 | // securitybits:=125; |
322 | // k:=1024; |
323 | // for t:=1 to 65 do |
324 | // for M:=3 to Floor(2*Sqrt(k-1)-1) do |
325 | // S:=0; |
326 | // // Sum over m |
327 | // for m:=3 to M do |
328 | // s:=0; |
329 | // // Sum over j |
330 | // for j:=2 to m do |
331 | // s+:=(RealField(32)!2)^-(j+(k-1)/j); |
332 | // end for; |
333 | // S+:=2^(m-(m-1)*t)*s; |
334 | // end for; |
335 | // A:=2^(k-2-M*t); |
336 | // B:=8*(Pi(RealField(32))^2-6)/3*2^(k-2)*S; |
337 | // pkt:=2.00743*Log(2)*k*2^-k*(A+B); |
338 | // seclevel:=Floor(-Log(2,pkt)); |
339 | // if seclevel ge securitybits then |
340 | // printf "k: %5o, security: %o bits (t: %o, M: %o)\n",k,seclevel,t,M; |
341 | // break; |
342 | // end if; |
343 | // end for; |
344 | // if seclevel ge securitybits then break; end if; |
345 | // end for; |
346 | // |
347 | // It can be run online at: http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/calc |
348 | // And will output: |
349 | // k: 1024, security: 129 bits (t: 6, M: 23) |
350 | // k is the number of bits of the prime, securitybits is the level we want to |
351 | // reach. |
352 | // prime length | RSA key size | # MR tests | security level |
353 | // -------------+--------------|------------+--------------- |
354 | // (b) >= 6394 | >= 12788 | 3 | 256 bit |
355 | // (b) >= 3747 | >= 7494 | 3 | 192 bit |
356 | // (b) >= 1345 | >= 2690 | 4 | 128 bit |
357 | // (b) >= 1080 | >= 2160 | 5 | 128 bit |
358 | // (b) >= 852 | >= 1704 | 5 | 112 bit |
359 | // (b) >= 476 | >= 952 | 5 | 80 bit |
360 | // (b) >= 400 | >= 800 | 6 | 80 bit |
361 | // (b) >= 347 | >= 694 | 7 | 80 bit |
362 | // (b) >= 308 | >= 616 | 8 | 80 bit |
363 | // (b) >= 55 | >= 110 | 27 | 64 bit |
364 | // (b) >= 6 | >= 12 | 34 | 64 bit |
365 | static int BN_prime_checks_for_size(int bits) { |
366 | if (bits >= 3747) { |
367 | return 3; |
368 | } |
369 | if (bits >= 1345) { |
370 | return 4; |
371 | } |
372 | if (bits >= 476) { |
373 | return 5; |
374 | } |
375 | if (bits >= 400) { |
376 | return 6; |
377 | } |
378 | if (bits >= 347) { |
379 | return 7; |
380 | } |
381 | if (bits >= 308) { |
382 | return 8; |
383 | } |
384 | if (bits >= 55) { |
385 | return 27; |
386 | } |
387 | return 34; |
388 | } |
389 | |
390 | // num_trial_division_primes returns the number of primes to try with trial |
391 | // division before using more expensive checks. For larger numbers, the value |
392 | // of excluding a candidate with trial division is larger. |
393 | static size_t num_trial_division_primes(const BIGNUM *n) { |
394 | if (n->width * BN_BITS2 > 1024) { |
395 | return OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kPrimes); |
396 | } |
397 | return OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kPrimes) / 4; |
398 | } |
399 | |
400 | // BN_PRIME_CHECKS_BLINDED is the iteration count for blinding the constant-time |
401 | // primality test. See |BN_primality_test| for details. This number is selected |
402 | // so that, for a candidate N-bit RSA prime, picking |BN_PRIME_CHECKS_BLINDED| |
403 | // random N-bit numbers will have at least |BN_prime_checks_for_size(N)| values |
404 | // in range with high probability. |
405 | // |
406 | // The following Python script computes the blinding factor needed for the |
407 | // corresponding iteration count. |
408 | /* |
409 | import math |
410 | |
411 | # We choose candidate RSA primes between sqrt(2)/2 * 2^N and 2^N and select |
412 | # witnesses by generating random N-bit numbers. Thus the probability of |
413 | # selecting one in range is at least sqrt(2)/2. |
414 | p = math.sqrt(2) / 2 |
415 | |
416 | # Target around 2^-8 probability of the blinding being insufficient given that |
417 | # key generation is a one-time, noisy operation. |
418 | epsilon = 2**-8 |
419 | |
420 | def choose(a, b): |
421 | r = 1 |
422 | for i in xrange(b): |
423 | r *= a - i |
424 | r /= (i + 1) |
425 | return r |
426 | |
427 | def failure_rate(min_uniform, iterations): |
428 | """ Returns the probability that, for |iterations| candidate witnesses, fewer |
429 | than |min_uniform| of them will be uniform. """ |
430 | prob = 0.0 |
431 | for i in xrange(min_uniform): |
432 | prob += (choose(iterations, i) * |
433 | p**i * (1-p)**(iterations - i)) |
434 | return prob |
435 | |
436 | for min_uniform in (3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 19, 28): |
437 | # Find the smallest number of iterations under the target failure rate. |
438 | iterations = min_uniform |
439 | while True: |
440 | prob = failure_rate(min_uniform, iterations) |
441 | if prob < epsilon: |
442 | print min_uniform, iterations, prob |
443 | break |
444 | iterations += 1 |
445 | |
446 | Output: |
447 | 3 9 0.00368894873911 |
448 | 4 11 0.00363319494662 |
449 | 5 13 0.00336215573898 |
450 | 6 15 0.00300145783158 |
451 | 8 19 0.00225214119331 |
452 | 13 27 0.00385610026955 |
453 | 19 38 0.0021410539126 |
454 | 28 52 0.00325405801769 |
455 | |
456 | 16 iterations suffices for 400-bit primes and larger (6 uniform samples needed), |
457 | which is already well below the minimum acceptable key size for RSA. |
458 | */ |
459 | #define BN_PRIME_CHECKS_BLINDED 16 |
460 | |
461 | static int probable_prime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits); |
462 | static int probable_prime_dh(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, const BIGNUM *add, |
463 | const BIGNUM *rem, BN_CTX *ctx); |
464 | static int probable_prime_dh_safe(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, const BIGNUM *add, |
465 | const BIGNUM *rem, BN_CTX *ctx); |
466 | |
467 | void BN_GENCB_set(BN_GENCB *callback, |
468 | int (*f)(int event, int n, struct bn_gencb_st *), |
469 | void *arg) { |
470 | callback->callback = f; |
471 | callback->arg = arg; |
472 | } |
473 | |
474 | int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *callback, int event, int n) { |
475 | if (!callback) { |
476 | return 1; |
477 | } |
478 | |
479 | return callback->callback(event, n, callback); |
480 | } |
481 | |
482 | int BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add, |
483 | const BIGNUM *rem, BN_GENCB *cb) { |
484 | BIGNUM *t; |
485 | int found = 0; |
486 | int i, j, c1 = 0; |
487 | BN_CTX *ctx; |
488 | int checks = BN_prime_checks_for_size(bits); |
489 | |
490 | if (bits < 2) { |
491 | // There are no prime numbers this small. |
492 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL); |
493 | return 0; |
494 | } else if (bits == 2 && safe) { |
495 | // The smallest safe prime (7) is three bits. |
496 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL); |
497 | return 0; |
498 | } |
499 | |
500 | ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
501 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
502 | goto err; |
503 | } |
504 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
505 | t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
506 | if (!t) { |
507 | goto err; |
508 | } |
509 | |
510 | loop: |
511 | // make a random number and set the top and bottom bits |
512 | if (add == NULL) { |
513 | if (!probable_prime(ret, bits)) { |
514 | goto err; |
515 | } |
516 | } else { |
517 | if (safe) { |
518 | if (!probable_prime_dh_safe(ret, bits, add, rem, ctx)) { |
519 | goto err; |
520 | } |
521 | } else { |
522 | if (!probable_prime_dh(ret, bits, add, rem, ctx)) { |
523 | goto err; |
524 | } |
525 | } |
526 | } |
527 | |
528 | if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, BN_GENCB_GENERATED, c1++)) { |
529 | // aborted |
530 | goto err; |
531 | } |
532 | |
533 | if (!safe) { |
534 | i = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(ret, checks, ctx, 0, cb); |
535 | if (i == -1) { |
536 | goto err; |
537 | } else if (i == 0) { |
538 | goto loop; |
539 | } |
540 | } else { |
541 | // for "safe prime" generation, check that (p-1)/2 is prime. Since a prime |
542 | // is odd, We just need to divide by 2 |
543 | if (!BN_rshift1(t, ret)) { |
544 | goto err; |
545 | } |
546 | |
547 | for (i = 0; i < checks; i++) { |
548 | j = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(ret, 1, ctx, 0, NULL); |
549 | if (j == -1) { |
550 | goto err; |
551 | } else if (j == 0) { |
552 | goto loop; |
553 | } |
554 | |
555 | j = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(t, 1, ctx, 0, NULL); |
556 | if (j == -1) { |
557 | goto err; |
558 | } else if (j == 0) { |
559 | goto loop; |
560 | } |
561 | |
562 | if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, i, c1 - 1)) { |
563 | goto err; |
564 | } |
565 | // We have a safe prime test pass |
566 | } |
567 | } |
568 | |
569 | // we have a prime :-) |
570 | found = 1; |
571 | |
572 | err: |
573 | if (ctx != NULL) { |
574 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
575 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
576 | } |
577 | |
578 | return found; |
579 | } |
580 | |
581 | static int bn_trial_division(uint16_t *out, const BIGNUM *bn) { |
582 | const size_t num_primes = num_trial_division_primes(bn); |
583 | for (size_t i = 1; i < num_primes; i++) { |
584 | if (bn_mod_u16_consttime(bn, kPrimes[i]) == 0) { |
585 | *out = kPrimes[i]; |
586 | return 1; |
587 | } |
588 | } |
589 | return 0; |
590 | } |
591 | |
592 | int bn_odd_number_is_obviously_composite(const BIGNUM *bn) { |
593 | uint16_t prime; |
594 | return bn_trial_division(&prime, bn) && !BN_is_word(bn, prime); |
595 | } |
596 | |
597 | int BN_primality_test(int *is_probably_prime, const BIGNUM *w, |
598 | int iterations, BN_CTX *ctx, int do_trial_division, |
599 | BN_GENCB *cb) { |
600 | *is_probably_prime = 0; |
601 | |
602 | // To support RSA key generation, this function should treat |w| as secret if |
603 | // it is a large prime. Composite numbers are discarded, so they may return |
604 | // early. |
605 | |
606 | if (BN_cmp(w, BN_value_one()) <= 0) { |
607 | return 1; |
608 | } |
609 | |
610 | if (!BN_is_odd(w)) { |
611 | // The only even prime is two. |
612 | *is_probably_prime = BN_is_word(w, 2); |
613 | return 1; |
614 | } |
615 | |
616 | // Miller-Rabin does not work for three. |
617 | if (BN_is_word(w, 3)) { |
618 | *is_probably_prime = 1; |
619 | return 1; |
620 | } |
621 | |
622 | if (do_trial_division) { |
623 | // Perform additional trial division checks to discard small primes. |
624 | uint16_t prime; |
625 | if (bn_trial_division(&prime, w)) { |
626 | *is_probably_prime = BN_is_word(w, prime); |
627 | return 1; |
628 | } |
629 | if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, -1)) { |
630 | return 0; |
631 | } |
632 | } |
633 | |
634 | if (iterations == BN_prime_checks) { |
635 | iterations = BN_prime_checks_for_size(BN_num_bits(w)); |
636 | } |
637 | |
638 | BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; |
639 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
640 | new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
641 | if (new_ctx == NULL) { |
642 | return 0; |
643 | } |
644 | ctx = new_ctx; |
645 | } |
646 | |
647 | // See C.3.1 from FIPS 186-4. |
648 | int ret = 0; |
649 | BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; |
650 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
651 | BIGNUM *w1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
652 | if (w1 == NULL || |
653 | !bn_usub_consttime(w1, w, BN_value_one())) { |
654 | goto err; |
655 | } |
656 | |
657 | // Write w1 as m * 2^a (Steps 1 and 2). |
658 | int w_len = BN_num_bits(w); |
659 | int a = BN_count_low_zero_bits(w1); |
660 | BIGNUM *m = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
661 | if (m == NULL || |
662 | !bn_rshift_secret_shift(m, w1, a, ctx)) { |
663 | goto err; |
664 | } |
665 | |
666 | // Montgomery setup for computations mod w. Additionally, compute 1 and w - 1 |
667 | // in the Montgomery domain for later comparisons. |
668 | BIGNUM *b = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
669 | BIGNUM *z = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
670 | BIGNUM *one_mont = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
671 | BIGNUM *w1_mont = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
672 | mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new_consttime(w, ctx); |
673 | if (b == NULL || z == NULL || one_mont == NULL || w1_mont == NULL || |
674 | mont == NULL || |
675 | !bn_one_to_montgomery(one_mont, mont, ctx) || |
676 | // w - 1 is -1 mod w, so we can compute it in the Montgomery domain, -R, |
677 | // with a subtraction. (|one_mont| cannot be zero.) |
678 | !bn_usub_consttime(w1_mont, w, one_mont)) { |
679 | goto err; |
680 | } |
681 | |
682 | // The following loop performs in inner iteration of the Miller-Rabin |
683 | // Primality test (Step 4). |
684 | // |
685 | // The algorithm as specified in FIPS 186-4 leaks information on |w|, the RSA |
686 | // private key. Instead, we run through each iteration unconditionally, |
687 | // performing modular multiplications, masking off any effects to behave |
688 | // equivalently to the specified algorithm. |
689 | // |
690 | // We also blind the number of values of |b| we try. Steps 4.1–4.2 say to |
691 | // discard out-of-range values. To avoid leaking information on |w|, we use |
692 | // |bn_rand_secret_range| which, rather than discarding bad values, adjusts |
693 | // them to be in range. Though not uniformly selected, these adjusted values |
694 | // are still usable as Rabin-Miller checks. |
695 | // |
696 | // Rabin-Miller is already probabilistic, so we could reach the desired |
697 | // confidence levels by just suitably increasing the iteration count. However, |
698 | // to align with FIPS 186-4, we use a more pessimal analysis: we do not count |
699 | // the non-uniform values towards the iteration count. As a result, this |
700 | // function is more complex and has more timing risk than necessary. |
701 | // |
702 | // We count both total iterations and uniform ones and iterate until we've |
703 | // reached at least |BN_PRIME_CHECKS_BLINDED| and |iterations|, respectively. |
704 | // If the latter is large enough, it will be the limiting factor with high |
705 | // probability and we won't leak information. |
706 | // |
707 | // Note this blinding does not impact most calls when picking primes because |
708 | // composites are rejected early. Only the two secret primes see extra work. |
709 | |
710 | crypto_word_t uniform_iterations = 0; |
711 | // Using |constant_time_lt_w| seems to prevent the compiler from optimizing |
712 | // this into two jumps. |
713 | for (int i = 1; (i <= BN_PRIME_CHECKS_BLINDED) | |
714 | constant_time_lt_w(uniform_iterations, iterations); |
715 | i++) { |
716 | int is_uniform; |
717 | if (// Step 4.1-4.2 |
718 | !bn_rand_secret_range(b, &is_uniform, 2, w1) || |
719 | // Step 4.3 |
720 | !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(z, b, m, w, ctx, mont)) { |
721 | goto err; |
722 | } |
723 | uniform_iterations += is_uniform; |
724 | |
725 | // loop_done is all ones if the loop has completed and all zeros otherwise. |
726 | crypto_word_t loop_done = 0; |
727 | // next_iteration is all ones if we should continue to the next iteration |
728 | // (|b| is not a composite witness for |w|). This is equivalent to going to |
729 | // step 4.7 in the original algorithm. |
730 | crypto_word_t next_iteration = 0; |
731 | |
732 | // Step 4.4. If z = 1 or z = w-1, mask off the loop and continue to the next |
733 | // iteration (go to step 4.7). |
734 | loop_done = BN_equal_consttime(z, BN_value_one()) | |
735 | BN_equal_consttime(z, w1); |
736 | loop_done = 0 - loop_done; // Make it all zeros or all ones. |
737 | next_iteration = loop_done; // Go to step 4.7 if |loop_done|. |
738 | |
739 | // Step 4.5. We use Montgomery-encoding for better performance and to avoid |
740 | // timing leaks. |
741 | if (!BN_to_montgomery(z, z, mont, ctx)) { |
742 | goto err; |
743 | } |
744 | |
745 | // To avoid leaking |a|, we run the loop to |w_len| and mask off all |
746 | // iterations once |j| = |a|. |
747 | for (int j = 1; j < w_len; j++) { |
748 | loop_done |= constant_time_eq_int(j, a); |
749 | |
750 | // Step 4.5.1. |
751 | if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(z, z, z, mont, ctx)) { |
752 | goto err; |
753 | } |
754 | |
755 | // Step 4.5.2. If z = w-1 and the loop is not done, run through the next |
756 | // iteration. |
757 | crypto_word_t z_is_w1_mont = BN_equal_consttime(z, w1_mont) & ~loop_done; |
758 | z_is_w1_mont = 0 - z_is_w1_mont; // Make it all zeros or all ones. |
759 | loop_done |= z_is_w1_mont; |
760 | next_iteration |= z_is_w1_mont; // Go to step 4.7 if |z_is_w1_mont|. |
761 | |
762 | // Step 4.5.3. If z = 1 and the loop is not done, w is composite and we |
763 | // may exit in variable time. |
764 | if (BN_equal_consttime(z, one_mont) & ~loop_done) { |
765 | assert(!next_iteration); |
766 | break; |
767 | } |
768 | } |
769 | |
770 | if (!next_iteration) { |
771 | // Step 4.6. We did not see z = w-1 before z = 1, so w must be composite. |
772 | // (For any prime, the value of z immediately preceding 1 must be -1. |
773 | // There are no non-trivial square roots of 1 modulo a prime.) |
774 | *is_probably_prime = 0; |
775 | ret = 1; |
776 | goto err; |
777 | } |
778 | |
779 | // Step 4.7 |
780 | if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, i)) { |
781 | goto err; |
782 | } |
783 | } |
784 | |
785 | assert(uniform_iterations >= (crypto_word_t)iterations); |
786 | *is_probably_prime = 1; |
787 | ret = 1; |
788 | |
789 | err: |
790 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); |
791 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
792 | BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); |
793 | return ret; |
794 | } |
795 | |
796 | int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *candidate, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx, |
797 | BN_GENCB *cb) { |
798 | return BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(candidate, checks, ctx, 0, cb); |
799 | } |
800 | |
801 | int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx, |
802 | int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb) { |
803 | int is_probably_prime; |
804 | if (!BN_primality_test(&is_probably_prime, a, checks, ctx, do_trial_division, |
805 | cb)) { |
806 | return -1; |
807 | } |
808 | return is_probably_prime; |
809 | } |
810 | |
811 | int BN_enhanced_miller_rabin_primality_test( |
812 | enum bn_primality_result_t *out_result, const BIGNUM *w, int iterations, |
813 | BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) { |
814 | // Enhanced Miller-Rabin is only valid on odd integers greater than 3. |
815 | if (!BN_is_odd(w) || BN_cmp_word(w, 3) <= 0) { |
816 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_INVALID_INPUT); |
817 | return 0; |
818 | } |
819 | |
820 | if (iterations == BN_prime_checks) { |
821 | iterations = BN_prime_checks_for_size(BN_num_bits(w)); |
822 | } |
823 | |
824 | int ret = 0; |
825 | BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; |
826 | |
827 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
828 | |
829 | BIGNUM *w1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
830 | if (w1 == NULL || |
831 | !BN_copy(w1, w) || |
832 | !BN_sub_word(w1, 1)) { |
833 | goto err; |
834 | } |
835 | |
836 | // Write w1 as m*2^a (Steps 1 and 2). |
837 | int a = 0; |
838 | while (!BN_is_bit_set(w1, a)) { |
839 | a++; |
840 | } |
841 | BIGNUM *m = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
842 | if (m == NULL || |
843 | !BN_rshift(m, w1, a)) { |
844 | goto err; |
845 | } |
846 | |
847 | BIGNUM *b = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
848 | BIGNUM *g = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
849 | BIGNUM *z = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
850 | BIGNUM *x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
851 | BIGNUM *x1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
852 | if (b == NULL || |
853 | g == NULL || |
854 | z == NULL || |
855 | x == NULL || |
856 | x1 == NULL) { |
857 | goto err; |
858 | } |
859 | |
860 | // Montgomery setup for computations mod w |
861 | mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new_for_modulus(w, ctx); |
862 | if (mont == NULL) { |
863 | goto err; |
864 | } |
865 | |
866 | // The following loop performs in inner iteration of the Enhanced Miller-Rabin |
867 | // Primality test (Step 4). |
868 | for (int i = 1; i <= iterations; i++) { |
869 | // Step 4.1-4.2 |
870 | if (!BN_rand_range_ex(b, 2, w1)) { |
871 | goto err; |
872 | } |
873 | |
874 | // Step 4.3-4.4 |
875 | if (!BN_gcd(g, b, w, ctx)) { |
876 | goto err; |
877 | } |
878 | if (BN_cmp_word(g, 1) > 0) { |
879 | *out_result = bn_composite; |
880 | ret = 1; |
881 | goto err; |
882 | } |
883 | |
884 | // Step 4.5 |
885 | if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(z, b, m, w, ctx, mont)) { |
886 | goto err; |
887 | } |
888 | |
889 | // Step 4.6 |
890 | if (BN_is_one(z) || BN_cmp(z, w1) == 0) { |
891 | goto loop; |
892 | } |
893 | |
894 | // Step 4.7 |
895 | for (int j = 1; j < a; j++) { |
896 | if (!BN_copy(x, z) || !BN_mod_mul(z, x, x, w, ctx)) { |
897 | goto err; |
898 | } |
899 | if (BN_cmp(z, w1) == 0) { |
900 | goto loop; |
901 | } |
902 | if (BN_is_one(z)) { |
903 | goto composite; |
904 | } |
905 | } |
906 | |
907 | // Step 4.8-4.9 |
908 | if (!BN_copy(x, z) || !BN_mod_mul(z, x, x, w, ctx)) { |
909 | goto err; |
910 | } |
911 | |
912 | // Step 4.10-4.11 |
913 | if (!BN_is_one(z) && !BN_copy(x, z)) { |
914 | goto err; |
915 | } |
916 | |
917 | composite: |
918 | // Step 4.12-4.14 |
919 | if (!BN_copy(x1, x) || |
920 | !BN_sub_word(x1, 1) || |
921 | !BN_gcd(g, x1, w, ctx)) { |
922 | goto err; |
923 | } |
924 | if (BN_cmp_word(g, 1) > 0) { |
925 | *out_result = bn_composite; |
926 | } else { |
927 | *out_result = bn_non_prime_power_composite; |
928 | } |
929 | |
930 | ret = 1; |
931 | goto err; |
932 | |
933 | loop: |
934 | // Step 4.15 |
935 | if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, i)) { |
936 | goto err; |
937 | } |
938 | } |
939 | |
940 | *out_result = bn_probably_prime; |
941 | ret = 1; |
942 | |
943 | err: |
944 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); |
945 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
946 | |
947 | return ret; |
948 | } |
949 | |
950 | static int probable_prime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits) { |
951 | uint16_t mods[OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kPrimes)]; |
952 | const size_t num_primes = num_trial_division_primes(rnd); |
953 | BN_ULONG delta; |
954 | BN_ULONG maxdelta = BN_MASK2 - kPrimes[num_primes - 1]; |
955 | char is_single_word = bits <= BN_BITS2; |
956 | |
957 | again: |
958 | if (!BN_rand(rnd, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_TWO, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD)) { |
959 | return 0; |
960 | } |
961 | |
962 | // we now have a random number 'rnd' to test. |
963 | for (size_t i = 1; i < num_primes; i++) { |
964 | mods[i] = bn_mod_u16_consttime(rnd, kPrimes[i]); |
965 | } |
966 | // If bits is so small that it fits into a single word then we |
967 | // additionally don't want to exceed that many bits. |
968 | if (is_single_word) { |
969 | BN_ULONG size_limit; |
970 | if (bits == BN_BITS2) { |
971 | // Avoid undefined behavior. |
972 | size_limit = ~((BN_ULONG)0) - BN_get_word(rnd); |
973 | } else { |
974 | size_limit = (((BN_ULONG)1) << bits) - BN_get_word(rnd) - 1; |
975 | } |
976 | if (size_limit < maxdelta) { |
977 | maxdelta = size_limit; |
978 | } |
979 | } |
980 | delta = 0; |
981 | |
982 | loop: |
983 | if (is_single_word) { |
984 | BN_ULONG rnd_word = BN_get_word(rnd); |
985 | |
986 | // In the case that the candidate prime is a single word then |
987 | // we check that: |
988 | // 1) It's greater than kPrimes[i] because we shouldn't reject |
989 | // 3 as being a prime number because it's a multiple of |
990 | // three. |
991 | // 2) That it's not a multiple of a known prime. We don't |
992 | // check that rnd-1 is also coprime to all the known |
993 | // primes because there aren't many small primes where |
994 | // that's true. |
995 | for (size_t i = 1; i < num_primes && kPrimes[i] < rnd_word; i++) { |
996 | if ((mods[i] + delta) % kPrimes[i] == 0) { |
997 | delta += 2; |
998 | if (delta > maxdelta) { |
999 | goto again; |
1000 | } |
1001 | goto loop; |
1002 | } |
1003 | } |
1004 | } else { |
1005 | for (size_t i = 1; i < num_primes; i++) { |
1006 | // check that rnd is not a prime and also |
1007 | // that gcd(rnd-1,primes) == 1 (except for 2) |
1008 | if (((mods[i] + delta) % kPrimes[i]) <= 1) { |
1009 | delta += 2; |
1010 | if (delta > maxdelta) { |
1011 | goto again; |
1012 | } |
1013 | goto loop; |
1014 | } |
1015 | } |
1016 | } |
1017 | |
1018 | if (!BN_add_word(rnd, delta)) { |
1019 | return 0; |
1020 | } |
1021 | if (BN_num_bits(rnd) != (unsigned)bits) { |
1022 | goto again; |
1023 | } |
1024 | |
1025 | return 1; |
1026 | } |
1027 | |
1028 | static int probable_prime_dh(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, const BIGNUM *add, |
1029 | const BIGNUM *rem, BN_CTX *ctx) { |
1030 | int ret = 0; |
1031 | BIGNUM *t1; |
1032 | |
1033 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
1034 | if ((t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) { |
1035 | goto err; |
1036 | } |
1037 | |
1038 | if (!BN_rand(rnd, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD)) { |
1039 | goto err; |
1040 | } |
1041 | |
1042 | // we need ((rnd-rem) % add) == 0 |
1043 | |
1044 | if (!BN_mod(t1, rnd, add, ctx)) { |
1045 | goto err; |
1046 | } |
1047 | if (!BN_sub(rnd, rnd, t1)) { |
1048 | goto err; |
1049 | } |
1050 | if (rem == NULL) { |
1051 | if (!BN_add_word(rnd, 1)) { |
1052 | goto err; |
1053 | } |
1054 | } else { |
1055 | if (!BN_add(rnd, rnd, rem)) { |
1056 | goto err; |
1057 | } |
1058 | } |
1059 | // we now have a random number 'rand' to test. |
1060 | |
1061 | const size_t num_primes = num_trial_division_primes(rnd); |
1062 | loop: |
1063 | for (size_t i = 1; i < num_primes; i++) { |
1064 | // check that rnd is a prime |
1065 | if (bn_mod_u16_consttime(rnd, kPrimes[i]) <= 1) { |
1066 | if (!BN_add(rnd, rnd, add)) { |
1067 | goto err; |
1068 | } |
1069 | goto loop; |
1070 | } |
1071 | } |
1072 | |
1073 | ret = 1; |
1074 | |
1075 | err: |
1076 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
1077 | return ret; |
1078 | } |
1079 | |
1080 | static int probable_prime_dh_safe(BIGNUM *p, int bits, const BIGNUM *padd, |
1081 | const BIGNUM *rem, BN_CTX *ctx) { |
1082 | int ret = 0; |
1083 | BIGNUM *t1, *qadd, *q; |
1084 | |
1085 | bits--; |
1086 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
1087 | t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
1088 | q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
1089 | qadd = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
1090 | if (qadd == NULL) { |
1091 | goto err; |
1092 | } |
1093 | |
1094 | if (!BN_rshift1(qadd, padd)) { |
1095 | goto err; |
1096 | } |
1097 | |
1098 | if (!BN_rand(q, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD)) { |
1099 | goto err; |
1100 | } |
1101 | |
1102 | // we need ((rnd-rem) % add) == 0 |
1103 | if (!BN_mod(t1, q, qadd, ctx)) { |
1104 | goto err; |
1105 | } |
1106 | |
1107 | if (!BN_sub(q, q, t1)) { |
1108 | goto err; |
1109 | } |
1110 | |
1111 | if (rem == NULL) { |
1112 | if (!BN_add_word(q, 1)) { |
1113 | goto err; |
1114 | } |
1115 | } else { |
1116 | if (!BN_rshift1(t1, rem)) { |
1117 | goto err; |
1118 | } |
1119 | if (!BN_add(q, q, t1)) { |
1120 | goto err; |
1121 | } |
1122 | } |
1123 | |
1124 | // we now have a random number 'rand' to test. |
1125 | if (!BN_lshift1(p, q)) { |
1126 | goto err; |
1127 | } |
1128 | if (!BN_add_word(p, 1)) { |
1129 | goto err; |
1130 | } |
1131 | |
1132 | const size_t num_primes = num_trial_division_primes(p); |
1133 | loop: |
1134 | for (size_t i = 1; i < num_primes; i++) { |
1135 | // check that p and q are prime |
1136 | // check that for p and q |
1137 | // gcd(p-1,primes) == 1 (except for 2) |
1138 | if (bn_mod_u16_consttime(p, kPrimes[i]) == 0 || |
1139 | bn_mod_u16_consttime(q, kPrimes[i]) == 0) { |
1140 | if (!BN_add(p, p, padd)) { |
1141 | goto err; |
1142 | } |
1143 | if (!BN_add(q, q, qadd)) { |
1144 | goto err; |
1145 | } |
1146 | goto loop; |
1147 | } |
1148 | } |
1149 | |
1150 | ret = 1; |
1151 | |
1152 | err: |
1153 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
1154 | return ret; |
1155 | } |
1156 | |